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ABSTRACT 
Controlling and Organizing the Network Structure 
of Korean Business Groups, 1997-2003 
Ho-Dae Chong 
 
This thesis examines organizing and controlling mechanisms within the network structure 
of Korean business groups, chaebols, for the family-based corporate ownership and 
control under environmental uncertainty. Research focuses on the groups’ changing 
patterns of inter-firm network structures, the maneuvering strategy by utilizing relational 
configurations of business groups for the family members’ robust control, and the effect 
of network structure on the corporate performance of affiliated firms. Considering the 
financial crisis of 1997 in South Korea and the aftermath of this crisis as a natural 
experiment, social network analysis is used for analyzing each of the 178 cases for 28 
chaebols during 1997 to 2003. Although retaining a centralized, hierarchical form of 
group structure with the tau statistic, the overall inter-firm configurations of each 
business group, as result of concrete but simplified images of network configurations by 
blockmodel analysis and the comparison of them with idealized models by simple 
matching analysis, show the existence of variations within a monolithic form in 
synchronic comparison and the changing trend to be a less centralized, hierarchical form 
along with stable transitive patterns in diachronic comparison. Family-based corporate 
control, by strategically intertwining affiliated people as vicarious agents to carry out the 
interests of family members and sending these combinatorial equity ties to a few major 
firms occupying core positions, is guaranteed without losing its substantial controlling 
power. It is argued that, borrowing from Bourdieu’s “condescension strategy,” this 
strategically contrived control is a proactive and reactive strategy in response to 
environmental pressure even though this strategy is effective in certain intercorporate 
conditions. The estimated influence of inter-firm network structure on the corporate 
performance of affiliated firms is minimal in multilevel analysis. In contrast, affiliated 
firms having direct connections with family members show relatively better corporate 
performance than those that do not have these connections. The implication of this result 
is that the network structure of chaebols tend to be shaped, maintained, and reorganized 
for family-based, effective, overarching corporate control at the business group level 
rather than for efficient corporate performance of affiliated firms at the firm level. Finally, 
this thesis suggests that corporate control and corporate gain do not always go hand in 
hand, and economic practices need to be understood by the simultaneous consideration of 
pecuniary and not necessarily pecuniary but still related interests, such as control and 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
How organizations adapt to changing institutional environments and how they react to 
environmental uncertainty have been consistent research topics in the field of 
organization theory and economic sociology (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Fligstein 
1987; Granovetter 1985; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Williamson 1994). In addition, 
understanding and explaining family-based ownership and control in large corporations 
in modern capitalist society has been one of the primary areas of interest (Bertrand and 
Schoar 2006; La Porta et al. 1999; Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung 2005; Orru, Biggart, 
and Hamilton 1997; Zeitlin 1974). According to La Porta et al. (1999), unlike the general 
expectation of a clear separation between ownership and control in large modern 
corporations based on Berle and Means’ (1932) pioneering analysis on American 
corporations, the controlling power over firms in twenty-seven wealthy countries belongs 
primarily to family owners or the state. In particular, their study reveals that family 
ownership in big corporations is not so much a rare economic phenomenon observed in 
under-developed or developing countries as it is a widely observed economic 




et al. focused on whether individual corporations would be primarily held by other firms, 
family owners, or the state, they did not articulate how family-based ownership and 
control was related to network structures which are grounded on intercorporate relations.  
The Korean business group, often referred to as chaebol and analogous to the 
Japanese zaibatsu before the Second World War, has been understood as a group of firms 
that are primarily owned and controlled by individual family members. There has been 
much research on Korean business groups themselves as well as the relationship between 
Korean business groups and the state to account for South Korea’s rapid economic 
development at the macro structural level (e.g., Amsden 1989; 1997; Guillen 2001; Kim 
1997; Steers, Shin and Ungson 1989). However, it is ironic that there has been relatively 
little research examining the intercorporate network structures of business groups at the 
group level. Despite the fact that a business group is based on the interconnection among 
firms, it is rare to find studies analyzing this group of firms from a social relational 
perspective.   
This thesis intends to fill the gaps of previous works by incorporating the insights 
of economic sociology with a social network framework in order to analyze the 
interactions among affiliated firms of business groups at the micro inter-firm level. 
Additionally, this thesis sheds light on the increasing interest in the association between 
ownership and control of business groups.  
 The financial crisis of 1997 is the institutional backdrop in this research. The 
financial problems that confronted South Korea in 1997-1998 pushed the country to the 




institutional conditions, like the critical role of the state, to lead industrialization and 
institutional conventions such as hierarchical and patrimonial corporate culture in the 
Korean economy.  
 The focus of this thesis is on what organizing and controlling mechanisms within 
network structures of Korean business groups work for the family-based corporate 
ownership and control under conditions of abruptly increasing environmental uncertainty 
like the financial crisis of 1997. In addition, the issue of whether these organizing and 
controlling mechanisms have changed over time is addressed in detail. Finally, attention 
is given to the extent that these network structures of Korean business groups contributed 
to the affiliated firms’ corporate performance during this turbulent period.  
 While investigating the changing pattern of organizing and controlling 
mechanisms of chaebols, sociological perspective is indispensable. Sociological 
perpective not only acknowledges the pecuniary and profit maximizing motivation of 
human action but it also takes into consideration not necessarily pecuniary but still 
economically associated issues like power, control, legitimacy, and social ties (e.g., 
Baron and Hannan 1994). Although various kinds of economic and financial indicators 
would be helpful to figure out the chaebols’ corporate ownership and control patterns as 
well as their corporate performance during the financial crisis, it seems that these 
indicators are not enough to fully comprehend the underlying mechanisms of chaebols’ 
corporate control and performance. Paul DiMaggio, while remarking upon changing 
trends of scholarly approaches to corporations in the field of social sciences since the 





These developments [network analysis, neoinstitutional theory, and organizational 
ecology] all portrayed formal organizational structures – bureaucracy and the 
organization chart – as epiphenomena that the analyst must penetrate in order to 
capture the essence of organizational life. And network analysis (made practical 
by improvement in computational power) provided both a language and a formal 
method for doing this (DiMaggio 2001: 238).  
 
 
DiMaggio calls this changing trend in the field of organization studies “a pervasive 
realism,” or “the move toward realism, toward a suspicion of surface appearance,” and 
claims that this trend tries to “look behind the veil of everyday appearance to identify 
underlying patterns that conventional wisdom obscures” (DiMaggio 2001: 238). That is, 
DiMaggio’s suggestion calls one’s attention to the necessity for scrutinizing what is 
going on below the surface of economic phenomena. For this purpose, it is important to 
analyze how the chaebol owners and family members were organizing and controlling the 
interfirm network structures of business groups to stabilize their corporate dominance.  
 
1.1. Two Main Issues 
Regarding the changing legislative regulations and corporate restructuring policies, which 
were triggered by exogenous pressure right after the financial crisis of 1997, as the 
backdrop of institutional change and environmental pressure, I examine how Korean 
business groups organized or reorganized their interorganizational network structures for 
family-based corporate control and how relational configurations among firms within a 
business group have been related to corporate performance.  
 




The first issue is how legally independent companies are interlinked to each other so that 
they form a group of firms, that is, the business group in Korea. This relation is equity 
shareholding – equity shares in a firm that are held by a person or an organization – 
which is the tie for distributing and owning financial resources among affiliated firms 
within a business group. Equity shareholding is also the relational route that is 
strategically contrived in order to assure corporate control of the chaebol founder, his 
family members and heirs over group affiliated firms. The directed corporate ties through 
equity shareholding between affiliated firms show not only the pattern of resource flow 
but also that of corporate control. Considering these overall inter-organizational 
conditions, the group structure of Korean business groups is grounded on the relation of 
equity shareholding between affiliated firms themselves as well as the relation of equity 
shareholding of affiliated firms owned by affiliated agents. They include the chaebol’s 
founder, his successors as family members, top managers, and family-owned charities or 
nonprofit organizations. Retaining ownership of and practicing control over business 
groups has provided them with non-pecuniary advantages like privileged social status and 
its concomitant prestigious life style as well as pecuniary benefits, such as material 
wealth. Therefore, it can be argued that intercorporate equity shareholding is the means 
of constructing inter-firm relations on the one hand and the strategic shield to defending 
the controlling power of the owner and family members against the threat of hostile 
takeovers by outsiders on the other.  
 The patterns of network structure for each business group are examined over the 




affiliated firms including affiliated individuals. I analyze each business group’s network 
structure at the dyadic (centrality – i.e., indegree and outdegree), triadic (triadic census), 
and group (structural equivalence, block modeling, simple matching analysis, and tau 
statistic) level in terms of multilevel perspective.  
 
1.1.2. Network Structure and Corporate Performance 
The other issue is how network structures and relational features of the business groups 
are related to their corporate performance while also taking into account each affiliated 
firm’s position and its accompanying role in the network structure of the business group 
(e.g., Mizruchi and Galaskiewicz 1993: 55; Wellman 1988). The (causal) association 
between network structure and corporate performance is based on the assumption that 
structures affect organizational behaviors (Borgatti and Foster 2003: 1000; Wellman 
1988). Therefore, network properties are considered causes influencing the variation of 
corporate performance:  
 
Once interorganizational networks are in place, they influence subsequent 
organizational behavior and strategy. We believe that consequences of network 
ties remain the key issue in demonstrating the value of network analysis. Research 
has focused on the effects of interorganizational network structures on four 
outcomes; organizational power, performance, strategic decision making, and 
noneconomic activities such as philanthropy and political contributions (Mizruchi 
and Galaskiewicz 1993: 55).  
 
 
Multilevel modeling is used to analyze how network structures of business groups 
influence the corporate performance of affiliated firms. By focusing on the overall inter-




firm’s direct connection with family members –  within each business group at the firm 
level, I study to what extent these relational features would influence the corporate 
performance of affiliated firms.  
 
1.2. Outline of Thesis 
In chapter two, I examine the major features of business groups in general and chaebols 
in particular. While analyzing the relational features of chaebols and their corporate 
control patterns, I argue that new economic sociology enmeshed with a social network 
framework, which could be called relational economic sociology, would be a relevant 
theoretical and methodological framework. While underscoring that power is a social 
relation, I suggest that different configurations of the chaebols’ network structure are 
closely related with the sustenance of the family-based corporate control within a 
business group. I also briefly refer to the changing institutional conditions during this 
research period in order to make sense of the background of this research. As a result, I 
argue that the chaebol owners and family members strategically contrive corporate 
control mechanism by effectively organizing and reorganizing intercorporate network 
structure within a business group for the maintenance of their overarching corporate 
control against environmental pressure.  
 In chapter three, the research focus is on the analysis of the inter-firm network 
structures of Korean business groups during 1997-2003 using the structural equivalence 
algorithm in social network analysis. Then, I compare each business group’s simplified 




method. A series of diachronic and synchronic examinations based on relational analyses 
reveal the various ways that group owners and family members were reorganizing and 
controlling group structures for their stable corporate ownership and control over time. In 
addition, I investigate overall macro structure of each business group by using the triad 
census and the tau statistic. I claim that this adaptive controlling strategy is a kind of 
“condescension strategy” following the argument proposed by Pierre Bourdieu.       
 In chapter four, the major focus is on how the group structures of chaebols 
influence the variations of group member firms’ corporate performance. I found that 
group structure is not necessarily so influential in each affiliated firm’s corporate 
performance over time. This result indirectly means that group structures tend to be 
shaped, maintained, and reorganized for effective corporate control rather than for 
efficient corporate performance at the group level.  
I conclude by concisely synthesizing the research results and providing a few 
implications of this research in chapter five. Here, I argue that corporate control in 
chaebols is not just grounded on financial resources; rather, its central pillar is inter-firm 
relations. The network structure of Korean business groups can be primarily attributed to 
the stable overarching dominance by the chaebol owner and his or her family members 













CHAPTER TWO: BUSINESS GROUPS 
 
2.1. Two sides of the Same Coin: Economic Sociology and Social Networks 
One of the important theoretical ideas in a new economic sociology is to employ social 
structure for the analysis of economic phenomena. Raising a question in the relevance of 
neoclassical economic perspective which assumes an atomized individual as a basic unit 
of analysis and neglects social structure, a group of economic sociologists (Granovetter 
1985; Stark 1996; 2001; Swedberg and Granovetter 2001; Uzzi 1997; White 1981) 
suggest that to maximize utility, economic action does not encompass all social actions 
but is a special type of social action. Furthermore, economic action is always embedded 
in social structure which is socially constructed throughout ongoing interpersonal 
networks. Mark Granovetter claims that social actors are not atomized beings but socially 
embedded beings: “Actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, nor 
do they adhere slavishly to a spirit written for them by the particular intersection of social 
categories that they happen to occur. Their attempts at purposive action are instead 
embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations” (Granovetter 1985: 487). In 




organization, are grounded on the networks of relations of actions or behaviors of others 
in the market. The embedded nature of economic action in a social structure whose 
relational configurations take various forms based upon networks among people, groups, 
communities, organizations, or nations could be the counterpart to the image of a 
monological actor pursuing pecuniary self-interests in a non-structured market. The 
emphasis on a socially constructed structure as the form of institution makes up for 
economists’ negligence on structural conditions that enable or constrain actors’ prospects, 
choices, and actions. 
New economic sociology that is closely intertwined with social network 
perspectives tries to systematically examine actors’ actions considering their social and 
economic positions under their interrelated relationships with other actors, groups, 
communities, and organizations. Under these embedded social relations that comprise a 
kind of social condition that surrounds social actors, social actors pursue their self-
interests among available means and accessible resources that they are able to choose or 
mobilize given their positions while taking into account others’ decisions and actions as 
well. 
In social network research, the main unit of analysis is not variables as 
autonomous entities but relations or ties of individual actors, groups, organizations, and 
even national states (Wellman 1988; Wasserman and Faust 1994). These relations of 
actors [nodes] are the basis of social structure.1 Social network research is not just 
                                                
1 Here, I share with Padgett and Ansell’s (1993) viewpoint on attributes and networks. While 
analyzing the Medici’s centralized patrimonial control despite its heterogeneous and even 




interested in the presence or absence of relations. Rather, it is more interested in, if there 
are relations, what patterned relations among nodes exist in reality so as to become the 
basis of social structure that constrains people’s choices and actions on the one hand and 
provides people with opportunities to drive their intended goals or sometimes unintended 
consequences. According to Harrison White, “a network, a set of points partly connected 
by tie lines, itself is a shell, or better a skeleton, for describing concrete social processes. 
The real goal is specifying mechanisms” (White 1972: 6). Moreover, a social network 
framework as theory and method can tackle social phenomena at multiple levels: “The 
main theoretical thrust of work with networks is to induce, indeed to define, social 
structure and process in the large from the explicit cumulation of observable micro 
structures and processes in which individuals are imbedded” (White 1972: 7). To sum up, 
the central aim of social network analysis is to retrieve and analyze structural regularities 
and dynamics of relational patterns among nodes in a specified research boundary. 
 Social network approach would be an appropriate theoretical as well as 
methodological framework to describe and analyze Korean business groups because a 
business group itself consists neither of one firm nor of one conglomerate but rather as a 
group of interconnected firms. When Richard Swedberg evaluated the progress of new 
economic sociology since the 1980s, he (1997: 168) called attention to the relational 
feature of business groups:  
 
                                                                                                                                            
social attributes are irrelevant: the particular way in which the Medici recombined social 
attributes through networks is the heart of the story here. What we object is the arraying of 
attributes discretely as groups or spatially as grids - a procedure that presumes attributes to be 




A very significant recent development in network theory, I would argue, is 
represented by the introduction of the concept of ‘business group’ – a concept 
which has been given sociological content and status by Granovetter. […] ‘A 
business group’, according to Granovetter’s definition, ‘is a collection of firms 
bound together in some formal and/or informal ways.’ […] The concept of 
business groups fits perfectly such phenomena as the Korean chaebol, the 
Japanese keiretsu and many other, less-known formations of firms from all over 
the world. […] It is my opinion that the idea of business groups is one of the most 
fertile concepts generated by New Economic Sociology. 
 
 
 However, it is ironic that despite a plethora of research on chaebols, there is a 
dearth of academic research that attempts to identify the relational features of chaebols 
and investigate their ownership and control mechanisms along with meticulous, data 
driven analysis except for a few works (e.g., Chang 1999; Chang 2003). It seems that this 
would be partly due to the difficulty to obtain reliable, concrete inter-corporate 
information on chaebols that is necessary to conduct a data driven examination on the 
network structure of business groups. In addition to the difficulty in obtaining detailed 
intercorporate data of chaebols, some literature on chaebols acknowledge that the 
networks of affiliated firms in each business groups are so “complicated” and “intricate” 
that it is hard to formulate a patterned structure from these networks: “It is difficult to 
disentangle the complicated web of cross-ownership that can comprise a chaebol” (Kang 
1996: 98-99). In order to fill the gap between the sweeping generalization on network 
structures of Korean business groups and the lack of detailed empirical analyses, I use the 
social network approach as the theory and method for the analysis of the patterned 
network structure of chaebols. 
From a theoretical vantage point, the network structures of Korean business 




group by equity shareholding. This network structure of a business group represents “the 
nature of business group”2 on account of the following two reasons. First, by equity 
shareholding ties, affiliated persons and legally independent affiliated firms are 
connected with each other so that they are bound together to be an identifiable entity, that 
is, a chaebol. Second, equity shareholding ties within a business group not only make it 
possible for the business group owners and family members to own and control affiliated 
firms but also legitimize their overarching domination within a given group boundary. 
In terms of a methodological perspective, it is possible for researchers to analyze 
the complicated network structure of each business group using social network analysis. 
As a consequence, I retrieve a simplified underlying network structure of each business 
group. Furthermore, I identify each affiliated firm’s network position and its 
accompanying role. In this comprehensive as well as analytical process, I intend to 
examine how the chaebol owners and their family members strategically paved the way 
for exerting their overarching corporate control over member firms by organizing and 
reorganizing particular forms of network structures of Korean business groups during the 
research period of 1997-2003. 
Using social network analysis, I examine the patterned relations among affiliated 
persons as well as affiliated firms through equity shareholding within each business 
                                                
2 While illustrating the basic characteristics of Chinese business groups, Keister mentions that 
relational structure represent the “the nature of the group” because the business group is 
composed by the linkages of firms: “The member firms of a business group are usually connected 
through a variety of social, legal, and economic ties. ... Joint-stock ownership, the mutual holding 
of stock between two companies, is also common in business groups and tends to be related to 
ownership ties. ... In any case, the nature of the group is reflected in the structure of ties that 




group. Patterned and repeated relations among affiliated firms within a business group 
would create an interorganizational network structure of the business group. In addition, 
changing patterns of interfirm relations would reconfigure network structures of each 
business group. Different positions of affiliated firms in a business group not only 
demand those affiliated firms have different roles at the group level but also bring about 
the different distribution of controlling power of each affiliated firm over other firms 
(Merton 1957; White, Boorman, and Breiger 1976). I model the structured pattern of ties, 
and examine which firm(s) take a unique position(s) and its (their) own roles within the 
business networks for corporate control and strategic management. 
The basic unit of social network analysis in this research is the network of 
affiliated firms within a business group. Here, the network indicates a tie as the 
shareholding relation between affiliated firms as well as affiliated persons including (1) 
the chaebol’s incumbent owner, his or her family members and heirs, (2) top managers, 
and (3) family-owned charities or non-profit organizations. Interfirm ties represent the 
interorganizational corporate control of affiliated persons and some affiliated firms over 
other affiliated firms. By shareholding ties, affiliated firms are directly linked to each 
other or indirectly connected with one another via intermediate firms. 
 
2. 2. Power is a Social Relation 
A person who possesses power, according to Max Weber, is able to influence others 
despite others’ resistance (Weber 1968). In this case, the power holder is in some ways a 




resources since the superordinate is capable of controlling resources that the subordinate 
values. Therefore, power could be regarded as the capacity of a person or people to 
control resources that others around the power holder(s) are in need of or want. As 
resource dependency theorists (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) point out, to secure resources 
needed for organizations is the critical basis to stabilize corporate control by those who 
control organization(s) and to guarantee organizational survival under environmental 
uncertainty: “The potential for one organization’s influencing another derives from its 
discretionary control over resources needed by that other and the other’s dependence on 
the resource and lack of countervailing resources or access to alternative sources” 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 53). Hence, the capacity to control capital resources is critical 
to stabilizing and assuring the overarching influence of the business group owner and 
family members on all affiliated firms within a business group. 
 And yet, the execution of power is neither possible nor sufficient by just relying 
on the capacity to influence others and the ability to control resources. A group of 
scholars (Blau 1964; Emerson 1962; Emirbayer 1997; Hamilton and Biggart 1985; 
Pfeffer 1987; Powell and Smith-Doerr 1994; Simmel 1950; Stinchcombe 1989) 
uniformly pointed out that power is socially relational; furthermore, they underscore that 
power works within and depends on the social interactions or relations among people. For 
instance, “power is unthinkable outside matrices of force relations; it emerges out of the 
very way in which figurations of relationships [...] are patterned and operate” (Emirbayer 
1997: 292). Moreover, Hamilton and Biggart (1985: 15) stress the relational basis of 




justification for action regarding those resources. These justifications are based on the 
role relations themselves, and are both structural and qualitative in nature.” “People have 
power,” in Pfeffer’s words, “because of their organizational position” and, what is more, 
“the interorganizational power is a property of the position and the organization, not of 
the particular individual who happens to occupy the position at that moment” (Pfeffer 
1987: 32). So for those who occupy the dominant position, their power does not come 
from themselves. Rather, their power resides in the relational patterns with others who 
surround the power holders. This is why Powell and Smith-Doerr (1994: 376-377) give 
emphasis to the relational property of power by saying that “power lies in structural 
position.” 
The most essential feature of power is that power [or control] is not an attribute 
but a relation (White 1985; 1992), since power [or control] is implemented by networks 
connecting nodes. In fact, Max Weber explicitly states that the execution of power is 
grounded on the social relations around those who practice power: power is “the 
probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his 
own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests” 
(Weber 1968: 53, Italics added). Maurice Zeitlin, following Weber’s idea of power, also 
highlights the relational feature of control in intercorporate relations: “Control (or power) 
is essentially relative and relational. [...] When the concrete structure of ownership and of 
intercorporate relationships makes it possible that an identifiable group of proprietary 
interests will be able to realize their corporate objectives over time, despite resistance, 




In particular, White puts special emphasis upon the “existing networks” of relations when 
he explains the meaning of control. He claims that:  
 
Control must be both flexibly strategic and reliably operational, and both on the 
same turf. This turf itself is better seen as part of existing networks of formal and 
informal relations: just that part which needs to be brought into focus at a given 
time. Control must be crafted continually out of what are residuals as seen by the 
bulk of persons involved: their central cognitive and emotional investments are 
put into keeping their social acts together, into keeping going a show not 
apparently concerned with the strategy and change that are crucial to the 
controller (White 1985: 191-192, Italics added).  
 
 
Indeed, control is defined as “the process of enactment of authority” and authority means 
“transferability of efforts from some to other definite, timely purposes as one’s 
discretion” (White 1985: 208).   
 That power is not an attribute but a social relation becomes more evident when 
this idea is applied for the analysis of corporate ownership and control. To secure the 
ownership of financial resources does not seem to always assure the retention of 
corporate control. First of all, in most chaebols the group founder and family members 
have not always been the majority shareholders. In particular, as the group size – the 
number of affiliated firms – becomes larger, it becomes a more challenging task to own 
all affiliated firms by means of majority shareholding – more than fifty percent of shares 
of each firm – in the hands of family members. This is because family members do not 
have enough self-sufficient financial resources at all times. Therefore, what becomes 
more critical is that “the very same quantitative proportion of stock may have a 
qualitatively different significance, depending on the systems of intercorporate 




with the same amount of the ownership of equity, the overarching influence of the 
chaebol owner and family members on the entire business group could differ. This 
difference depends on the configuration of inter-firm relations and how the superordinate 
is interlinked with the subordinate who shares the same stake with the former. 
Finally, power, even if one acknowledges that it is partly true that power is 
somewhat grounded on an individual’s innate attributes, could be a potentially and 
substantially influential force insofar as it exists in the interdependent or dependent 
relations among people, groups, and organizations. The exercise of power is embedded in 
relations (forms of networks) and relationships (contents of networks) among those who 
share the same stake with the power holder(s). What structural positions people or 
organizations occupy in the relations with others or other organizations influences the 
degree of the controlling power of the former position holders over the latter. 
 
2. 3. Chaebol as a Paragon of Business Groups 
The previous research revealed that business groups are a widely observed economic 
phenomenon in a capitalism system: for example, zaibatsu before the Second World War 
and keiretsu after the Second World War in Japan, guanxi chiye in Taiwan, chaebol in 
Korea, and grupos económicos in Latin America. According to Granovetter (1994; 1995; 
2005), the business groups have some distinctive features and these features could be 
generally defined as follows: 
 
“Business groups” are sets of legally separate firms bound together in persistent 
formal and/or informal ways. The level of binding is intermediate between, and 




linked merely by short-term strategic alliances, and those legally consolidated into 
a single entity (Granovetter 2005: 429). 
 
 
When I follow Granovetter’s general definition of business groups, it becomes clear that, 
first of all, business groups are primarily “sets of legally separate firms bound together in 
persistent formal and/or informal ways.” Second, the networks of firms within a business 
group should be “persistent.” Third, by using holding companies or pyramid- type 
network ties among firms, “a central individual or group, often a family” owns a business 
group and maintains its controlling power over member firms despite each firm’s legally 
independent status (Granovetter 2005: 429-430).3 Therefore, a business group could be 
considered “the kind of organizational configurations that can be found midway between 
the individual firm and macro economic phenomena” (Swedberg 2003: 100). 
The Korean chaebol refers to the highly diversified, family-owned and managed 
group of firms. The term chaebol in the literal sense means “wealth clique” or “financial 
clique” (Kang 1996: 11; Steers, Shin, and Ungson 1989: 34). It is important to note that a 
chaebol is not a mere aggregate of firms but a group of firms consisting of a coordinated 
inter-firm relation for effective corporate control by the group founder, family members 
                                                
3 Granovetter’s definition of business group in his article, “Coase Revisited: Business Groups in 
the Modem Economy” (1995), is also very similar to his latest definition: “One can consider as 
business groups those collections of firms bound together in some formal and/or informal ways, 
characterized by an ‘intermediate’ level of binding. This means that we exclude, on the one hand, 
a set of firms bound merely by short-term strategic alliances, and on the other, a set of firms 
legally consolidated into a single entity” (Granovetter 1995: 95). Feenstra and Hamilton (2006) 
also define business group in general and chaebol in particular as Granovetter did: “A central 
feature of Korea’s industrial organization is the business groups, or chaebol. These groups, 
consisting of legally independent firms, are affiliated under a common group name and are 
centrally controlled through direct family ownership and mutual shareholding among member 




and heirs.4 In other words, its overall connection is grounded upon family ownership and 
control via formal equity shareholding ties as well as family ties. Since the overall 
characteristics of business groups resonate with the general features of chaebols, the 
notion of business groups is an interchangeable term with chaebols.  
 
2.4. The Emergence of Chaebols 
How did business groups emerge in Korea and what brought about the emergence and 
formation of business groups? As institutional organization theorists (Hamilton and 
Biggart 1988; Orru, Biggart, and Hamilton 1991) have emphasized, historical and 
political events in each country are crucial factors in explaining the formation of different 
organizational structures: “Enterprise structure represents situational adaptations of 
preexisting organizational forms to specific political and economic conditions” (Hamilton 
and Biggart 1988: S87). Most enterprises that became the founding companies of major 
chaebols were established by family entrepreneurs from the very beginning. The majority 
                                                
4 It has been reported that the overall control of business groups is planned, coordinated, and 
monitored by a so-called group headquarters (Feenstra and Hamilton 2006; Kim 1997; Richter 
2002: 79-81; Scott 1991: 198). This group headquarters is a virtual organization because it does 
not belong to any specific affiliated firms but is only operating under the umbrella of the group 
chairman. A group headquarters’ corporate control over tasks such as planning, coordination, 
resource allocation, and strategic decision over members firms had positively contributed to the 
growth of chaebols. In doing so, a chaebol effectively allocated resources across firms at the 
group level and strategically invested capital and personnel into new business areas. Besides, this 
virtual headquarters was a useful organizational tool for both the chaebol owner and his or her 
family members since it also functioned to increase the concentration of corporate controlling 
power in the hands of them. Of notable interest was the fact that both a chairman and a group 
headquarters did not exist as legally formalized organizational entities in Korean business groups. 
As a result, they were not liable for issues of mismanagement and declaration of bankruptcy 
despite their authoritative control over business groups. Because of this reason, the dissolution of 
the group headquarters of chaebols were one of the reform agendas for corporate restructuring 





of these firms in general set about their businesses after the Korean War even though a 
few founding firms in major chaebols were already established before the Korean War.5 
However, it cannot be denied that a series of state-led, five-year economic 
development planning periods since 1962 were a critical institutional condition that 
contributed to the full-scale expansion of business groups in Korea during the 1960s and 
1970s, and then the formation of the current forms of chaebols. The developmental state 
proceeded favorable economic policies toward large corporations in order to propel rapid 
export-oriented industrialization during this period (Amsden 1989; Chang 2003; Cho 
1997; Feenstra and Hamilton 2006; Kang 2002; Kim 1997). In particular, the Korean 
government selectively chose a few big domestic firms and intensively provided them 
with incentives such as preferential financing, tax exemptions or reduction, long-term 
cheap loans and guarantees, and the formation of a protected domestic market from 
foreign competitors. The developmental state’s support created positive environmental 
conditions for the evolution and expansion of chaebols.  
In addition, chaebols could be regarded as a socially constructed economic entity 
as well. The large Korean corporations had no choice but to compulsorily follow the 
government’s direction in order to enjoy preferential policies toward chaebols. As time 
went on, the chaebol owner also tried to actively cooperate more with the developmental 
                                                
5 For example, it was reported that the first company of the Doosan group was established in 1933 
and the first firm of the Samsung group was established in 1937. For both the Hyundai group and 
LG (Lucky Goldstar) group, their first companies, respectively, that became the matrix of group 




state’s economic development policies. 6  For chaebols, close ties with the Korean 
government were beneficial since these close ties were the critical backdrop to guarantee 
preferential support from the Korean government.7 The Korean government’s policies 
toward chaebols created market conditions in favor of chaebols – that is, easy market 
entry into new industries under the government’s financial and administrative support. In 
addition, these policies contributed to stabilizing the chaebols’ dominant market position 
using their size under uncertain environmental conditions. The mobilization and 
utilization of their alliance based on inter-organizational ties worked as a buffer to react 
effectively to the environmental pressure, as a way of diversifying risk, and as a route of 
effective information exchange and cost saving through a coordinated process among 
inter-organizational ties (Cho 1997; Guillen 2001; Jeong 2004; Kim 1997). Finally, 
chaebols are the social product of Korean enterprises’ enforced or even voluntary 
                                                
6 With regard to the relation between the state and the emergence of modem corporations, 
William Roy (1990) claims that the rise of corporate capitalism in the United States was 
stimulated not merely by economic process to increase efficiency but by political factor, 
especially the role of the state. There are two reasons. Considering American history, first, the 
corporation is characterized as "collectively constituted property" by the government. Second, the 
corporation was "originally created as a public institution charted by government to serve the 
public interest" (1990: 31). Roy criticizes Alfred Chandler's explanation of "the economic 
changes in terms of economic needs" (1990: 32). Accordingly, as an intention to broaden 
narrowly bounded technological advance for the efficiency in the field of economy, Roy 
identifies the state as a major transformative agent: "The corporation is not only an economic 
entity but also a political creature" (1990: 31). Dobbin (2001) also underlines the role of political 
institution in economy. Through comparing rail policy in Britain, France, and the United States, 
Dobbin claims that different political systems bring about different industrial logics. That is, "the 
logic of political organization became the logic of industrial organization" (2001: 419). 
 
7 For example, in the process of the state-led economic development, the Korean government 
provided chaebols unique opportunities for their businesses such as “preferential disposal of 
government-vested properties, preferential allocation of foreign exchange, preferential treatment 




cooperation to adjust themselves to the changing social and economic environment of 
Korea. 
 
2.5. Chaebol as a Prop for Social Status and Privilege  
When most scholars examine the basic characteristics of chaebols, they underscore the 
chaebols’ strong patrilineal relationships in the immediate family, affinitive ties through 
marriage, alumni, and regional ties (e.g., Chang 2003; Feenstra and Hamilton 2006; Jwa 
2002; Kim 1997; Orru, Biggart, and Hamilton 1991; Siegel 2007). The chaebol owners 
systematically employ these relationships to facilitate their corporate control beyond the 
family boundary within a group on the one hand and to create favorable social 
environment by building up close social ties with those who get involved with their group 
businesses in society on the other hand.  
 Then, why have chaebols relied on strong relationships? Generally speaking, it 
seems to be due to a low level of trust in Korean society (Fukuyama 1995: 127-145; Jwa 
2002). According to Jwa (2002), Korean society can be categorized as a low trust society 
since informal institutions rather than formal institutions are a more influential 
underlying mechanism in society as a whole and transaction costs in general are higher in 
market situations. Under such an environment characterized by low trust and high 
uncertainty, people tend to rely on the “rule of person” rather than the “rule of law” (Jwa 
2002: 181) because strong interpersonal relationships are expected to function as a safety 
net to acquire reliable information, secure resources, and lessen transaction costs. 




society contributed to securing the chaebols’ family-based corporate control, stabilizing 
the long-term financial support from banks, and guaranteeing the administrative backing 
from the government.  
 The control of the chaebol founder and his or her family members over affiliated 
firms is bound up with interpersonal trust and filial loyalty via kinship ties such as family 
members and relatives (Chang 2003; Kim 1997; Kang 2002; Hamilton and Biggart 1988; 
Orru, Biggart, and Hamilton 1991). In addition to family ties, affiliated companies in 
chaebols are connected with one another throughout an interfirm network of shareholding. 
This interfirm tie makes it possible for the chaebol founder and family members to secure 
stable corporate control in their hands even though the amount of ownership of their 
shareholding is not always predominant to all affiliated firms. 
 Then why did the business group founders and their family members consistently 
try to control group firms over generations instead of shifting the corporate control 
pattern from “family capitalism” (James 2006) to “managerial capitalism” (Chandler 
1984)? What kinds of benefits do they expect or have already been enjoying throughout 
their ownership and control of business groups? Above all, it goes without saying that the 
chaebol owner and family members seek pecuniary profit. However, pecuniary interests 
do not seem to be the only reason for family members’ corporate control over business 
groups. With regard to this issue, Granovetter argues that: 
 
Collaboration and common ownership are conceptually separate, but empirically 
related. Independent firms may collaborate without common ownership. But one 
typical reason why they do collaborate is that individuals, families, or financial 




the firms’ activities in an attempt to improve their own financial or social 
situations (Granovetter 2005: 435, Italics added). 
 
The goal of families can conflict with profit maximization for the groups and 
firms they dominate. At times the clash is entirely financial, as when families shift 
resources around business groups at the expense of minority shareholders in order 
to enrich themselves. Such families are still maximizing profits. But families often 
want more than wealth from their business activities: they also want to enhance 
their social status (Granovetter 2005: 442, Italics added) 
 
That is, coordinated group activity under the umbrella of family-based group control for 
the purpose of increasing pecuniary benefit at the group level would be indirectly 
beneficial for the chaebol owner and family members to augment their privileged social 
status and prestige (Feenstra and Hamilton 2006; Granovetter 2005; Khanna and Yafeh 
2007; Kim 1997). Concerning the issue on why chaebol owners and family members 
consistently cling to the domination of chaebols under the umbrella of family control, it 
seems that the diagnosis of Agnblad, et al. (2001) on the family-based corporate control 
of Swedish business groups is also relevant to make sense of the Korean case:  
 
Social prestige is an important, even dominant, part of the total benefits 
associated with control of large corporations in Sweden. Many owner families try 
to build a legacy around themselves as good citizens and project themselves onto 
the public arena as important contributors to socially worthy causes like 
philanthropy, endowment, and research (Agnblad, et al. 2001: 252, Italics added).  
 
 
Finally, not only does economic gain motivate the chaebols’ family members to hold 
their control over affiliated firms but the other main reason revolves around the interest in 
maintaining high social status and prestige. Thus, it is raison d’être of the business group 
that would be worthwhile for the group founders and their descendants to engage in 




power over the group. That is why, with their loss of ownership and control, the survival 
of the group itself would not be a valuable stake for the incumbent group owner and 
family members.   
 
2.6. Inheritance, Tension, and Group Split 
In addition to gaining economic wealth and high social status, the effort for the smooth 
transition of group ownership and control from group founders to their second and third 
generations is another chief stake for both the incumbent owners and future successors. 
The stereotypical process of inheritance of the chairman’s position has usually been 
completed through the incumbent chairman’s designation of one of his sons as his 
successor.8 Needless to say, it is critical to select the most able individual among 
competing siblings to be groomed as an official successor for the successful maintenance 
of the business group itself as well as for a smooth transition. However, appointing the 
successor of the group to an apposite position within the inter-organizational network 
structure seems to be more important in the long run than any other issue for the effective 
overarching corporate control because “interests are the result of the distribution of 
controls, and that in turn is determined by organizational structure” (Collins 1988: 466). 
Therefore, controlling a business group in the best interests of the group founder’s 
                                                
8 The Kia group stood as the only exception among major chaebols in that it was run by 
professional managers. Before the financial crisis in Korea, the Kia group was one of five 
automobile makers including Hyundai, Daewoo, Ssangyong, and Samsung. However, while 
experiencing the financial crisis of 1997 and subsequent economic downturn, Hyundai Motor was 
the only surviving one that kept a family-based corporate control pattern. Kia group went 
bankrupt in July 1997, and the Hyundai group acquisitioned Kia motor in 1999. Then, when 
Hyundai Motor departed from the Hyundai group, Kia motor became the major affiliated firm of 




descendants themselves is closely related to their position taking within inter-firm 
relations. 
There have been internal contests and conflicts among family members about who 
is going to inherit the chairman’s position so as to control the business group even though 
these conflicts or tensions are not often disclosed to the public. Family members 
especially tend to be embroiled with one another in the process of inheriting the 
ownership of flagship companies of the business group. Family feuds often lead to the 
split of the business group. During the economically convoluted period after the financial 
crisis at the end of 1997, some chaebols experienced an unexpected group division. For 
instance, one big business group (e.g., the Hyundai group) was divided into several 
business groups. In other cases, some affiliated firms were partitioned from their mid-
sized original business group and established their own relatively small business group 
(e.g., the Kisco group and the Orion group): the Kisco group was a new group founded in 
2000 as a result of its separation from the Dongkuk Steel group; the Orion group was also 
a newly established business group in 2001 and was originally rooted in the Dongyang 
group. 
The Hyundai group was one of the major business groups in Korea and was 
regarded as a paragon of the chaebol along with Samsung, LG, and SK.9 A family feud 
among siblings of the Hyundai group founder is an exemplary case to represent how 
internal conflicts resulted in the division of the big business group into several groups 
such as Hyundai Department Store (1999), Hyundai Development (1999), Hyundai 
                                                




Motor (2000), and Hyundai Heavy Industries (2001). In fact, the tentative plan of group 
division after the retirement of the group founder, Ju-yung Chung, from his active 
engagement in group management and control was planned in advance by Chung himself 
before the financial crisis of 1997. After the financial crisis of 1997, this group division 
plan was officially proclaimed as a part of a group restructuring strategy in 2000. 
Nevertheless, this publicly announced plan for the corporate restructuring of the Hyundai 
group, which was closely associated with the succession to the group chairman position 
by one of the group founder’s sons, was not done smoothly. Hyundai’s major affiliated 
firms like Hyundai Motor Company and Hyundai Heavy Industries, respectively, with 
their subsidiary firms departed from the Hyundai group itself and founded their own new 
business groups during this period. Mong-ku Chung, the eldest surviving son of the 
group’s founder, took over Hyundai Motor Company and other subsidiary firms having 
ties with Hyundai Motor Company. The sixth son, Mong-joon Chung, owned Hyundai 
Heavy Industries. Even though the fifth son, Mong-hun Chung, ascended to the chairman 
position of the Hyundai group, the Hyundai group per se was already losing its 
predominant economic power in the Korean economy as a result of a series of group 
divisions, becoming just one of the small business groups, and was finally suffering from 
its deteriorated debt condition.10 
In summary, the concept of family connection is a double-edged sword. On the 
one hand, family connection was the important underpinning to establish business groups 
                                                
10 At that time, the Hyundai group was composed of Hyundai Elevator, Hyundai Merchant 
Marine and other money-losing financial units. After Mong-hun’s suicide in 2003, his wife, 




at the outset and to expand the size of business groups since this relationship was the 
principal basis of trust and filial loyalty. That is, the blood ties in chaebols worked 
positively as a social bond to coordinate legally independent firms, to integrate them into 
solidified group membership, and to make it possible for family members to exercise 
family-based corporate control over affiliated group firms. On the other hand, because of 
blood ties, family feuds at times became the deep-seated cause that led to group division 
in the process of owning, controlling, and inheriting the business group. 
 
2. 7. A Cacophony between Agency Theory and Chaebol's Corporate Governance 
One of the distinctive features of chaebols as a paragon of business groups is that a single 
person - i.e., the group founder or chairman - and a few family members tend to occupy 
their position at the upper reaches of a chaebol (Chang 2003; Orru, Biggart, and Hamilton 
1991). Thus, chaebols, like the zaibatsu in Japan prior to the Second World War, have 
been regarded as a family-based ownership and management system that takes a 
centralized, hierarchical form of effective corporate control over affiliated companies 
within a business group (Amsden 1997: 358; Kim 1997: 54-64). In contrast to the critical 
role of family members, the roles of interlocking directors and the board of directors were 
nominal in the corporate governance of chaebols. Finally, family-based corporate control 
over the chaebol has been the predominant trend among business groups in Korea. 
With respect to the corporate control patterns of chaebols, let us briefly discuss 
agency theory in order to clearly reveal the general characteristics of the chaebols’ 




2003; Daily, Dalton, and Cannella 2003). When the main idea of agency theory is used as 
a yardstick to explain the corporate governance11 pattern of chaebol or the control of the 
chaebol owner over a business group, this might be confronted with some discrepancies 
between the theoretical assumptions of agency theory and the chaebols’ actual 
ownership-control structure. However, this incongruity ironically highlights the unique 
features of Korean corporations, chaebols in particular, when compared to the 
characteristics of western corporations. 
Agency theory (e.g., Eisenhardt 1989) treats the corporation as a nexus of 
contracts among atomized principals (owners or shareholders) and agents (managers) that 
have conflicting interests over how the proceeds from the corporation’s endeavors are 
distributed. Given the potential separation of ownership and control, shareholders as the 
principals delegate work to the managers as agents who perform that work, which 
maximizes returns such as rising stock prices at a reasonable risk. In contrast to the 
interest of the principals, it is assumed that managers prefer growth to profits and that 
they are lazy or fraudulent (“shirk”) (Aguilera and Jackson 2003: 447). Here, the issue is 
that the principal is hardly capable of supervising or monitoring what the agent is actually 
doing (Eisenhardt 1989: 58). Finally, both the conflicting interests between principals and 
agents and the difficulty for principals to monitor the performance of the agents brought 
about an agency problem. Therefore, the focus of agency theory is on determining the 
                                                
11 Generally speaking, corporate governance could be defined as the institutionalized internal and 
external relationships on how to deploy and control organizational resources and conflicts among 
those who are involved in firms such as managers, debt-holders, equity-holders, board of 
directors, and stakeholders [employees] (Daily, Dalton, and Cannella 2003: 371; Fligstein and 




most efficient contract governing the principal-agent relationship given the assumptions 
that people are self-interested, have bounded rationality, and are averse to risk 
(Eisenhardt 1989: 58). 
Whereas agency theory assumes that the separation of ownership and control is 
one of the fundamental characteristics of a modem corporation, a chaebol’s owner exerts 
substantial control over the corporation(s) and is a final decision maker for corporate 
management. At the same time, since the founder of a chaebol and his or her family 
members have not only been relatively large shareholders of major affiliated firms of a 
chaebol, but also deeply involved in corporate management, the relationship between 
principals (owners or shareholders) and agents (managers) within a chaebol is not truly a 
conflicting contractual relationship; rather, they are formally or informally intertwined 
with each other and even maintain a collusive relationship. More than anything else, the 
owner of a chaebol has tried to maintain and has actually been holding the position of 
being the most formally or informally influential manager. In addition, as the board of 
directors of chaebols has consisted primarily of insiders and those who are loyal to the 
chairman of chaebols, these directors tend to represent the interests of chaebol owners 
rather than those of the minority shareholders or institutional investors. To conclude, 
there is no substantial separation of control from ownership in the case of Korean 
chaebols. The principal-agent relationship in chaebols does not take the same form as it 





In summary, centralized, hierarchical family-based ownership has implemented 
the equity shareholding relationship as the major means of organizational control over 
firms in a business group. However, unlike Anglo Saxon corporate relationships (Dore 
2000; Hall and Soskice 2001), the role of the board of directors in chaebols was nominal. 
In contrast to the endeavor to maintain strong intra-group solidarity within a business 
group, inter-group relations were very competitive and even antagonistic rather than 
cooperative with one another. For that reason, interrelations among business groups in 
Korea have been reported as having “few ties outside each group, and with no significant 
ties between them” (Biggart and Guillen 1999: 732). Thus, the interrelationship between 
business groups was rare. These general features of chaebols are the targets of scrutiny in 
this research. More than anything else, the patterns of intra-group shareholding of each of 
the twenty-eight major business groups in Korea are the central object of this research in 
that they show how family-based ownership is strategically organized and how to 
reorganize corporate control over all of the affiliated firms of the business group. 
Therefore, while examining the shareholding relations of each chaebol, I study not only 
the patterns of shareholding of the chaebol owner and owner’s family, but also those of 
all affiliated firms that are identified as the member firms of each business group. 
 
2. 8. Controlling Mechanism by Strategically Reorganizing Inter-corporate Ties 
Family ties have not only been the bottom line of family-based corporate control but also 
the basis for the formation of the network structure of chaebols. However, what is ironic 




predominant controlling power over all the affiliated firms within a business group 
despite their non-predominant shares for ownership of all affiliated firms at the group 
level. The discrepancy between the extent to ownership and that to controlling power in a 
business group indirectly discloses that inter-firm relation is the critical corporate 
backbone to amplify the controlling power of family members beyond their corporate 
ownership.12 Seeing that the inter-firm network structures through equity shareholding 
within a business group are the driving force for the execution of family-based corporate 
control over entire affiliated firms, it can be argued that the network structure of a 
business group is strategically contrived rather than contingent or arbitrary. In the same 
way, Khanna and Yafeh (2007: 341) state, “A possible rationale for the superiority and 
predominance of the group form in emerging market is that the group structure insulates 
the controlling shareholder from institutional investor pressure and takeovers, and 
bestows undisputed control and economic influence with limited capital investment.” 
Finally, both the exercise and stabilization of overarching corporate control are possible 
through organizing and reorganizing intercorporate ties.  
 It is the financial ties as well as family ties that are the major links to cementing a 
set of legally independent firms not into the mere sum of firms but into the aggregate 
which is comprised of affiliated firms and persons. Equity shareholding is a critical link 
                                                
12 This discrepancy is often called “tunneling”: “the expropriation of minority shareholders” 
(Khanna and Yafeh 2007: 343). Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005: 678) also describe in 
detail what tunneling means: “The act of transferring value from one pyramid firm to another is 
dubbed tunneling by Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000). Value can be 
transferred between controlled firms via transfer pricing, the provision of capital at artificial 
prices; or via inflated payments for intangibles such as patents, brand names, and insurance. 
Although the firm at the receiving end of the tunnel benefits from the wealth transfer, public 





in maintaining the organizational control by the chaebol owner’s family over a business 
group (Biggart 1997; Chang 2003: 163-170). As Amsden (1997: 360) points out, since 
the top Korean business groups were heavily invested by a founding family, “even the 
publicly held companies were in fact controlled by the family through its holding and 
intragroup mutual shareholding.” In addition, once chaebols were more easily able to 
raise their equity in the stock market, they could increase “their holdings by starting or 
buying firms in areas related to their production” (Hamilton 1998: 188). So the formation 
and integration of legally independent firms into one business group is generally possible 
by equity shareholding. Since chaebols are composed of legally independent firms and 
these firms often operate in different industries, these diversified businesses have worked 
as a kind of “an insurance system” (Kang 2002: 169) or “risk sharing” system (Khanna 
and Yafeh 2007: 339) to help or bail out financially troubled affiliated firms by the other 
financially sound firms’ support. Thus, the chaebol system is called a “self-help backup 
network of support” (Kang 2002: 169).  
Intercorporate relations in Korean business groups are the binding force for 
integrating affiliated firms. They are also the principal route that makes it possible for 
family members to own and control affiliated firms. In particular, how a business group is 
composed of affiliated firms often matters more than how many firms are affiliated 
within a business group. It goes without saying that the size of a chaebol matters for the 
formation of different structural composition. However, it is also true that the same size 
does not always result in the same form of network structure. Therefore, it is worthwhile 




business groups in Korea experienced any drastic transformations or changes of their 
group structures in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 1997.  
There is a lot of truth in the argument that Korean business groups, especially 
chaebol’s ownership and control patterns, have taken the form of the centralized and 
hierarchical group structure. Nicole Biggart (1997) claims that chaebols’ family-based 
centralized, hierarchical control pattern is based on “institutionalized patrimonialism.”13 
However, the sweeping generalization of the existing works about chaebols’ ownership 
and control patterns seems to leave one key question unanswered: to what extent do 
network structures of Korean business groups take centralized and hierarchical forms and 
to what degree would these structural forms be closely associated with corporate 
performance of affiliated firms in a business group? Bringing up a question about the 
approach on chaebols in terms of sweeping generalization beyond the group size, 
network composition, and different environmental conditions, I suggest that the network 
structure of chaebols as a linked set of affiliated firms would be less centered on the 
stereotypical monolithic form – a highly centralized and hierarchical one.  
It has been generally acknowledged that intercorporate ties within a Korean 
business group take the form of hierarchical network structures. The hierarchical 
formation of network structures is primarily due to the fact that the direction of equity 
shareholding and the flow of its accompanied resources among affiliated firms are 
                                                
13 Biggart, following the general idea of Weber’s patrimonialism as one of the types of traditional 
domination, describes patrimonialism as “a form of rule in which power is held by a patriarch and 
administered through a personal staff. […] The subjects of rule are treated as, and may in fact be, 
members of the patriarch’s household. The household, whether a manor or a principality, is run at 
the pleasure of the master, whose rule extends over the economic, moral, and personal affairs of 




asymmetric or un-reciprocal (Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti 1997: 936; Knoke 1990: 109; 
Monge and Contractor 2001). When the flowing pattern of resources between affiliated 
firms is not based so much on reciprocal or symmetric flows as on unidirectional or 
asymmetric flows, the overall inter-firm relation would be likely to take a vertical and 
hierarchical form rather than a horizontal form. Thus, the unilateral flow of resources 
from those who have resources to those who have not would result in hierarchically 
stratified positions – the superordinate, the intermediate, and the subordinate – within 
inter-firm relations (Knoke 1990: 109). Different positions of affiliated firms within an 
intercorporate relation expect different roles for different position occupants. A few 
flagship firms or major firms are expected to occupy dominant positions and strategically 
control most minor firms that take marginal positions under this hierarchical form.  
 Some organizational theorists (Biggart 1997: 229-233; Granovetter 1994; 1995; 
2005; Hattori 1989: 87-88; Jeong 2004: 79-82; La Porta et al. 1999; Scott 1991; Shin and 
Chang 2003; Yoo and Lee 1987: 97-98) commonly mention that there have been a few 
identifiable forms of network structures of family ownership of chaebols. The two main 
network patterns of ownership are distinctive in that they provide the relational basis for 
controlling mechanisms of the chaebol owner and family members through shareholding. 
One network pattern is that the chaebol owner and family members directly own the 
shares of major affiliated firms in a business group. Sometimes, they also own the shares 
of minor affiliated firms. The other distinctive network pattern is that one flagship or a 




her family members own the shares of other affiliated or subsidiary firms on behalf of the 
family members’ interest.  
 How network patterns of ownership would be organized and which patterns 
would be more prevalent than other patterns seems to be closely related to the scale of 
each affiliated firm or the number of affiliated firms composing a business group 
(Granovetter 1995: 113). The variation of network structure of business groups would be 
closely related with an effective and strategic “controlling interest being held by a single 
individual or family members” (Granovetter 1995: 111). It is generally expected that the 
organizing control mechanism in a chaebol is that the chaebol owner and his or her 
family members directly control the major affiliated firms or sometimes minor affiliated 
firms. Then, these major affiliated firms not only control each other but also control other 
minor or subsidiary firms within a business group.14  
To put organizing control mechanism concretely, if a business group consists of a 
small number of firms, there would be no reason to construct a complicated network 
structure for family-based corporate control. Therefore, family members would directly 
                                                
14 Cyclic relation among three or four major affiliated firms, although it is not a predominant 
shareholding pattern, is not often but sometimes observed in a chaebol. Cyclic pattern tends to 
amplify the affiliated firms’ (virtual) shareholding. Cyclically connected firms are symbiotically 
interconnected with one another. Thus, the absence of any one connection between two specific 
firms within a cyclic relation dismantles the whole cyclic relation itself. The cyclic relation seems 
to take a form of horizontal rather than vertical form. For instance, the chairman and his direct 
family members in the Samsung group have maintained their controlling power over the entire 
group throughout the cyclic shareholding ties among major firms. First of all, Samsung 
Everland’s largest amount of shares is held by family members. Then, Samsung Everland hold 
shares of Samsung Life Insurance, which owns shares of Samsung Electronics, which is the 
mainstay of the Samsung group and has shares of Samsung Credit Card. Finally, Samsung Credit 
Card holds the stakes of Samsung Everland. That is, a chain of cyclic shareholding ties (Samsung 
Everland – Samsung Life Insurance – Samsung Credit Card – Samsung Everland) contributed to 




own and control affiliated firms. In particular, if an affiliated firm is relatively small, then 
family members might directly own this firm with no serious financial burden. Otherwise, 
the chaebol founder and family members might own flagship firm(s), and then the 
flagship firm(s) might control other subsidiary firms on behalf of family members. 
However, when a business group becomes bigger as more firms are included in the 
boundary of the business group, it must be a challenging task for the chaebol founder and 
his or her family members to directly own and even control entire affiliated firms at their 
disposal. Under this situation, family members would attempt to deliberately construct 
and exploit inter-firm relations, and hence rely more on these intercorporate relations for 
their overarching corporate control. In addition, family members would actively mobilize 
executives and/or non-profit organizations as their allies so that these allies vicariously 
exercise corporate ownership of affiliated firms on behalf of family members’ corporate 
interests in maintaining overarching control over affiliated firms.  
With respect to family-based corporate ownership and control within a business 
group, according to Khanna and Yafeh (2007), business groups, both taking the form of 
pyramid15 and being based on family-based corporate ownership and control, are more 
                                                
15 Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means’s (1932) description on a pyramid in Modern Corporation 
and Private Property is pertinent to grasp the general idea of a pyramidal form in organizations. 
Berle and Means claim that:  
 
In the effort to maintain control of a corporation without ownership of a majority of its 
stock, various legal devices have been developed. Of course, the most important among 
the very large companies is the device of ‘pyramiding.’ This involves the owning of a 
majority of the stock of one corporation which in turn holds a majority of the stock of 
another – a process which can be repeated a number of times. An interest equal to slightly 
more than a quarter or an eighth or a sixteenth or an even smaller proportion of the 
ultimate property to be controlled is by this method legally entrenched. By issuing bonds 




common in countries with “poor investor protection and inadequate rule of law” (2007: 
343). Under these weak institutional conditions that are not strong enough to legally 
protect minority shareholders from group owners or other major shareholders, pyramidal 
form makes it possible for family members to “enable control in excess of cash flow 
rights” (Khanna and Yafeh 2007:346). Finally, family-based corporate control is 
undergirded by a chain of interfirm ownership relations. Moreover, in order to amplify 
family-based overarching group control by making the most of ownership with limited 
financial resources, the chaebol owners would regard organizing and reorganizing overall 
inter-firm network structure of their business group as a stepping-stone for effective 
corporate control. 
 
2. 9. Institutional Conditions: Endogenous and Exogenous Forces 
On the eve of the financial crisis at the end of 1997, the financial problems that hit South 
Korea pushed the country to the brink of bankruptcy as a result of the rapid downgrading 
of Korea’s sovereign ratings and the abrupt departure of foreign investment capital from 
the Korean capital market (Chang 2003; Feenstra and Hamilton 2006; Shin and Chang 
2003; Stiglitz 2002). In addition to the instability of the foreign exchange rate, the Korean 
domestic banking system was almost incapable of repaying external debts and Korea’s 
                                                                                                                                            
accelerated. By the introduction of two or three intermediate companies each of which is 
legally controlled through ownership of a majority of its stock by the company higher in 
the series, complete legal control of a large operating company can be maintained by an 
ownership interest equal to a fraction of one per cent of the property controlled. The 
owner of a majority of the stock of the company at the apex of a pyramid can have almost 
as complete control of the entire property as a sole owner even though his ownership 




usable foreign-exchange reserves were nearly depleted. The Korean government was on 
the verge of national bankruptcy and announced on November 21, 1997, that it had 
requested the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to provide emergency funds. As a 
consequence of an ongoing negotiation process between the Korean government and the 
IMF, both parties finally reached a general agreement on a bailout plan and publicized 
this deal on December 3, 1997, with an announcement that the IMF would provide the 
Korean government with bailout funds. 
While undergoing the financial crisis of 1997, the public opinion on chaebols 
drastically shifted from lukewarm acceptance to harsh criticism. In fact, it is hard to deny 
that chaebols were one of the major institutional receptacles to lead the rapid economic 
growth in South Korea. Some organizational styles of chaebols such as family-based 
corporate control, a highly centralized decision making system, the heavy reliance on 
closed personal ties, and excessively diversified expansion into unrelated industries were 
not regarded as desirable modes to compete with global rivals in the world economy. 
Nevertheless, these organizational features of chaebols could at least hold institutional 
legitimacy from both inside and outside since chaebols had functioned well enough to 
achieve rapid economic growth in the Korean economy until the financial crisis of 1997. 
Accordingly, chaebols could have endured their form from criticism until the financial 
crisis of 1997. 
However, right after the financial crisis, the chaebols’ taken-for-granted practices 
of corporate ownership and control began to lose their institutional legitimacy from 




castigation as an inertial force to drag flexible and efficient economic practices; what is 
more, they were considered one of the primary causes of the financial debacle of 1997. 
As a result, reforming the structures and operations of chaebols became one of the main 
agendas that both the Korean government and the IMF had to deal with during the 
recovery period. 
Throughout this fluctuating period, coercive pressure from the outside rather than 
voluntary endeavor from the inside was the predominant driving force that pushed 
chaebols to change their corporate practices and opaque financial systems. In the ongoing 
economic predicament after 1997, rigorous corporate restructuring and reform policies on 
chaebols were stipulated under the regime of the new Korean government beginning in 
1998. Various kinds of exogenously imposed standards were adopted as reference points 
for the economic reform and corporate restructuring to escape from the IMF bailout.16 
The Korean government began to conduct corporate restructuring and reform policies. 
For the top five Korean business groups, the so-called “Big Deal” program – mergers or 
                                                
16 “The IMF demanded that the Korean government implement the following measures: 
1. Liberalization of foreign investment in the Korean equity market by increasing the 
ceiling on aggregate ownership from 26 to 50% by the end of 1997, and 55% by the end 
of 1998. The ceiling on individual foreign ownership will be lifted from 7 to 50% by the 
end of 1997. 
2. Improvement of corporate governance structures. In particular, the IMF demanded that 
the government adopt international accounting principles to enhance the transparency of 
the Korean accounting system. As part of such efforts, the IMF requested that the 
Korean chaebols disclose information and make public their combined financial 
statements. 
3. No government interference with banks’ business operations and lending decisions. 
4. Improvement of bankruptcy procedures and elimination of any subsidies to bail out 
individual companies. 
5. Reduction of debt levels of Korean companies and changes to the system of mutual 





swaps of affiliated firms between chaebols – was put into practice in order to resolve 
redundant over-investment in some industrial sectors. For other business groups, a 
“workout” program was enforced so that financially problematic affiliated firms could 
get some help through a debt rescheduling process (Chang 2003; Jeong 2004). 
Here, it is worthwhile to briefly mention the chaebols’ overall financial systems in 
order to be aware of the relevance of corporate reform policies during that time. Even 
though the Korean chaebol closely resembled the Japanese prewar zaibatsu, one of the 
biggest differences between chaebols and zaibatsus was that chaebols were not allowed to 
own (commercial) banks as their affiliated firms by governmental regulation (Amsden 
1997: 336; Fligstein and Freeland 1995). The main reason of this regulation was that the 
Korean government did not want large corporations to predominantly control the 
financial market. Instead, the government historically supplied chaebols with huge 
amounts of capital to stimulate their rapid growth. Furthermore, not only did the Korean 
government retain the right to appoint bank directors but it was also the majority 
shareholder in most commercial banks. This shows that the role of the Korean 
government was very influential in the state-led economic development process since the 
early 1960s (Amsden 1989; 1997; Guillen 2001; Kim 1997; Orru, Biggart, and Hamilton 
1991; Shin and Chang 2003). However, non-banking financial institutions such as 
insurance companies and security firms were allowed to be a part of chaebols. The role of 
chaebol-owned non-banking financial institutions became especially critical in providing 
financial resources under favorable conditions for other affiliated firms belonging to the 




Considering this overall financial setting that surrounded chaebols, attentiveness 
should be directed towards the meaning of chaebols’ debt-to-equity ratio as a specific 
economic indicator to measure financial soundness. It had been reported that most big 
corporations in Korea had a high debt-to-equity ratio before the financial crisis of 1997.17 
This general trend is easily likely to lead us to regard commercial banks as financial 
institutions having a considerable influence upon the corporate management of chaebols 
during the Korean industrialization. However, unlike this general expectation, it was 
reported that banks functioned as a kind of an instrumental mediator to reflect the 
government’s financial and corporate policies because the overall banking system was 
under the Korean government’s strong control (Guillen 2001: 187-189). In addition, the 
Korean government was in some sense the financial guarantor when chaebols tried to 
obtain a loan from foreigners. So if chaebols’ high debt-to-equity ratio is superficially 
understood as face value, then this high ratio could be regarded as the indicator of 
chaebols’ lax management or moral hazard.  
However, considering overall institutional conditions, most chaebols’ high debt-
to-equity ratio did not necessarily indicate that chaebols’ corporate performance was 
inefficient because this high ratio was institutionally grounded on long-term financial ties 
between chaebols and banks with the backing of the Korean government (Chang 2003: 
141; Chang, Park, and Yoo 2001: 151-152; Joh and Kim 2003; Shin and Chang 2003). 
Capital structures of corporations are closely intertwined with external factors such as 
                                                
17 According to Shin and Chang (2003: 50-51), Korean firms’ average debt-ratio between 1980 
and 1991 was 3.662. They claim that this ratio “is not exceptionally high by international 
standard” (2003: 50) in that the ratio of Japan was 3.688, and even some other advanced countries 




social, political, or financial environments that corporations face. Therefore, despite the 
fact that the IMF emphasized that lowering chaebols’ debt-to-equity ratio was a crucial 
criterion to measure the soundness of financial performance, the debt-to-equity ratio itself 
needs to be understood as a context-bound performance measure rather than a 
decontextualized universal standard to judge corporate performance. 
Due to this undeniable feature of the embedded nature of economic practices in 
social relations (Granovetter 1985), a group of scholars (e.g., Shin and Chang 2003; 
Stiglitz 2002) commonly indicate that one cannot merely ascribe Korea’s financial crisis 
of 1997 to the high debt of big business groups. Instead, it seems to be a more pertinent 
approach to try to make sense of this economic crisis with a broader perspective; that is, 
what overall international as well as domestic economic conditions triggered this 
financial crisis. Concerning domestic economic conditions, on the one hand, this crisis 
was closely related to the Korean government’s industrial policies that did not properly 
regulate some chaebols’ ineffective over-investment in some industries. On the other 
hand, the government’s ill-designed financial liberalization policies during the transition 
“from a state-controlled economy to market-based economy” since the early 1990s 
(Chang 2003: 38) did not properly monitor capital flows in general and chaebols’ 
accumulated foreign debts in particular (Chang 2003; Shin and Chang 2003; Palma 2003; 
Stiglitz 2002). With regard to this issue, Joseph Stiglitz (2002: 99) explicitly states that “I 
[Stiglitz] believe that capital account liberalization was the single most important factor 
leading to the crisis” (Stiglitz 2002: 99, Italics original). Parallel to the de-regulated 




influx and efflux of free floating foreign capital across national boundaries in a short 
period was an international condition. Stiglitz (2002: 99-100) writes about this situation 
as follows: 
 
Capital market liberalization made the developing countries subject to both the 
rational and the irrational whims of the investor community, to their irrational 
exuberance and pessimism. Keynes was well aware of the often seemingly 
irrational changes in sentiments. In The General Theory of Employment, Interest 
and Money (1935), he referred to these huge and often inexplicable swings in 




Similar to Stiglitz’s argument, Gabriel Palma (2003), as a result of his comparative 
analysis of a series of financial market opening processes in developing countries like 
Mexico (1988-1994), Brazil (1994-1999), and Korea (1988-1997) during the neoliberal 
era, reports that poorly administered or unprepared capital markets opening sooner or 
later tended to lead to a financial crisis.  
What is noteworthy is that a series of ups and downs during the reform efforts for 
corporate restructuring after the financial crisis of 1997 show the trial to change 
endogenous institutions - e.g., corporate rules and practices - could be a challenging and 
even fragile undertaking when it is primarily triggered by exogenous forces. Concerning 
institutional change,18 W. Richard Scott points out that institutional change has external 
as well as internal reasons: 
                                                
18 For DiMaggio and Powell (1991: 8-9), institution refers to “a rulelike status in social thought 
and action.” In addition, DiMaggio and Powell, referring to Zucker, point out that 
““institutionalization” means “phenomenological process by which certain social relationships 
and actions come to be taken for granted” and a state of affairs in which shared cognitions define 





Institutional systems undergo change for both external and internal reasons. 
Exogenous change may be occasioned by disruptions occurring in wider or 
neighboring systems - whether for political, economic, or social reasons - that 
destabilize existing rules and understandings. Frequently, carriers of “new” 
institutional logics invade from “foreign” realms and colonize existing stable 
fields. [...] Endogenous sources of change include gaps or mismatches between 
more macro systems and micro activities in response to local circumstances, 
inconsistencies existing between institutional elements or competing frameworks, 
and persisting poor performance levels in relation to expectations (Scott 2008: 
437, Italics added). 
 
 
Here the main issue is not about how strong the exogenous forces to change the 
endogenously taken-for-granted economic routines and practices are. Rather, it is 
necessary to be more attentive to under which endogenous conditions exogenous 
pressures would be substantially forceful to trigger and even drive institutional change. It 
is of particular importance to pay attention to how the interests of the government and 
chaebols are closely attached to specific institutional transformations or changes, and in 
what ways they interact with each other and react to exogenous pressure.   
The Korean government and chaebols were two principal endogenous carriers, 
regardless of their merits and demerits. Furthermore, both of them were responsible for 
the execution and practice of exogenously imposed “new institutional logics” as new 
rules and regulations in concrete endogenous contexts right after the financial crisis of 
1997. Keeping in mind a public acknowledgement of chaebols as one of the main pillars 
in the Korean economy, let us examine Biggart’s emphasis on people’s “shared meaning 
to reality.” She claims, “Although institutional theories of organizations vary, for the 




people interpret and give shared meaning to reality. Over time, these shared meanings 
come to be understood as ‘institutionalized’ structures of social action” (Biggart 1997: 
217). Despite Biggart’s apt remark on the social identification of chaebols, what she did 
not bring out clearly, it seems, was whose interests matter more than others in this 
process. 
It is true that chaebols in Korea have been formally identified as an economic 
entity under specified legal regulation. However, before legal designation and regulation 
of chaebols, Koreans already knew what chaebols were even though they did not clearly 
specify a chaebol as a set of interconnected firms. In other words, there was an ongoing 
process of social recognition of chaebols prior to their legal identification. Chaebols 
began to get public attention due to their increasing influence on economic, social, and 
political fields. Accordingly, it raised public concern about the tendency of chaebols’ 
over-expansion in the Korean society. People began to bring up the necessity to check 
and regulate chaebols’ omnipotence. Finally, it can be said that the identification of 
chaebols as legal entities arose out of the public – the people and the government – 
discernment about chaebols’ increasing influence on the Korean society. 
Moreover, with regard to the social recognition of chaebols, it is worth 
remembering whose interpretations have been more influential than those of others in the 
process of the imposition of corporate identity on chaebols. As it were, 
institutionalization needs to be understood not as an outcome by an anonymous mass 
“beyond the reach of interest and politics” but as “a product of the political efforts of 




the form that the resulting institution takes depend on the relative power of the actors 
who support, oppose, or otherwise strive to influence it” (DiMaggio 1988: 13). That is, 
one should not disregard how endogenous agents attach their own group interests to the 
efforts of institutional change during this convoluting period. 
 Hall and Soskice’s (2001) categorization of two different types of market 
economies – liberal market economies and coordinated market economies – could be a 
relevant reference point to grasp the overall feature of the Korean economy. Hall and 
Soskice (2001), while tackling the issue of how to understand varieties of capitalism, 
suggest that it is necessary to shift the research focus from the nation-state to firms, and 
hence account for different roles of firms under different institutional contexts. They 
define firms as “actors seeking to develop and exploit core competences or dynamic 
capabilities understood as capacities for developing, producing, and distributing goods 
and services profitably” (Hall and Soskice 2001: 6). Firms’ success depends on its ability 
to coordinate internal and external relations with a wide range of “actors” and other 
organizations. First of all, concerning internal and external relations in which each firm is 
embedded, they suggest that there are two types of economies: liberal market economies 
(LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs). In LMEs, firms’ coordination 
activities depend on hierarchies and competitive market arrangements [arm’s-length 
exchange of goods or services]. So the equilibrium outcome of firm behavior is given by 
supply and demand conditions in competitive markets. In contrast to LMEs, firms’ 
coordination activities for building competitive competencies under CMEs depend on 




Thus, the equilibrium outcomes of firm behavior are more often given by the result of 
strategic interactions among firms and other actors (Hall and Soskice 2001: 17). 
The second major argument Hall and Soskice raise, in addition to their 
categorization of LMEs and CMEs, is that “(institutional) structure conditions (corporate) 
strategy” (2001: 14). In other words, institutions influence human behaviors and decision 
making. Although the influence of institutions on human behaviors looks like a taken-for-
granted idea, what is important here is Hall and Soskice underscore that institutional 
structure does not fully determine but “conditions” or “influences” corporate strategy. 
That is why Hall and Soskice claim that “strategy follows structure” (2001: 14). Since 
strategic interactions are central to the behavior of economic actors, different institutional 
frameworks of the political economy would generate a different corporate strategy (2001: 
16). Corporate strategy is not determined by institutions but conditioned by institutions. 
Here institutions refer to “socializing agencies that instill a particular set of norms or 
attitudes in those who operate within them” (2001: 5). The corporate strategy pattern of 
Korean chaebol and Japanese keiretsu are grounded on “group-based” coordinated 
market economies (Hall and Soskice 2001: 34). DiMaggio (2001: 213-214), similar to the 
argument of Hall and Soskice, claims that vertically organized business groups like 
chaebols are frequently observed organizational forms when both the level of 
coordination among firms and the extent of domination of some firms over others are 
high.  
When this idea is applied to the comprehension of network structures or corporate 




determine but condition chaebols’ corporate strategies. Considering an increasing social 
awareness of chaebols as a critical economic entity, the attempt to attribute the general 
corporate culture of chaebols – e.g., the emphasis on filial loyalty and hierarchical 
relationships – to Korean traditional culture could be seen as a kind of ex post facto 
endeavor to gain legitimacy about family-based corporate control from corporate insiders 
in particular as well as from the society in general. 
 Ronald Dore’s (1983) account of Japanese “obligated relational contracting” is a 
good exemplary case to show how economic strategies or practices are socially 
constructed by those who have a stake in contractual relationships with the backing of 
specific institutional conditions. According to Dore, obligated relational contracting is 
grounded on equal risk sharing security and long-term advantage, dutifulness, and 
friendliness among parties who were involved in economic exchange. What is striking is 
there was no such economic practice as an obligated relational contracting in the 
Japanese economy before and right after the Second World War. 
 
Japan of the 1920s, and again in the post-war period, was much more of a 
cutthroat jungle than it is today. Not the ethics of relational contracting nor the 
emphasis on product quality nor the life-time employment system, seem to have 
been at all characteristic of earlier periods of Japanese industrialization. 
Add all these fragments together and an obvious hypothesis emerges that 
relational contracting is a phenomenon of affluence, a product, Hobhouse would 
say, of moral evolution. It is when people become better off and the market-stall 
haggle gives way to the world of Which, where best buys are defined more by 







Relational contracting, so to speak, was not a historical legacy transmitted from the 
traditional Japanese society. Rather, it was socially constructed a good while after the 
Second World War under auspices of changing social and economic conditions that 
became favorable institutional backdrops for the formation of relational contracting. This 
historical example shows what is taken for granted in a society at some point is in fact not 
always a fixed entity beyond time, but a historical construct by those who have an interest 
in this construct.  
A series of corporate restructuring policies along with severe economic recession 
in 1998 became unprecedented environmental pressures for chaebols. The owners of the 
business groups had no choice but to react to a series of environmental pressures in order 
to show some positive signals to the market so that they could cut through and survive 
under these circumstances (Bridges 2001: 73-81). All in all, major endogenous reform 
attempts were triggered by the exogenous pressure; the IMF pushed the Korean 
government to follow the IMF’s reform suggestions in return for financial help to save 
the Korean economy from national bankruptcy. The reform policies to change the Korean 
economy in general and chaebols in particular were executed by the superficially 
thorough governmental regulations (Chang 2006: 66; Guillen 2001: 197). Therefore, as 
the government gradually drew back corporate reform policies following positive signs of 
recovery in the Korean economy in 1999, chaebols also slowed down their half-hearted 
restructuring process. However, when the boom in the information-technology industry in 
Korea rapidly collapsed after March 2000, there was another downturn in the Korean 




1997 to reform their corporate governance patterns so that they could effectively adapt to 
convoluting environmental conditions. Even so, after many twists and turns, the Korean 
government finally completed the repayment of the bailout loan, which was provided by 
the IMF, on August 23, 2001. This official announcement of completion was three years 
earlier than originally scheduled. 
 
2.10. Summary 
Regarding the change of legislative regulation and the corporate restructuring policies for 
the resolution of the 1997 crisis, which was triggered by exogenous pressure on large 
Korean corporations via the Korean government, as the backdrop of environmental 
pressure and institutional change, one examines how Korean business groups maintain 
their inter-organizational network structures and how these network structures are related 
to corporate control and performance. How does relational mechanism work for the 
family-based corporate control over chaebols? How does the configuration of linkages 
among firms within a business group influence the affiliated firms’ corporate 
performance? 
Confronted with the unexpected financial crisis in 1997 and the corporate 
restructuring policies carried out by the Korean government under the strong pressure of 
the IMF, business group owners and family members had no choice but to react to 
environmental pressures for corporate survival and, more than anything else, for the sake 
of maintaining their controlling power over affiliated firms. What is important is the 




family-based dominance over the business groups under tumultuous environmental 
uncertainty and rapidly changing institutional conditions. 
The corporate control patterns of business groups are closely intertwined with 
groups’ network structures. Korean business groups are not composed of one firm or one 
conglomerate but a strategic contrivance as a set of interconnected firms.19 By effectively 
utilizing and strategically (re)organizing the network structures of inter-firm ownership 
ties so as to buffer business groups from environmental pressure, the group owners and 
family members tried to maintain their overarching ownership and controlling power 
over affiliated firms. 
Considering chaebols’ overall corporate features and environmental conditions, 
the main issue, while analyzing network structures of business groups, is in what ways 
the business groups take the form of their own group structures and what patterned 
relational structures contribute to the group owner’s and family members’ robust 
corporate control over entire affiliated firms of their group. At the same time, which 
structured patterns of inter-firm relations of the business groups have been shaped and 
changed is another main issue. The retrieval of the patterned network relations by which 
the business groups are composed shows how family-based robust corporate control is 
exerted on the business group over time since the overall control of the chaebol owner 
and family members over affiliated firms is derived from the intricate network structure 
                                                
19 Neither “a set of firms bound merely by short-term strategic alliances” nor “a set of firms 





of the business group.20 In addition to the retrieval of the patterned network structure, the 
other primary issue is to what extent and in what ways business groups have shown 
“variations” of the forms of inter-firm network structures (Granovetter 1994; 2005). 
Rather than assume the existence of one monolithically fixed type of business groups, the 
research focus of business groups is on “why firms adopt the organizational form of the 
business group rather than some other form, and what explains the many variations in the 
way business groups are constructed” (Granovetter 2005: 431). If there are variations of 
inter-organizational relations within Korean business groups, I examine what the unique 
different types of inter-organizational patterns among business groups are and which 






                                                
20 Concerning the intertwined association between family-based corporate control and network 
structure of the business group in Korea, Zeitlin’s (1974: 1098-1099) description is also relevant 
to explain how the family-based corporate control is embedded in the network structure of the 
business group. For example, even if chaebol owners and family members own the same amount 
of financial resources for their corporate control over the entire group, their substantial influence 
on the business group could vary. This difference depends on the type of network structure by 
which the business group is constructed: “Moreover, given such family ‘spheres of influence’ 
which radiate out among several large corporations, it should be understood that the same small 
proportion of the stock in the hands of such a family in a specific corporation carries different 
implications and potential for control than when held by a single individual with no other major 
resources and institutions to buttress his position. It is known that a great number of related 
individuals may participate in the ownership of family bloc, utilizing a complex holding pattern 
to keep control concentrated, despite the diffusion of ownership. Its control is exercised through 
entangling interests in several interrelated corporations, rather than limited to one, then such 










CHAPTER THREE. NETWORK STRUCTURE AND CORPORATE CONTROL 
 
3.1. Overview 
The rapid economic growth under the guide of the East Asian developmental states since 
the 1970s raised an academic interest in the forms of economic organizations in East 
Asian capitalism. Organizational and economic sociologists have been interested in 
chaebol in Korea and keiretsu in Japan, and the primary research focuses were on what 
kinds of group operating mechanisms were associated with and contributed to the rapid 
economic growth in these countries. The relational features of business groups have 
received attention not only from academia but also from real economies. Biggart and 
Hamilton (1992: 474-475, 486) regard “business networks” as an “institutional feature of 
Asian capitalism”: “The Japanese and Korean economies are ruled by networks of 
medium-sized to very large firms.” When the financial crisis of 1997 hit Southeast Asian 
countries in general and then the Korean economy in particular, chaebols once again 
captured people’s attention. While experiencing the unprecedented financial crisis of 
1997, some Korean chaebols went technically and substantially bankrupt between 1997 




the form itself of Korean business groups did not wither away but survived. Even though 
the issue of business groups has been a consistent interest in sociology, the topic has 
acquired a renewed interest throughout this historic event. 
The central concern in this chapter is to investigate how different patterns of the 
network structure of Korean business groups contribute to the robust corporate control of 
the group owner and family members over the business group when confronted with an 
unexpected environmental uncertainty. The focus is not to examine the mere presence or 
absence of inter-organizational relations but rather to reveal the patterned inter-
organizational relations in Korean business groups at the group level. Considering the 
Korean financial crisis of 1997 and its aftermath as a natural experiment, I examine the 
inter-organizational network structures of the top twenty-eight business groups in Korea 
during the research period of 1997-2003. 
 
3. 2. Network Structures of Business Groups 
It is generally acknowledged that Korean business groups take the form of centralized, 
hierarchically organized inter-organizational relationships. Orru, Biggart, and Hamilton 
(1991) claim that when one controls the size of business groups, the Korean business 
groups take a form of “a centralized management and ownership structure”: “If we 
discount the effects of size, [...] South Korean business groups [show] the predominance 
of one isomorphic network configuration: a centralized management and ownership 
structure controlled by a founding patriarch and heirs” (Orru, Biggart, and Hamilton 




business groups is likely to be caught in a snare of sweeping generalizations. As a result, 
these generalizations would obscure the possible variation of patterned inter-firm 
relations of chaebols. Therefore, the issue is how well this sweeping generalization about 
the form of chaebols at the group level represents the network structure of Korean 
business groups. The study of corporate control and management of Korean business 
groups needs to pay attention to what types of corporate control patterns are more 
prevalent than other types under certain conditions instead of trying to identify a typified 
representative type for entire business groups.  
It has been generally acknowledged that different forms of network structures 
were regarded as substantial ways that made it possible for the chaebol owner and family 
members to control the affiliated firms. However, it is ironic that the possible variations 
of network structures of chaebols have rarely been examined with empirical evidence 
with a few exceptions (e.g., Chang 1999; Feenstra and Hamilton 2006). While studying 
the forms of business groups, The focus of this research is to investigate what types of 
intercorporate relations the chaebol owner and family members utilize in order to control 
the group. The examination of interorganizational network structures of Korean business 
groups would be critical to verify or refute whether such a sweeping generalization is 
relevant or not. 
Thus, when the group size – the number of affiliated firms – is taken into account, 
certain types of network structures can be identified as representatives of the various 
patterns of ownership and control of chaebols. One investigates to what extent the 




structure of each Korean business group would be anchored on some specific locus in the 
continuum ranging from a more centralized, hierarchical ownership and control at one 
end to a less centralized, hierarchical ownership and control at the other. 
A group of recent studies (e.g., Feenstra and Hamilton 2006; Hall and Soskice 
2001; Jackson 2003) emphasize intra-social variation within intra-social isomorphism. 
That is, compared with most institutional organizational studies (e.g., DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983), they stress that one needs to heed different types of economic practices 
within the same institutional context. This is a critical, indirect criticism on new 
institutionalism in sociology and political science. Culture and institution cannot always 
be treated as the ultimate underpinning to determine a different pattern of economic 
activities. Yet most institutionalists tend to stress intra-social isomorphism among 
organizations in the process of field construction within a nation state while underscoring 
the inter-social variation of the organizational structures among different economies. 
Therefore, the overemphasis on the isomorphic organizational practice within a nation is 
likely to fail to capture the existence of a varying degree of organizational practices based 
on the network structures and the positions of firms within a specific industry or within a 
domestic economy. Finally, the simultaneous focus on “variations” as well as similarities 
of the business groups would be a valid way to make sense of Korean business groups. 
 
3. 3. Equity Shareholding as Intercorporate Ties 
A business group does not consist of one big firm nor a conglomerate but instead a group 




multiple ties such as blood, social, and financial relationships. Equity shareholding 
among member firms is not the only tie that connects affiliated firms and affiliated 
persons in Korean business groups for corporate control (Keister 2000: 29-31): “A 
business group is more than a group of firms with economic connections. In a business 
group, there are social connections as well that bind group members and that distinguish 
this type of alliance from the other organizational forms” (Keister 2000: 29).  
Then, the question arises as to what binds together legally independent firms into 
an economically interconnected business group despite the fact that these affiliated firms 
within a business group are legally independent economic organizations.21 Although 
interlocking directorates have been major research objects in analyzing the corporate and 
market networks (e.g., Baker 1990; Gerlach 1992; Keister 2000), the roles and positions 
of directors or executives in chaebols have been subject to the group chairman’s decision 
in the last instance under the umbrella of the chaebols’ family-based corporate 
governance pattern. In contrast, it is the ownership relations by equity shareholdings that 
are widely acknowledged as the ties to interconnect both affiliated persons and affiliated 
firms in a business group. For example, Hamilton (1998: 187) called these ties “capital 
networks,” Scott (1991: 198) refers to them as “capital and personal relations,” and Shin 
and Chang (2003: 26-32) use the term “interlocked shareholding.” Therefore, both equity 
shareholding among affiliated firms and equity shareholding of affiliated firms by 
affiliated people within a business group are the links for overarching family-based 
                                                
21 The legally independent status of affiliated firms of a business group in Korea makes the 




corporate control over affiliated firms via a few major affiliated firms in most Korean 
business groups. 
Thus, on the one hand, asymmetric equity shareholding among affiliated firms 
within a business group reflects the differential allotment of controlling power among 
affiliated firms. On the other hand, this patterned equity shareholding represents the inter-
organizational network structure of a business group. Accordingly, equity shareholding 
ties under the control of the chaebol owner and his or her family members are the 
principal way for the formation of the business group as well as the family-based 
ownership of and control over the business group. Considering such an organizational 
control pattern of chaebols, I examine the patterned equity shareholding relations within 
each business group in order to retrieve which “organizing” and “controlling” 
mechanisms work within inter-organizational economic networks. 
 
3. 4. General Group Structure 
How was the small number of individuals, consisting of the group owner and the owner’s 
family members, capable of exerting their robust controlling power on all affiliated firms 
over time? In regard to this question, Korean business groups are “essentially owned by a 
single family - very common, though this ownership may be masked by indirect control 
through holding companies and pyramids” (Granovetter 2005: 433). Under the umbrella 
of family ownership of chaebols, “centralized ownership may be the vehicle for 
centralized control” (Granovetter 2005: 433) even though they are not exactly correlated 




social network analysis on Korean business groups, underscores that “strong central 
control is supported by patterns of shareholding that concentrate ownership in a single 
family, across large numbers of group firms” (Granovetter 2005: 433). 
Here, the main issue is to understand what mechanisms work not only for the 
consolidation of family ownership and control and but also for the integration of a 
business group. Comprehending the control mechanism requires a close examination of 
the network structures of business groups throughout equity shareholding. The 
construction of the dependent or asymmetrically interdependent relations with regard to 
resource allocations, distributions, and transactions among legally independent firms 
could result in close inter-firm relationships. However, more than anything else, 
hierarchically coordinated linkage via equity shareholding among affiliated firms 
strengthens the controlling power of the group owner and the small number of family 
members over affiliated firms. 
The well-coordinated formation and maintenance of inter-organizational relations 
is a central task for chaebol family members in order to effectively own and control their 
entire group. Therefore, the flow of resources in the inter-organizational network would 
entail not only the distribution and control of financial resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978) but also the implementation of authority as a legitimate power (Weber 1968) at the 
group level. These inter-organizational conditions sometimes implicitly assume the 
member firms’ commitment toward common goals such as the survival of the business 
group itself at the expense of some affiliated firms’ sacrifice. As the interconnections of 




strategically utilize its inter-firm ties as a collective safeguard in order to protect affiliated 
firms from environmental uncertainty and financial pressure. It is due to the fact that the 
mobilization and allocation of resources at the group level could help some troubled 
firms lessen their financial burden (e.g., Lincoln, Gerlach, and Ahmadjian 1996). 
Yet, in contrast to the positive aspects of hierarchically coordinated network 
structure of chaebols, the same structure could sometimes be a constraint to bring about 
negative consequences at the group level. For example, if there are a few financially 
troubled or bankrupt firms within a business group, then this predicament at first could 
affect other affiliated firms which are directly related with the troubled firms at the local 
boundary within a group. However, if this trouble goes beyond the carrying capacity at 
the local level, then it is likely to result in a negative chain reaction at the group level 
since troubled affiliated firms are directly or indirectly interrelated with other affiliated 
firms throughout equity shareholding ties under the umbrella of family ownership and 
control. 
 
3. 5. Patterns of Control 
Concerning the organizing control mechanisms of the chaebol owners through 
shareholding, a group of scholars (Biggart 1997: 229-233; Granovetter 1994; Hattori 
1989: 87-88; Jeong 2004: 79-82; Kim 2003; La Porta et al. 1999; Scott 1991; Shin and 
Chang 2003; Yoo and Lee 1987: 97-98) point out a pyramid type of control through 
shareholding as the distinctive network structure that supports family-based ownership 




analytic network model that is expected to represent a pyramid type by using the social 
network framework. 
Furthermore, whatever distinctive network structure each business group takes, 
two major ownership patterns are consistently observed in chaebols over time. One 
network pattern is that the chaebol owner and family members directly own the shares of 
major or minor affiliated firms within a business group. The role of the group owner and 
his or her family members is of importance for the effective corporate control over 
chaebols because the corporate control of business groups is closely intermingled with 
social ties such as family members in a direct line and relatives (e.g., Padgett and Ansell 
1993; White 1985). For the effective persistence of group control, the group owner’s and 
family members’ ownership of the share of affiliated firms usually tends to be 
concentrated on core firms.  
The other network pattern is that some flagship firms and nonprofit organizations 
or foundations, which are already owned and controlled by the chaebol owner and family 
members, own the shares of other affiliated or subsidiary firms.22 Here, these core firms 
might work as a lever in lifting up family members’ overall influence on affiliated firms 
throughout the organizing and reorganizing of network relations among firms within a 
                                                
22 Under these interorganizational shareholding ties, “member companies of a chaebol not only 
hold shares of the other member companies but also guarantee their loans and debts” (Shin and 





business group. That is, these major affiliated firms act like pseudo holding companies as 
the intermediary between family members and minor affiliated firms.23 
To recapitulate, the organizing control mechanism in a chaebol is that the chaebol 
owner and his or her family members directly control the major or minor affiliated firms. 
Then, these major affiliated firms control not only each other but also other affiliated or 
subsidiary firms within a business group. For that reason, the control of the major firms 
over minor firms could be considered an indirect route that was strategically contrived for 
the effective family-based control over business group. Both direct and indirect 
ownership ties enable the chaebol owners and family members to have a good hold on 
entire affiliated firms at the group level despite the fact that they do not directly own the 
shares of all affiliated firms. Finally, the interorganizational relations of Korean business 
groups need to be considered not so much the arbitrarily constructed fixture as the 
strategically coordinated construct for the effective family-based corporate control under 
given environmental situations. 
The fact that relational features of Korean business groups are the binding force 
integrating affiliated firms as well as the principal route that makes it possible for family 
members to predominantly manage and control affiliated firms raises the following 
crucial issues: What types of intercorporate network structures do chaebols have? Do 
these network structures have any variations? Did business groups experience any drastic 
                                                
23 Holding companies were not allowed by the Korean government until the financial crisis of 
1997. In addition, the Korean Fair Trade Act forbids the direct circular cross-shareholding 
between two affiliated firms within a business group but it is tolerant of transitive type of cross-
shareholding among three firms. As a result, Chang (2003: 165) writes, “Korean chaebols have 
devised more complicated cross-shareholding schemes to increase equity stakes by affiliates far 




structural transformations while they were faced with an unanticipated environmental 
uncertainty such as the financial crisis of 1997 and an unprecedented strong pressure on 
structural reforms under the supervision of the Korean government? 
 
3. 6. Data and Method 
 
3. 6. 1. Data 
As previously stated, chaebol is not merely a sum of firms but a group of firms that is 
composed of a coordinated relationships of firms. This inter-organizational feature of 
business groups needs to be analyzed in terms of a relational perspective. Social network 
framework is used as a method as well as a theory to scrutinize the relational features of 
business groups. Publicly available data are used for the analysis of network structure  for 
each business group. One primarily uses the data from The Ownership Structure of 
Korean Chaebols (2005). In this volume, the main author, Jin-Bang Kim, provides data 
on equity shareholding of the top thirty-four chaebols over a seven-year period from 1997 
to 2003.24 These data were collected from various original sources and constructed as the 
result of the group research project.25  
                                                
24 Although Kim collected the information of thirty-four top business groups’ equity shareholding, 
he did not provide enough information on the equity shareholding of six business groups to 
construct the matrix of intra-group equity shareholding. In those cases, one omitted these business 
groups from this research since those cases missed information for social network analysis. 
However, this omission, one believes, does not harm the goal of this research because these six 
groups are not ranked as top tier in the Korean economy. 
 
25 It is reported that two research institutes were involved in this project: Participatory Society 
Research Center and The Institute of Business and Economic Research - under the financial 




The annual reports on chaebols published by the Korean Fair Trade Commission 
(KFTC) are also used as a complementary source for social network analysis. The KFTC 
is the central administrative organization under the authority of the prime minister and 
functions as a quasi-judiciary body. This commission formulates and administers 
competition policy. It also deliberates, oversees and handles antitrust cases within the 
Korean economy. The KFTC has been annually designating the largest Korean business 
groups since 1986. The purpose of this designation was to curb and supervise the 
excessive concentration of economic power on chaebols. Whether or not a specific firm 
belongs to one business group depends on the proportion of affiliated firms’ and affiliated 
people’s ownership of this specific firm. If more than thirty percent of the shares of a 
firm is owned by a specific business group’s controlling shareholder(s) and its affiliated 
companies, then this firm is counted as an affiliated firm of this specific business group. 
Here, affiliated people refer to those who own a certain amount of shares of equity in a 
specific firm. These people include (1) the chaebol founder and his family members who 
are involved in corporate activity – that is, the founder of a business group or the 
incumbent owner, his or her direct line family members (wife, sons and daughters), sons-
in-law, daughters-in-law, the founder’s brothers and relatives such as third cousins on the 
father’s side and cousins on the mother’s side, (2) top senior executives who own equity 
shares of affiliated firms, and (3) non-profit foundations or charities26 owned by the 
chaebol owner’s family.27 
                                                
26 A group of scholars indicate that chaebol owners have utilized non-profit organizations, 
foundations, or charities owned by the chaebol owner or his family members as the detour for the 




The selection criterion of the top Korean business groups was based on the size of 
the total assets of each group. When the KFTC began to examine and report the list of the 
Korean business groups, its specific designation criterion was grounded on whether each 
group’s total assets were over 400 billion Won (a Korean currency unit)28 or not. The 
KFTC changed its policy slightly after 1993, and began to designate only the top thirty 
business groups although the designation criterion was still the same. Once a group of 
firms are officially designated as the top thirty business groups, this group was then 
banned from having direct mutual cross-shareholdings between two affiliated firms 
within a business group by the regulation of the KFTC.  
 
3. 6. 2. Method 
Based on the data and supplementary information on business groups, I constructed the 
equity shareholding matrices of each business group. There are two main reasons that I 
make the matrices and do social network analysis: one is to identify the network 
structures of each business group; the other is to examine how these business network 
                                                                                                                                            
foundations, run by their chaebols, to avoid these taxes” (Chang 2003: 172, Italics added); “In 
anticipation of the centrifugal tendencies of property-inheritance norms, the complexities of 
multiform management, and state policies designed to separate ownership and management, the 
chaebol have taken measures to assure familial succession and chaebol longevity. Many of the 
chaebol founders established foundations to which they turned over much of their personal assets. 
Ostensibly charitable organizations, these foundations have provided a convenient institutional 
method for circumventing cultural norms of succession and inheritance and passing on assets 
outside the scrutiny of government policy makers and tax authorities'’’’ (Kang 1996: 104, Italics 
added). 
 
27 The category of these affiliated persons rests on the suggestion by the Korean Fair Trade 
Commission (KFTC). The major reason that the KFTC set up this affiliated persons’ category 
was to examine and check the chaebol owner’s excessive concentration of economic power. 
28 400 billion Won can be converted to four hundred million US dollars if one counts 1000 won 




structures work for the robust control of the chaebol owner and family members over the 
affiliated firms. First of all, I created two different types of matrices for each business 
group during each year of research period. The construction of both matrices is grounded 
on the percentage stake that affiliated people or affiliated firms hold in each affiliated 
firm that belongs to the same business group. One matrix is generally called the incidence 
- rectangular - matrix and it shows the affiliated persons’ shareholding percentage of 
affiliated firms in each business group. The other matrix is the adjacency - square - 
matrix that represents the shareholding percentage between affiliated firms in each 
business group.29  
The existence of relations between nodes – relations between affiliated firms and 
affiliated people in an incidence matrix or relations between affiliated firms in an 
adjacency matrix – represents the presence of directed ties between nodes. Specifically 
speaking, in the incidence matrix of affiliated persons and affiliated firms – [m (row) x n 
(column)] – m is the affiliated persons and n is the affiliated companies of which shares 
are held by the affiliated persons. Therefore, the number in a cell (i, j) of this matrix 
represents the percentage stake of firm j’s share held by affiliated person(s) i. In the 
adjacency matrix of shareholding – [n (row) x n (column)] – n is the affiliated firms 
                                                
29 There are two reasons that I construct two different matrices: theoretical and practical reasons. 
In regard to theoretical reasons, the owner family’s controlling interest over a business group is 
generally one crucial feature of a business group. At the same time, the owner family’s control 
over a business group through inter-organizational relations among major affiliated firms is 
another important characteristic of a business group. As a group of scholars (Granovetter 2005; 
Scott 1991; Shin and Chang 2003) commonly point out, these two different types of network 
relations are used as major strategic routes for overarching corporate control in Korean business 
groups. Concerning practical reasons, the original data I use for this research are also composed 
of these two different types of data. Therefore, based on these theoretical and practical reasons, I 




within the business group and the value in a cell (i, j) stands for the percentage stake of 
firm j’s share held by firm i. Since the primary focus of this study is to investigate the 
patterned relations among firms within a business group and these firms’ positions, which 
are expected to contribute to both the chaebol owner’s control over the business group 
and the maintenance of group identity among affiliated member firms, I underscore the 
presence and absence of ties among firms.30 
 
3. 7. Blockmodeling 
By using blockmodeling (White, Boorman, and Breiger 1976), I try to comprehend the 
simplified network structure of each business group. One of the strengths of 
blockmodeling is the reduction of “the enormous complexity of social networks” 
(Bearman 1993: 73). In particular, blockmodeling reveals how some affiliated firms take 
anticipated or even unanticipated positions in the relations of other firms and how they 
change their positions over time. More than anything else, blockmodeling is expected to 
posit nodes into a specific position as a kind of group of nodes through a partitioning and 
aggregating process of the original sociomatrix.  
A series of the reshuffling process finally shows “sets of structurally equivalent 
actors” (White, Boorman, and Breiger 1976: 739). Structurally equivalent actors occupy a 
structurally equivalent position if they have relations of identical ways to other identical 
actors. Thus, it is a block that refers to a set of structurally equivalent actors. 
                                                
30 After constructing two matrices of each chaebol in each year, I also transformed valued ties 





Blockmodeling makes it possible to classify the affiliated firms into different blocks 
based on a similar pattern of each firm’s relations with other firms. However, it does not 
necessarily mean that affiliated firms themselves within the same block are directly 
connected with each other and shape a cohesive group. Finally, the process of 
blockmodeling is not based on the attributes of each firm but instead based on the 
patterned relations of each firm with others. Using CONCOR (CONvergence of iterated 
CORrelations) – “a hierarchical clustering algorithm that partitions men into possible 
blocks and then finds a blockmodel by inspecting the data matrices rearranged according 
to the partition” (White, Boorman, and Breiger 1976: 745) –, I especially examine each 
block’s composition by affiliated firms, the overall configuration of affiliated firms 
within a business group, and its changing pattern of composition and configuration 
during the turbulent period from 1997 to 2003. 
While examining the overall features of each affiliated firm’s relational features 
in a business group, I try to identify each block’s different positions and its 
accompanying roles in the overall network structure of each specific business group. In 
greater detail, the affiliated firms would occupy different positions: (1) core, (2) 
intermediary, and (3) periphery. Different roles – the controller, the mediator, and the 
controlled – are also expected to be performed in accordance with different positions in 
the inter-firm network structure of business groups (Wasserman and Faust 1994); 
“Whereas network position refers to a collection of actions, network roles refers to 
association among relations that link social positions. [...] Roles within a corporate 




also important to note that roles are defined not simply on the linkages between the two 
positions, but on how relations link the entire collection of actors and positions 
throughout the network” (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 349). 
In determining the cut-off criterion in the process of constructing image matrices 
and reduced graphs in blockmodeling, the overall density of each business group per year 
is used as a yardstick for deciding the cut-off level. In other words, the overall density of 
each sociomatrix (Table 3.2. Overall Density of Interfirm Relations within Each Business 
Group, 1997-2003) is used as the reference point for the construction of each chaebol’s 
image matrix during each year that is derived from each business group’s density table as 
a consequence of blockmodeling (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 397-401; White, Boorman, 
and Breiger 1976: 745). The transformation of a density table into an image matrix 
occurs in the following manner: if any block’s density in the density table is above the 
overall mean density, then this block’s density is transformed into one [1], otherwise it is 
zero [0]. The simplified image matrix of each business group is created by the 
comparison of each block’s density with an overall density (See Figure 3.1. Image 
Matrices of Blockmodels of Business Groups, 1997-2003). After creating image matrices, 
the reduced graphs of blockmodels are drawn for visual presentation based on image 








Table 3.1. Number of Firms within Each Business Group, 1997-2003 
 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
CJ 13 13 16(+4/-1) 28(+15/-3) 28(+2/-2) 30(+6/-4) 34(+4) 
Daelim 21 17(-4) 18(+3/-2) 17(+1/-2) 15(+4/-6) 15(+1/-1) 14(+1/-2) 
Dongbu 24 22(-2) 22(+1/-1) 19(-3) 21(+2) 24(+3) 22(+1/-3) 
DongKuk 17 16(-1) 14(-2) 8(+2/-8) 6(-2) 7(+1) 8(+1) 
Kisco       7 8(+1) 10(+2) 11(+1) 
Dongwon 16 16 14(-2) 15(+2/-1) 17(+4/-2) 16(+1/-2) 17(+2/-1) 
Dongyang 24 22(-2) 24(+5/-3) 29(+5) 15(+1/-15) 15(+2/-2) 16(+1) 
Orion         23 24(+2/-1) 27(+5/-2) 
Dongyang Chemical 21 18(-3) 16(-2) 22(+6) 18(+2/-6) 19(+1) 19 
Doosan 23 14(+1/-10) 16(+3/-1) 16(+2/-2) 18(+6/-4) 22(+5/-1) 21(+3/-4) 
Hanjin 25 21(-4) 18(+5/-8) 19(+1) 21(+2) 21 23(+2) 
Hansol 19 20(+2/-1) 19(+1/-2) 19(+2/-2) 12(+1/-8) 13(+1) 11(-2) 
Hanwha 28 22(+1/-7) 23(+5/-4) 25(+4/-2) 26(+2/-1) 33(+7) 31(+2/-4) 
Hyundai 57 56(+5/-6) 34(+5/-27) 24(+2/-12) 12(+1/-13) 12 7(+1/-6) 
Hyundai Department     8 10(+2) 10(+1/-1) 18(+9/-1) 17(-1) 
Hyundai Development     3 9(+6) 10(+1) 9(+1/-2) 12(+3) 
Hyundai Haevy         5 6(+1) 6 
Hyundai Motor       15 25(+12/-2) 25(+1/-1) 25(+2/-2) 
Kolon 25 23(+1/-3) 15(+2/-10) 23(+9/-1) 26(+6/-3) 30(+5/-1) 30(+4/-4) 
Kumho 32 30(+2/-4) 19(+1/-12) 18(+1/-2) 15(+1/-4) 15(+1/-1) 16(+2/-1) 
LG 51 47(+3/-7) 41(+8/-14) 42(+5/-4) 48(+7/-1) 50(+6/-4) 45(+4/-9) 
Lotte 28 28 27(+2/-3) 31(+4) 32(+1) 35(+3) 35(+1/-1) 
Samsung 58 49(+5/14) 40(+1/-10) 63(+27/-4) 63(+4/-4) 63(+1/-1) 62(+1/-2) 
Seah 21 18(-3) 18(+2/-2) 20(+3/-1) 18(+1/-3) 18 28(+14/-4) 
SK 40 39(+7/-8) 38(+7/-8) 53(+16/-1) 63(+13/-3) 60(+4/-7) 58(+1/-3) 
Taekwang 9 10(+1) 11(+1) 15(+4) 18(+3) 20(+4/-2) 38(+18) 
Taihan 8 9(+1) 7(-2) 7 8(+1) 9(+1) 11(+2) 
Youngpoong 24 22(-2) 21(+3/-4) 24(+3) 24(+1/-1) 23(-1) 20(-3) 
 
In parenthesis, + (plus) and – (minus) numbers respectively refer to newly added firms to and 











Table 3.2. Overall Density of Interfirm Relations within Each Business Group, 1997-2003  
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
CJ 0.0897 0.0962 0.0667 0.0384 0.0344 0.0333 0.0312 
Daelim 0.0548 0.0662 0.0556 0.0735 0.081 0.0762 0.0824 
Dongbu 0.0797 0.0952 0.0952 0.1111 0.0857 0.0797 0.1082 
DongKuk 0.1434 0.1542 0.1978 0.1964 0.3 0.2381 0.2321 
Kisco       0.2143 0.1607 0.1556 0.1545 
Dongwon 0.0875 0.0917 0.1154 0.0952 0.0919 0.0833 0.0699 
Dongyang 0.0761 0.1017 0.0888 0.069 0.1429 0.1667 0.1458 
Orion         0.0534 0.0489 0.0442 
Dongyang Chemical 0.0571 0.0654 0.075 0.0628 0.0588 0.0585 0.0497 
Doosan 0.1245 0.1264 0.0917 0.1083 0.0948 0.0606 0.0667 
Hanjin 0.1033 0.1405 0.1438 0.1316 0.1214 0.1238 0.0968 
Hansol 0.1111 0.0974 0.1199 0.117 0.2121 0.1923 0.2273 
Hanwha 0.0728 0.0887 0.0672 0.0633 0.0615 0.0511 0.0559 
Hyundai 0.0501 0.0539 0.0971 0.1141 0.1667 0.1591 0.2143 
Hyundai Department     0.125 0.1 0.1222 0.1078 0.0956 
Hyundai Development     0.3333 0.1111 0.1111 0.125 0.0909 
Hyundai Haevy         0.2 0.1667 0.2 
Hyundai Motor       0.1381 0.0767 0.0833 0.085 
Kolon 0.0783 0.085 0.1619 0.0889 0.0769 0.0667 0.0678 
Kumho 0.0444 0.0586 0.117 0.1275 0.1619 0.1571 0.1417 
LG 0.0545 0.0652 0.061 0.0517 0.0421 0.0327 0.0268 
Lotte 0.1336 0.1362 0.1524 0.128 0.126 0.116 0.1151 
Samsung 0.043 0.0638 0.0929 0.0484 0.0492 0.0484 0.0505 
Seah 0.069 0.0817 0.1078 0.0895 0.0882 0.0784 0.0357 
SK 0.0423 0.0499 0.0519 0.0341 0.0264 0.028 0.0299 
Taekwang 0.0833 0.1 0.1 0.081 0.0621 0.0526 0.042 
Taihan 0.0893 0.0972 0.0952 0.119 0.1071 0.0972 0.0818 












Figure 3.1. Image Matrices of Blockmodels of 28 Business Groups, 1997-2003      
                                                                                  
CJ                                        
1 9 9 7   1 9 9 8   1 9 9 9   2 0 0 0   2 0 0 1   2 0 0 2   2 0 0 3  
                                         
 1 3 2     3 2     4 3 2   1 2 4 3   1 2 4 3   1 2 4 3   1 2 4 3 
1 0 1 1   1 0 1 1   1 1 1 1 0  1 0 1 0 0  1 0 1 0 0  1 0 1 0 0  1 0 1 0 0 
3 0 1 0   3 0 1 0   4 0 1 0 0  2 0 0 1 0  2 0 0 1 0  2 0 0 1 0  2 0 0 1 1 
2 0 0 0   2 1 0 0   3 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 1 1  4 0 0 0 1  4 0 0 0 1  4 0 0 0 1 
            2 0 0 0 0  3 1 0 0 0  3 1 0 0 0  3 1 0 0 0  3 1 0 0 0 
                                         
DAELIM                                      
1 9 9 7   1 9 9 8   1 9 9 9   2 0 0 0   2 0 0 1   2 0 0 2   2 0 0 3  
                                         
 1 2 3 4    3 4 2    2 4 3   1 4 3 2   1 2 3 4   1 2 3 4   1 2 3 4 
1 1 1 1 0  1 1 1 1 0  1 0 1 0 0  1 1 1 1 0  1 0 0 1 1  1 0 0 1 1  1 0 0 1 1 
2 0 0 1 0  3 0 1 0 1  2 0 0 1 0  4 0 0 1 1  2 1 0 0 0  2 1 0 0 0  2 1 0 0 0 
3 1 0 0 0  4 1 0 0 0  4 1 0 1 0  3 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 1 0  3 1 0 1 0  3 0 0 1 0 
4 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  4 0 1 0 0  4 0 1 0 0 
                                         
DONGBU                                     
1 9 9 7   1 9 9 8   1 9 9 9   2 0 0 0   2 0 0 1   2 0 0 2   2 0 0 3  
                                         
 2 1 3 4    3 4 2    3 4 2   1 2 3 4   1 3 4 2   1 3 4 2   1 3 4 2 
2 1 1 0 1  1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 0  1 1 1 1 0  1 1 1 1 0 
1 0 0 1 0  3 1 0 0 1  3 1 1 1 1  2 1 1 0 0  3 1 1 1 1  3 1 1 0 1  3 1 1 0 1 
3 1 0 0 0  4 1 1 1 0  4 1 0 1 0  3 0 1 1 0  4 0 0 1 0  4 1 1 0 0  4 1 1 0 0 
4 1 0 0 1  2 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0 
                                         
DONGKUK                                     
1 9 9 7   1 9 9 8   1 9 9 9   2 0 0 0   2 0 0 1   2 0 0 2   2 0 0 3  
                                         
 1 2 3 4    2 3 4    1 4 3   1 2 3 4   2 3 1    1 2 3 4   1 3 2 4 
1 1 1 1 0  1 1 1 1 0  2 1 1 0 1  1 1 1 1 0  2 1 1 0   1 1 1 1 0  1 1 1 0 1 
2 0 1 1 0  2 0 0 1 0  1 0 0 1 1  2 1 0 0 0  3 0 1 1   2 0 0 1 0  3 0 1 1 0 
3 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 1  4 1 0 0 1  3 0 0 0 1  1 0 0 1   3 0 0 0 1  2 1 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0        4 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0 
                                         
KISCO                                      
                  2 0 0 0   2 0 0 1   2 0 0 2   2 0 0 3  
                                         
                   1 2 4 3   1 2 4 3   2 1 3 4   1 3 2 4 
                  1 1 1 1 0  1 1 1 1 1  2 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 
                  2 0 1 1 0  2 0 0 1 0  1 0 0 1 1  3 0 0 0 1 
                  4 1 0 0 0  4 0 0 1 0  3 0 0 1 0  2 0 0 0 0 
                  3 1 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  4 0 1 0 0 
                                    
                                    
                                    
                                    




DONGWON                                    
1 9 9 7   1 9 9 8   1 9 9 9   2 0 0 0   2 0 0 1   2 0 0 2   2 0 0 3  
                                         
 1 2 3 4    2 4 3    3 2 4   1 3 2 4   1 3 2 4   1 3 2 4   4 2 1 3 
1 0 0 1 1  1 1 1 0 1  1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 0  1 1 1 1 1  1 1 0 1 0  4 0 0 0 1 
2 1 0 0 0  2 0 0 1 0  3 0 0 1 0  3 0 0 0 1  3 1 0 0 0  3 0 1 0 1  2 0 0 1 0 
3 1 1 0 0  4 1 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  2 0 1 0 0  2 0 1 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  1 0 1 1 0 
4 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  4 1 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 0 
                                         
DONGYANG                                    
1 9 9 7   1 9 9 8   1 9 9 9   2 0 0 0   2 0 0 1   2 0 0 2   2 0 0 3  
                                         
 1 2 4 3    2 3 4    2 3 4   1 2 4 3   1 2 3 4   1 2 4 3   1 3 4 2 
1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 0 0  1 0 1 1 0  1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 0 
2 0 1 0 0  2 0 1 0 1  2 0 0 0 1  2 0 0 1 0  2 0 1 1 1  2 1 1 1 0  3 0 1 1 0 
4 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 1  4 1 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 0  4 1 0 0 1  3 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0 
                                         
ORION                                      
                        2 0 0 1   2 0 0 2   2 0 0 3  
                                         
                         1 2 3 4   1 3 2 4   1 3 2 4 
                        1 0 1 0 0  1 1 1 1 0  1 1 1 1 0 
                        2 0 0 1 1  3 0 0 0 1  3 0 0 0 1 
                        3 1 1 0 0  2 0 0 1 0  2 0 0 1 0 
                        4 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0 
                                         
DONGYANG CHEMICAL                               
1 9 9 7   1 9 9 8   1 9 9 9   2 0 0 0   2 0 0 1   2 0 0 2   2 0 0 3  
                                         
 1 3 2 4    3 2 4    3 4 2   1 2 3 4   3 1 4 2   3 1 4 2   3 1 4 2 
1 1 0 1 0  1 1 1 0 1  1 1 1 1 0  1 0 0 1 1  3 1 1 1 1  3 1 1 1 1  3 0 1 0 1 
3 1 0 0 0  3 0 1 1 0  3 0 1 0 0  2 1 0 0 1  1 0 0 0 1  1 0 0 0 1  1 0 0 0 1 
2 0 0 0 1  2 0 0 1 0  4 0 0 0 0  3 1 0 0 1  4 0 0 1 0  4 0 0 1 0  4 1 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 1  4 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0 
                                         
DOOSAN                                     
1 9 9 7   1 9 9 8   1 9 9 9   2 0 0 0   2 0 0 1   2 0 0 2   2 0 0 3  
                                         
 1 2 3 4    3 4 2    3 2 4   1 3 4 2   1 2 3 4   1 3 4 2   1 3 2 4 
1 1 1 1 0  1 0 1 1 0  1 1 0 1 1  1 1 1 1 0  1 1 1 0 0  1 1 1 1 0  1 1 0 1 0 
2 0 0 1 0  3 1 1 0 1  3 1 0 0 0  3 1 1 0 1  2 0 0 1 1  3 1 1 0 1  3 1 1 0 1 
3 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  2 0 1 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 0  4 0 1 0 0  2 0 1 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0 
                                         
                                         
                                         
                                         
                                         
                                         




HANJIN                                      
1 9 9 7   1 9 9 8   1 9 9 9   2 0 0 0   2 0 0 1   2 0 0 2   2 0 0 3  
                                         
 1 4 3 2    2 3 4    2 3 4   1 2 4 3   1 3 2 4   1 2 3 4   1 2 3 4 
1 1 1 1 0  1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 0  1 1 1 1 1  1 0 1 0 1  1 0 0 1 1  1 0 0 1 1 
4 0 0 1 0  2 1 0 1 0  2 0 0 1 0  2 0 1 1 0  3 1 1 1 1  2 1 0 1 0  2 1 0 0 1 
3 0 0 1 1  3 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 1  4 1 0 0 1  2 1 1 1 0  3 0 1 1 0  3 0 0 0 1 
2 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 0  4 0 1 0 0  4 0 0 1 0  4 0 1 0 1 
                                         
HANSOL                                      
1 9 9 7   1 9 9 8   1 9 9 9   2 0 0 0   2 0 0 1   2 0 0 2   2 0 0 3  
                                         
 1 4 3 2    3 2 4    4 3 2   1 3 2 4   1 2 4 3   2 1 4 3   1 2 4 3 
1 1 1 1 0  1 1 0 1 1  1 1 1 0 1  1 1 0 1 0  1 1 0 1 1  2 0 1 1 1  1 1 0 1 0 
4 0 1 1 0  3 1 0 0 1  4 1 1 0 0  3 1 0 0 1  2 1 0 1 0  1 1 0 1 0  2 0 1 1 0 
3 0 0 0 1  2 0 1 0 0  3 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 1  4 0 0 1 1  4 0 0 0 1  4 0 0 0 1 
2 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 0  3 0 1 0 0  3 0 1 0 1 
                                         
HANWHA                                     
1 9 9 7   1 9 9 8   1 9 9 9   2 0 0 0   2 0 0 1   2 0 0 2   2 0 0 3  
                                         
 1 4 3 2    2 4 3    3 4 2   1 3 2 4   1 2 3 4   1 3 2 4   1 3 2 4 
1 0 1 1 0  1 0 1 0 0  1 0 0 1 1  1 0 0 1 0  1 1 1 1 0  1 0 0 1 0  1 1 1 1 0 
4 0 1 1 0  2 1 1 0 0  3 1 0 0 0  3 1 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  3 1 1 1 0  3 1 1 0 0 
3 0 0 0 0  4 0 1 0 1  4 0 1 1 0  2 0 1 1 0  3 0 0 1 0  2 0 1 0 0  2 0 1 0 0 
2 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 0  2 0 1 0 0  4 0 0 1 1  4 0 0 0 1  4 0 0 0 0  4 0 1 0 0 
                                         
HYUNDAI                                     
1 9 9 7   1 9 9 8   1 9 9 9   2 0 0 0   2 0 0 1   2 0 0 2   2 0 0 3  
                                         
 1 2 3 4    2 3 4    2 4 3   1 2 3 4   1 3 4 2   1 2 3 4   1 2 3 4 
1 1 1 1 0  1 1 1 1 0  1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 0 1  1 1 1 0 1  1 1 1 1 0  1 1 1 0 1 
2 0 0 1 1  2 0 1 0 0  2 0 0 1 0  2 0 0 0 1  3 1 0 1 0  2 0 0 1 0  2 0 0 1 1 
3 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 0  4 1 0 0 0  3 0 0 1 1  3 1 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0 
                                         
HYUNDAI DEPARTMENT                               
            1 9 9 9   2 0 0 0   2 0 0 1   2 0 0 2   2 0 0 3  
                                         
              2 3    1 3 4 2   1 3 2    3 4 1 2   3 2 1 4 
            1 0 1 1   1 0 1 1 0  1 0 1 1   3 0 0 1 1  3 0 1 0 0 
            2 1 0 0   3 0 0 0 1  3 0 1 0   4 1 0 1 1  2 0 1 1 1 
            3 0 0 0   4 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0   1 0 1 0 0  1 1 0 0 0 
                  2 0 0 0 0        2 1 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0 
                                         
                                         
                                         
                                         
                                         
                                         




HYUNDAI DEVELOPMENT                               
            1 9 9 9   2 0 0 0   2 0 0 1   2 0 0 2   2 0 0 3  
                                         
              2     1 2 3    1 2 3    1 2 3    1 3 4 2 
            1 0 1    1 0 1 1   1 0 1 1   1 0 1 1   1 0 1 1 0 
            2 0 0    2 0 1 0   2 0 0 0   2 0 0 1   3 0 0 1 0 
                  3 0 0 0   3 0 0 0   3 0 0 0   4 0 0 0 0 
                                    2 0 0 0 0 
                                         
HYUNDAI HEAVY                                  
                        2 0 0 1   2 0 0 2   2 0 0 3  
                                         
                         2 3 1    2 3 1    1 2 3 4 
                        2 0 1 0   2 0 1 0   1 0 1 1 0 
                        3 0 0 1   3 0 0 1   2 1 1 0 0 
                        1 0 0 0   1 0 0 0   3 0 0 0 1 
                                    4 0 0 0 0 
                                         
HYUNDAI MOTOR                                  
                  2 0 0 0   2 0 0 1   2 0 0 2   2 0 0 3  
                                         
                   1 3 2 4   1 3 4 2   1 2 3 4   1 3 4 2 
                  1 1 1 1 1  1 0 1 1 0  1 0 0 1 1  1 1 1 1 0 
                  3 1 0 1 0  3 1 1 1 0  2 1 1 1 1  3 0 0 0 0 
                  2 1 0 0 1  4 0 0 0 0  3 0 1 0 0  4 0 0 0 0 
                  4 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 1 
                                         
KOLON                                      
1 9 9 7   1 9 9 8   1 9 9 9   2 0 0 0   2 0 0 1   2 0 0 2   2 0 0 3  
                                         
 1 3 4 2    3 4 2    2 3 4   1 3 4 2   1 2 3 4   1 2 3 4   1 2 3 4 
1 0 1 1 0  1 0 1 1 0  1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 0  1 0 0 1 1  1 1 1 1 0  1 1 1 1 0 
3 0 0 1 0  3 0 1 1 0  2 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 1  2 0 0 1 0  2 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 1  4 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 1 0  4 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 1  3 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  4 0 1 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0 
                                         
KUMHO                                      
1 9 9 7   1 9 9 8   1 9 9 9   2 0 0 0   2 0 0 1   2 0 0 2   2 0 0 3  
                                         
 1 3 2 4    2 4 3    2 3 4   1 2 3 4   1 2 3 4   1 2 3 4   1 2 3 4 
1 1 1 0 1  1 0 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 
3 0 1 1 0  2 1 0 1 0  2 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 1 0 
2 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 1 0  3 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 1 0  3 0 0 1 0  3 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0 
                                         
                                         
                                         
                                         
                                         
                                         




LG                                        
1 9 9 7   1 9 9 8   1 9 9 9   2 0 0 0   2 0 0 1   2 0 0 2   2 0 0 3  
                                         
 1 4 3 2    3 2 4    2 3 4   1 2 3 4   1 2 3 4   1 2 3 4   1 2 3 4 
1 1 1 1 1  1 1 0 1 0  1 1 1 1 0  1 1 1 1 0  1 1 1 1 0  1 1 0 1 1  1 1 1 0 0 
4 1 0 1 0  3 1 1 0 1  2 0 1 1 0  2 0 1 0 1  2 0 0 0 1  2 1 0 1 0  2 0 0 1 1 
3 0 0 0 0  2 1 1 0 0  3 0 0 0 1  3 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 1 
2 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  4 1 0 0 0 
                                         
LOTTE                                      
1 9 9 7   1 9 9 8   1 9 9 9   2 0 0 0   2 0 0 1   2 0 0 2   2 0 0 3  
                                         
 1 2 3 4    2 4 3    2 3 4   1 2 3 4   1 2 3 4   1 2 3 4   1 2 4 3 
1 1 1 0 1  1 1 1 1 0  1 1 1 1 1  1 1 0 1 1  1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 0  1 1 1 1 1 
2 0 0 1 1  2 0 0 1 0  2 0 0 1 1  2 1 1 0 0  2 0 1 1 1  2 0 1 1 1  2 0 1 1 1 
3 0 0 0 1  4 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 1  3 0 0 0 1  3 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 0 
                                         
SAMSUNG                                     
1 9 9 7   1 9 9 8   1 9 9 9   2 0 0 0   2 0 0 1   2 0 0 2   2 0 0 3  
                                         
 1 3 4 2    2 3 4    3 2 4   1 2 4 3   1 3 4 2   1 3 4 2   1 3 4 2 
1 1 1 1 0  1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 0  1 1 1 1 0 
3 0 0 1 0  2 0 1 0 1  3 1 0 0 1  2 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 1 0  3 0 0 1 0  3 0 0 1 1 
4 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  4 0 1 0 0  4 0 0 0 1  4 0 0 1 1  4 0 0 1 0 
2 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 1 0  2 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0 
                                         
SEAH                                       
1 9 9 7   1 9 9 8   1 9 9 9   2 0 0 0   2 0 0 1   2 0 0 2   2 0 0 3  
                                         
 1 2 3 4    2 3 4    2 3 4   1 3 4 2   1 2 4 3   1 4 2 3   2 1 3 4 
1 0 1 1 1  1 1 0 1 1  1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 0  1 0 1 1 1  1 0 1 1 1  2 0 0 1 1 
2 1 0 0 0  2 1 0 0 0  2 0 0 1 0  3 0 0 0 1  2 1 0 1 0  4 1 1 0 0  1 0 1 0 1 
3 1 0 1 0  3 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 1 0  2 0 0 1 0  3 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 0  4 1 0 0 0 
                                         
SK                                        
1 9 9 7   1 9 9 8   1 9 9 9   2 0 0 0   2 0 0 1   2 0 0 2   2 0 0 3  
                                         
 1 3 2 4    3 4 2    4 2 3   1 2 3 4   1 3 4 2   1 2 3 4   2 1 3 4 
1 1 1 0 0  1 1 1 0 1  1 1 0 1 0  1 1 1 0 0  1 1 1 0 0  1 1 1 1 1  2 1 1 1 1 
3 0 0 1 1  3 0 0 1 1  4 0 0 0 1  2 1 1 0 0  3 1 1 1 1  2 1 1 0 0  1 1 1 0 0 
2 0 0 0 0  4 1 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 1 0  4 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 1 0  3 0 0 1 0 
4 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 1  2 0 0 0 1  4 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0 
                                         
                                         
                                         
                                         
                                         
                                         




TAEKWANG                                    
1 9 9 7   1 9 9 8   1 9 9 9   2 0 0 0   2 0 0 1   2 0 0 2   2 0 0 3  
                                         
 1 2 3     2 3     3 2 4   1 3 4 2   1 3 2 4   1 3 4 2   1 3 4 2 
1 1 1 0   1 1 1 0   1 1 0 1 0  1 1 1 1 0  1 1 1 1 0  1 0 1 1 0  1 1 0 0 1 
2 0 0 0   2 1 0 0   3 1 0 1 0  3 0 0 1 0  3 1 0 1 0  3 1 0 1 0  3 0 1 1 0 
3 0 0 0   3 0 0 0   2 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  4 1 0 1 0  4 0 0 1 0 
            4 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 1 
                                         
TAIHAN                                      
1 9 9 7   1 9 9 8   1 9 9 9   2 0 0 0   2 0 0 1   2 0 0 2   2 0 0 3  
                                         
 1 2 3 4    3 2 4    2 3    3 1 4 2   3 1 4 2   3 1 4 2   1 3 2 4 
1 1 1 1 0  1 0 1 0 0  1 0 1 0   3 0 1 0 0  3 0 1 0 0  3 0 1 0 0  1 0 1 0 1 
2 0 0 0 0  3 1 0 1 0  2 1 0 0   1 0 0 1 0  1 0 0 1 0  1 0 0 1 0  3 1 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 0  2 0 1 0 0  3 0 0 0   4 0 1 0 0  4 0 1 0 0  4 0 1 0 0  2 1 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0        2 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0 
                                         
YOUNGPOONG                                   
1 9 9 7   1 9 9 8   1 9 9 9   2 0 0 0   2 0 0 1   2 0 0 2   2 0 0 3  
                                         
 1 2 3 4    3 2 4    3 2 4   1 3 4 2   2 1 4 3   2 1 3 4   1 3 2 4 
1 0 0 1 1  1 1 1 0 1  1 1 1 0 1  1 1 1 1 0  2 1 1 0 0  2 1 1 0 0  1 1 0 1 0 
2 1 1 1 0  3 1 1 1 0  3 1 1 1 0  3 1 1 0 0  1 0 0 1 1  1 0 0 1 1  3 1 1 0 1 
3 1 0 1 0  2 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  4 1 1 0 0  3 1 0 0 0  2 0 1 0 0 
4 0 0 1 0  4 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 0  4 0 0 0 1 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.2. Reduced Graphs of Business Groups, 1997-2003 shows the visual 
representation of a simplified and patterned relational structure of each chaebol per year 
that is derived from image matrices. While drawing reduced graphs, if a specific block’s 
density level is above the overall density but does not exceed twice the overall density, 
then the presence of a tie between different blocks is symbolized by a dotted line in the 
reduced graphs. However, if a specific block’s density exceeds twice the overall density, 
then the presence of ties between different blocks is indicated by a straight line. This 
means that, in addition to mean density as the cut-off density criterion, I also determine 
the twofold average density as a more rigorous cut-off level. Accordingly, it is expected 
that this stringent criterion would identify where more robust relational patterns exist 
within a block and between blocks.  
In summary, directed ties between blocks are the product of equity shareholdings. 
Chaebols have used equity shareholdings as routes to control member firms. Thus, 
chaebols’ corporate control not only refers to equity holders’ – affiliated persons or 
affiliated firms – ownership of financial resources and control of resources over affiliated 
firms but also implicitly represents the capability of the chaebol owner and family 
members to influence directly or indirectly a subsidiary firm’s decision making process. 
 
3. 8. The Simplified Macro Pattern of Group Structure 
Chaebols are usually owned and controlled by a single group owner and the owner’s 
family members. Moreover, chaebol is not a mere sum of firms but rather a group of 




family ownership and control via equity shareholding ties. The family ownership-control 
mechanism is organized through family members’ direct control over major affiliated 
companies as well as family members’ direct or indirect control over minor affiliated 
firms by having recourse to the mobilization of major affiliated firms as intermediaries 
(Chang 2003; Orru, Biggart, and Hamilton 1991). Hence, the family-based corporate 
ownership and control pattern that is grounded on a centralized, hierarchical inter-firm 
relation has been considered the general image of chaebols, like that of Japanese 
zaibatsus prior to the Second World War. 
In this section, I investigate what types of configurations of network structures of 
Korean business groups have appeared over time. A group of social network scholars 
(Bearman 1993: 75; Wasserman and Faust 1994: 419-423; White, Boorman, and Breiger 
1976) suggests a set of ideal image matrices for blockmodeling. For the purpose of the 
comparative analysis of chaebols’ network structure, “centralized” and “hierarchical” 
ideal image matrices are of special interest because these two image matrices seem to 
reflect the widely acknowledged features of chaebols’ control and management patterns, 
that is, a highly centralized and hierarchical network structure. In the ideal image matrix 
which is expected to represent the highly centralized network structure of Korean 
business groups, “all ties are pointed away from a single position. In the image matrix, all 
oneblocks are ... in the same row (if all ties are from the same position). Reflexive ties 
may also be present” (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 420). In the idealized hierarchical 
image matrix, “a hierarchy appears as unreciprocated ties directed from each position to 




an organization” (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 420). Here the chief research focus is on to 
what extent corporate control patterns of each business group would be similar to or 
differ from the taken-for-granted forms of Korean business groups (See Figure 3.3. 
Idealized Centralized, Hierarchical, and Transitive Image Matrices). For this purpose, I 
examine what types of variations are more prevalent than others under various conditions. 
I compare actual image matrices – simplified network structures of each business 
group – with ideal image matrices. In order to compare actual image matrices with 
ideally centralized and hierarchical image matrices, respectively, at the group level, I use 
the method of “simple matching.” Simple matching coefficient, according to Wasserman 
and Faust (1994: 370), “counts the number or proportion of ties that are identical between 
two actors (for a dichotomous relation), or a measure of ordinal association (for a relation 
measured as an ordered scale).”31 The formula of simple matching is as follows: 
 
Simple Matching = ( a + d ) / ( a + b + c + d )  
 
where a = the number of attributes of i with pi = 1 and qi = 1, b = the number of attributes 
of i with pi = 1 and qi = 0, c = the number of attributes of i with pi = 0 and qi = 1, and d = 
the number of attributes of i with pi = 0 and qi = 0 for two ordered row profiles P = (p1, p2, 
                                                
31 I also examined Jaccard coefficient. Simple matching and Jaccard coefficient show similar 
result. So I just shows the result based on simple matching. Jaccard coefficient, according to 
Knoke and Yang (2008: 38-39), is “the proportion of agreements after excluding joint negative 
pairs. It is calculated as the number of persons nominated by an informant at both times divided 
by the total number of unique nominations for both tests (Brewer 2000). The Jaccard coefficient 
ranges from 0.00, indicating no reliability, to 1.00, indicating complete reliability.” See also 
Hanneman, Robert A. and Mark Riddle. 2005. Introduction to Social Network Methods. 





… , pn) and Q = (q1 q2, ... , qn). The range of simple matching is from zero to one. The 
higher the value is – that is, its value is closer to one – the more actual image matrices are 
similar to idealized image matrices. The following three tables show the similarity 
between actual image matrices and the ideal image matrix.  
To synthesize, using the structural equivalence algorithm, I analyzes affiliated 
firms’ matrices for each of 178 cases for twenty-eight business groups over a seven-year 
period. Once I construct image matrices as a result of simplification of complex network 
relations between affiliated firms, it is possible to identify different blocks. To determine 
how many blocks are most relevant not only for simplifying complex network relations 
but also for faithfully representing patterned relations, I base a cut-off criterion on 
theoretical framework and empirical evidence. As mentioned before, it is theoretically 
expected that there would be three block positions: core, intermediate, and periphery. On 
the empirical side, I randomly performed structural equivalence analyses several times 
with different splitting criteria – for example, from having only two blocks to five or 
more blocks. The result of these random trials shows that constructing two blocks was 
too simple to represent the overall patterns of network structure of each chaebol unless 
the group size – the number of affiliated firms – was too small. In contrast, once a matrix 
of inter-firm relations departed into more than five blocks in structural equivalence, I 
found that it became too complicated to retrieve simplified inter-firm network relations. 
As a result, I decided that it is a rather appropriate mapping to stick to four blocks. Then, 




image matrices so that I would identify to what extent each business group’s network 
structure would be similar to and differ from a series of given idealized models. 
The result of blockmodeling and simple matching analysis on all network 
structures (N = 178) of twenty-eight business groups from 1997-2003 shows that network 
structures of business groups constantly maintained centralized and hierarchical forms 
even though inter-firm relations of chaebols became relatively less centralized and less 
hierarchical as time went on. Besides identifying the overall network structures of 
business groups and their changing patterns over time, it is also noteworthy that there are 
















Figure 3.3. Idealized Centralized, Hierarchical, and Transitive Image Matrices
Centralized Hierarchical Trnsitive
4 Blocks 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 Blocks 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 Blocks 1 1 0 1

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































First of all, diachronic comparison over time reveals that overall trends of all 
centralized, hierarchical, and transitive simple matching values, respectively, decreased 
during this research period. The mean of the centralized simple matching value - the 
value to test to what extent actual image matrices of business groups are similar to the 
idealized central image matrix - slightly increased from 0.782 in 1997 to 0.804 in 1999, 
and then it gradually decreased to 0.721 in 2003; its median value also decreased from 
0.76 in 1997 to 0.813 in 1999 and to 0.688 in 2003. The mean of the hierarchical simple 
matching value also decreased during this period. It changed from 0.721 in 1997 to 0.643 
in 2003; its median value decreased from 0.75 in 1997 to 0.688 in 2003. The mean of 
transitive simple matching value slightly decreased from 0.699 in 1997 to 0.652 in 2003 
although its value slightly increased to 0.709 in 1999 and to 0.7 in 2001; its median value 
decreased from 0.719 in 1997 to 0.688 in 2003. Although centralized and hierarchical 
simple matching values decreased over time in diachronic analysis, the transitive simple 
matching value did not decrease as much as the former did during the same period. In 
summary, the overall network structures of most chaebols did not show any drastic 
structural transformations during this period even though overall structural forms of 
Korean business groups shifted to less centralized and less hierarchical forms while 
stably maintaining transitive patterns. 
In addition to diachronic analysis of business groups, I also synchronically 
examine centralized, hierarchical, and transitive simple matching values of business 
groups per year (See Figure 3.4. Box-and-Whisker Plots Showing Median and 




by Business Groups per Year). The synchronic analysis is expected to show how much 
the simple matching values of a set of business groups for each year diverge from the 
median. In other words, the synchronic examination effectively shows the varying 
degrees of network structures of business groups in terms of a comparative perspective. It 
has been consistently observed that there was a wide range of simple matching values in 
virtually every year. Interquartile ranges of the last two years (2002-2003) tended to 
become greater compared to the first two years (1997-1998) although there was some 
fluctuation in the middle period (1999-2001).  
This overall picture reveals that the network structure of Korean business groups 
does not lean so much toward a monolithically fixed type. Instead, there were varying 
forms of inter-firm network structures. However, this finding does not mean that the 
previous taken-for-granted image of the chaebols’ network structure can be readily 
dismissed. Rather, it can be said that although there were varying forms of network 
structures of chaebols over time, these variations still remain under the umbrella of a 
centralized, hierarchical form. This chronological topology shows that, in spite of 
unprecedented environmental challenges, Korean business groups did not drastically 
transform or even deconstruct their overall network structures; they held their forms even 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3. 9. Transitivity 
“Transitive” relations are of special interest when investigating the configuration of 
networks at the micro level. The transitive pattern was initially developed to figure out 
the cognitive relations of friendship networks within small groups (e.g., Davis 1963; 
Davis and Leinhardt 1972; McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001; Wasserman and 
Faust 1994). For instance, a friend relation is transitive if person A chooses person B as a 
friend and person B chooses person C as a friend, then person A also chooses person C as 
a friend. However, if person A does not choose person B as a friend or person B does not 
choose person C as a friend, then this triadic relation is called “vacuously transitive.” In 
contrast, if person A chooses person B as a friend and person B chooses person C as a 
friend but person A does not choose person C as a friend, then this type of triadic relation 
is called “intransitive.” 
What does this transitive pattern at the micro level imply for the understanding of 
the intricate network structure of business groups? Measuring transitivity is a critical 
component in assessing how macro structure is structured by locally patterned triadic 
relations. Some scholars (Kilduff and Tsai 2003; Laumann and Marsden 1982) suggest 
that transitive relations could also be applied to comprehend the patterns of inter- 
organizational networks. The tendency of a transitive network pattern in a business group 
would divulge a hierarchical configuration of inter-organizational network structures. It is 
expected that the more prevalent transitive relations are among triadic patterns in a 
chaebol’s network structure, the more hierarchical the business group would be. In 




“dominance” of some blocks over other blocks at the group level. At the same time, the 
transitive relations among firms could also indicate the coexistence of direct and indirect 
control; this means that a few major firms directly control other affiliated firms and they 
also indirectly control the latter via affiliates that take an intermediary position (Davis 
1963; de Nooy, Mrvar, and Batagelj 2005; Johnsen 1985; Wasserman and Faust 1994: 
chaps. 6 and 14). 
The prevalence of transitive relations not only indicates a hierarchical inter-firm 
structure but also operates as a safeguard to stabilize the family-based group control 
under uncertain environmental conditions. In particular, when inter-organizational 
networks are based on the “clan” type of organizations demanding “the commitment of 
members units to collective goals or values,” the dedication to common values among 
organizations would serve as “the basis for transitive resource flows” (Laumann and 
Marsden 1982: 340). Therefore, the transitive resource flows in inter-organizational 
networks would work as “a form of social insurance whereby uncertainty about the 
transmission of a resource from one organization to another may be reduced by sending it 
directly and by an alternate route through a third organization” (Laumann and Marsden 
1982: 340). Thus, it appears that transitive relations would be an effective way to 
maintain a family owner’s holding power over member firms under environmental 
pressure and uncertainty. 
However, the prevalence of a hierarchical pattern in a chaebol’s inter-
organizational network structure does not always seem to be closely associated with 




affairs is that if a chaebol adopts a centralized control strategy, its overall corporate 
control could principally rely on direct control over affiliated firms without reliance on 
the intermediary roles of some firms. In this case, it is likely that “transitivity will be 
devalued in centralized systems because of the presumed wastefulness of redundant 
resource transfers. Such patterns should be more easily tolerated in a loose confederation 
of organizations sharing a common goal” (Laumann and Marsden 1982: 340). The other 
situation is quite opposite to the former condition. Let us assume that major firms or 
chaebol family members mainly control intermediate firms and then these intermediate 
firms control subsidiary or peripheral firms on behalf of the major firms or family 
members. However, these major firms or family members seldom stretch out their direct 
ties to peripheral firms. In other words, the former has less direct ties – a route for the 
redundant control – over the latter.32 Therefore, considering the two mentioned conditions 
above, it could be argued that transitive inter-firm relations could be parallel with the 
hierarchical network structure insofar as business groups simultaneously adopt both 
direct and indirect control strategies. 
 
3.10. From Micro Structure to Macro Structure: Triad Census 
In addition to blockmodeling and simple matching analysis, I also examine what types of 
“triadic” relations among affiliated firms and affiliated persons are prevalent within each 
business group. There are two main reasons why it is worthwhile to investigate triadic 
relations within each business group. First of all, triadic ties are expected to reveal how 
                                                





each affiliated firm and affiliated people are interlinked to one another at the local level 
for the formation of the business group’s network structure. Triads are the key to 
measuring tendencies of the formation of cliques, the division of cliques into several 
cliques, and the formation of ranking or hierarchy among cliques at the local level. 
Second, the analysis of triadic relations makes it possible to test which specific model is 
the most relevant among given optional models to represent each business group’s overall 
network structure. 
To investigate triadic patterns in the micro-structure of each business group, I 
examine triad census (See Table 3.6. Triad Census and Macro-level Models). The triad 
census is a frequency distribution of the sixteen possible different types of triads – three 
nodes - in a directed network (Davis and Leinhardt 1972; de Nooy, Mrvar, and Batagelj 
2005; Wasserman and Faust 1994). A triad census provides an analytic framework to 
scrutinize what certain triadic mechanisms at the micro level work for the formation of  a 
different social structure at the macro level in a given specific boundary of network 
relations. In a triad census, the frequency of each different triad type is counted and this 
observed frequency of each triad type is compared with the expected frequency of each 
triad type - the randomly generated distribution of triad types in order to test the tendency 
toward ranking. Each triad type in a triad census is counted in terms of its particular 
combination of three possible pairwise relations of three nodes. These three pairwise 
relations are labeled in MAN: the number of mutual (M), asymmetric (A), and null (N) 
relations among three dyads in the triadic nodes. In addition to MAN, other labels like 




direction of ties in a triad. Sixteen possible triad types are as follows: {003, 012, 102, 
021D, 021U, 021C, 111D, 111U, 030T, 030C, 201, 120D, 120U, 120C, 210, 300} (see 
also Table 3.6.). 
While analyzing a triad census at the micro-structural perspective, the focus of 
research is usually on how the frequency distribution of different triadic types is related 
to macro-structural patterns in a given network boundary (Johnsen 1985): “A variety of 
analyses of these data have verified the presence of several important structural properties, 
such as balance, clustering, ranked clusters, and transitivity. An important research 
agenda of these early researchers was to link structural patterns found in triads (micro-














Triad Type # of Arcs # of T #of IT Balance Clusterability Ranked Clusters Transitivity Hierarchical Cliques
003 0 0 0 VT O O O O
012 1 0 0 VT O O
102 2 0 0 VT O O O O O
021D 2 0 0 VT O O O
021U 2 0 0 VT O O O
021C 2 0 1 IT
111D 3 0 1 IT
111U 3 0 1 IT
030T 3 1 0 T O O O
030C 3 0 3 IT
201 4 0 2 IT
120D 4 2 0 T O O O
120U 4 2 0 T O O O
120C 4 1 2 T + IT
210 5 3 1 T + IT O
300 6 6 0 T O O O O O









The result of the analysis of frequency distribution of the triad census is reported 
in Table 3.7. Triad Census Array in Row Numbers. For comparative purposes, the same 
result is also reported as percentages in Table 3.8. Triad Census Array in Row 
Percentages. The distribution pattern of the sixteen different types of isomorphic triads 
shows that there is no type 300 except in the Youngpoong group in 1997. Type 102 is 
also rarely observed. It is only observed in 15 out of 178 cases in a sample of eight 
business groups based on Table 3.8. Triad Census Array in Row Percentages.33  
In the process of selecting an appropriate macro-level model that is expected to 
represent the overall form of chaebols, the frequency distribution of a triad census 
provides the reason why the balance model is not a possible choice. The balance model, 
which is based on the existence of triad types 300 and 102 – {300, 102}, does not allow 
asymmetric relations and it assumes there are only two cliques that are unconnected with 
each other (de Nooy, Mrvar, and Batagelj 2005: 205-207; Wasserman and Faust 1994: 
229): Johnsen (1985: 207) shows that, in the balance model, the macrostructure consists 
of “at most two M-cliques (maximal subsets of vertices, pairwise connected by the M 
relation) which are related by N* (i.e., completely interconnected by the N relation).” 
Since triad types 300 and 102 are barely observed in the frequency distribution of the 
triad census for Korean business groups, the balance model would not be counted as a 
relevant model to represent the network structure of some Korean business groups. 
                                                
33 Kisco 2003 (.02%), Dongyang 2001 (.01%), Doosan 1997 (.01%), Doosan 1998 (.02%), 
Doosan 2001 (.01%), Dongwon 2003 (.01%), Hanjin 1999 (.01%), Hansol 2001 (.01%), Seah 

























There is another model that is called the clusterability model. The clusterability 
model is less restrictive than the balance model because the clusterability model allows 
for triad type 003 along with triad types 300 and 102: {300, 102, 003}. As a result, it is 
possible to contain more than three clusters that are disconnected with one another 
whereas the balance model can only contain one or two clusters.  
In contrast to the rare occurrence of triadic types 102 and 300, the triad types 
00334, 012, 021D, 021C35, 030T, and 021U among sixteen possible isomorphic triadic 
types in the triad census are the most recurrently observed patterns in the network 
relations of Korean business groups from 1997-2003. 
In the ranked clusters model, eight triadic types – {300, 102, 003, 120D, 120U, 
030T, 021D, 021U} – are the permitted ones among sixteen triadic types (Davis and 
Leinhardt 1972; de Nooy, Mrvar, and Batagelj 2005; Johnsen 1985; Wasserman and 
Faust 1994). The triad types 02ID and 030T are the most frequently observed types in the 
case of Korean business groups. The triad type 02ID consists of two nodes in different 
cliques at the same level and a third node at a higher level (Davis and Leinhardt 1972: 
225). Triad type 030T is composed of three nodes from three different levels similar to 
highest, intermediate, and lowest (Davis and Leinhardt 1972: 225). More than anything 
else, triad type 021D, including 021U and 021C, is regarded as the type that is “most 
likely within a centrally coordinated system” on the one hand and is expected to “create 
                                                
34 003 - “Triads of Type 003 consist of persons from three different cliques at the same level” 
(Davis and Leinhardt 1972: 224). 
 
35 021C - “In 021C triads, i and j are from different cliques at the same level, but k is above one 




hierarchical systems involving vertical differentiation” on the other (Laumann and 
Marsden 1982: 340-341). 
In contrast to the frequent observation of triad type 021D, the frequency of triad 
types 120D and 120U is relatively rare. Even though these two types have occurred, the 
percentage of their frequency among the sixteen possible triad types is very low. The rare 
occurrence of the types 120D and 120U seems to be closely associated with a legal 
regulation on the corporate practice of chaebols. In order to curb the creation of virtual 
capital, the Korean government prohibited chaebols from direct, mutual cross-
shareholding between two affiliates belonging to the same business group. Accordingly, 
these two triadic types – 120D and 120U – based on mutually dyadic shareholding ties 
were not widely adopted as a way of connecting and controlling affiliated firms within a 
business group even though some business groups still utilize such triadic types. 
Furthermore, now that the frequent incidence of triadic types - 02ID and 030T - in micro 
setting is closely linked to the model of ranked clusters, most business groups are 
expected to take the form of hierarchically organized network structures that are 
composed of several sub-groups in multiple layers. 
In the transitivity model, triad type 012 is added in the ranked cluster model: {300, 
102, 003, 120D, 120U, 030T, 02ID, 021U, 012}. The difference between the ranked 
cluster model and the transitivity model is the degree of strictness within a hierarchical 
relation among cliques. In the ranked clusters model, there is “a single hierarchy of clique 
levels” and there are clear ranks between cliques. The transitivity model, however, is less 




composed of “partially ordered” cliques. It means that there may be some null ties 
between differentially ranked cliques. Nonetheless, if there are ties between differently 
ranked cliques, then these connections are still based on the asymmetric relation (Johnsen 
1985: 208). 
The hierarchical cliques model is suggested by Johnsen (1985): {300, 102, 003, 
120D, 120U, 030T, 02ID, 021U, 012, 210}. Unlike previous models, this model permits 
“hierarchy within cliques” by including triad type 210. In other words, while the 
transitivity model assumes that “the cliques are homogeneously linked internally” 
(Johnsen 1985: 204), the hierarchical cliques model permits either mutual ties or 
asymmetric ties between nodes within a clique. 
 
3.11. Testing Structural Models: Tau Statistic 
By using the already known frequency distribution of sixteen different triad types, I can 
test which forms of network structure at the macro level would be the most relevant 
among given models. This test statistic is called tau ( τ ) statistic (Wasserman and Faust 
1994: 594). In this test, the observed configuration of a triad census is compared with an 
expected frequency value of a triad census. Then, this difference is standardized by 
standard error so that one can interpret this test result. The formula of tau statistic is as 
follows:  






where I = sixteen element weighting vector for the triad types, T = the observed triad 
census, µT = the expected value of T, and ∑T = the variance-covariance matrix of the triad 
census. So tau statistic tests “whether or not the observed triad census is or is not 
consistent with the predictions of the random digraph distribution” (Holland and 
Leinhardt 1978: 234). Finally, the tau statistic makes it possible to test which specific 
model among given optional models is a more relevant model than any other model to 
represent each business group’s overall network structure. If the test value of tau is zero 
or close to zero, then it means that there is no difference between the observed value and 
a random value. Therefore, if the tau value of a specific model is comparatively higher 
than that of other specific models, one can adopt this specific model could be adopted as 
a possible macro-level form that is expected to represent the network structure of specific 
business groups. 
 
Table 3.9. Descriptive Statistics of Overall Tau Distribution by Macro-level Models 
 
(N = 178) 
 
  Clusterability Ranked Clusters Transitivity Hierarchical Cliques 
Mean 12.3467 14.2000 1.3109 1.3242 
Median 11.3185 12.2910 0.7840 0.7880 
1st Quartile 6.4193 7.8105 -0.6873 -0.6748 
3rd Quartile 15.0928 17.9350 2.9455 2.9783 
Maximum 39.8270 44.0010 13.5140 13.5130 









































































































































































For each of the 178 cases of business group networks, the distribution of the tau 
statistic for each model is as follows (Table 3.9. Descriptive Statistics of Overall Tau 
Distribution of by Macro-level Models and Figure 3.7. Overall Tau Distribution of 
Chaebols, 1997-2003). First of all, when I compare the overall descriptive values of tau 
statistics for each macro-level model, the ranked clusters model’s mean (14.2) and the 
median (12.3), respectively, are higher than those of any other model; the clusterability 
model’s mean is 11.32 and its median is 11.32. In contrast, both the transitivity model 
and the hierarchical cliques have very low mean values (1.31 and 0.78) and medial values 
(1.32 and 0.79). Therefore, I conclude that that these two models might not be a pertinent 
model to represent the macro network structure for most chaebols. 
Then, I also analyze which model might be the most relevant macro-level model 
among the four possible candidates to represent the network structure of each business 
group (Figure 3.8. Tau Distribution of Each Business Group, 1997-2003). The results of 
the tau statistic show that the model of “ranked clusters” is the most frequently granted 
model across chaebols over time. In particular, whereas 152 out of 178 total cases (85.4 
percent) are counted as the model of ranked clusters, 24 out of 178 cases (13.5 percent) 
are regarded as the model of clusterability and only two cases are categorized as the 
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Table 3.10. Macro-Structural Models of Business Groups by Tau Statistic 
 
Business Groups 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
CJ RC RC RC RC RC RC RC 
Daelim RC RC RC RC RC RC RC 
Dongbu C C C RC RC RC RC 
Dongkuk RC RC C C C C T* 
Kisco    RC* C C C 
Dongwon RC RC RC C C C RC 
Dongyang RC RC RC RC RC RC C 
Orion     RC RC RC 
Dongyang Chemical RC RC RC RC RC RC RC 
Doosan RC RC C C RC RC C 
Hanjin RC RC RC C C C C 
Hansol RC RC RC RC RC C C 
Hanwha RC RC RC RC RC RC RC 
Hyundai RC RC RC RC RC RC RC 
Hyundai Department   RC RC RC RC RC 
Hyundai Development   C RC RC RC RC 
Hyundai Heavy     T* RC* RC* 
Hyundai Motor    RC RC RC RC 
Kolon RC RC RC RC RC RC RC 
Kumho RC RC RC RC RC RC RC 
LG RC RC RC RC RC RC RC 
Lotte RC RC RC RC RC RC RC 
Samsung RC RC RC RC RC RC RC 
Seah RC RC RC RC RC RC RC 
SK RC RC RC RC RC RC RC 
Taekwang RC RC RC RC RC RC RC 
Taihan RC RC RC RC RC RC RC 
Youngpoong RC RC RC RC RC RC RC 
 
C: Clusterability 
RC: Ranked Clusters 
T: Transitivity 
HC: Hierarchical Clusters 
* (Statistically insignificant in tau’s p value = 0.05 due to small size (the number of firms)) 
 
Accordingly, this result shows that the ranked clusters model could be regarded as 




structure over time. The model of ranked clusters, according to Davis and Leinhardt 
(1972: 220) shows the following characteristics: 
 
Relations of the sort we have called A are assumed to connect persons in different 
levels, while M and N relations are assumed to connect persons in the same level. 
Further we assume that in pairs connected by A relations, the recipient of the 
positive relationship is in the higher level36 [...] M relations are assumed to 
connect persons in the same clique within a level. N relations are assumed to 
connect persons in different cliques within a level (Davis and Leinhardt 1972: 220, 
Italics are original). 
 
 
That is, under the ranked clusters model, asymmetric relations exist between clusters 
situated in hierarchically different levels while symmetric mutual relations tend to 
connect affiliated firms belonging to the same clusters. In addition, the ranked clusters 
model assumes that there would be no relations among different clusters at the same level. 
However, what is important is these general features of the ranked clusters model do not 
reflect or should not be understood as a mere reflection of the monolithic form of a 
hierarchical network structure. With regard to this issue, Leik and Meeker’s (1975: 73) 
depiction of the ranked clusters model is pertinent in grasping the basic skeleton of this 
model: “This model [the model of ranked clusters] pictures groups as consisting of 
several levels, on each of which is one or more equal-status but distinct subgroups. This 
is probably a better aid to thinking about social structure than more simplistic models that 
assume that there is a single hierarchy with everyone above or below each other person, 
                                                
36 In equity shareholding ties of the Korean business group, generally speaking, the sender has 
power over the receiver since the former is the holder of the resource that is needed by the latter. 
In addition, reciprocal ties in equity shareholding are rare. That is, the direct mutual cross 
shareholding between affiliated firms of the same business group is a rarely observed pattern 
because direct mutual cross shareholding between affiliated firms belonging to a specific business 




or even the more complex model that assumes ranked groups but suppose everyone on 
the same level is in the same subgroup.” 
Then, why was the ranked clusters model considered more relevant and widely 
accepted to epitomize the network structure of most chaebols than the clusterability 
model or the transitivity model. Two main features of the ranked clusters model could be 
logical clues to answering this question and these two features are highlighted by the 
comparison with other models. First, the clusterability model assumes the existence of 
multiple cliques with no hierarchy among cliques. In contrast, the ranked clusters model 
assumes the existence of a hierarchy among cliques. Moreover, it supposes that relational 
ties exist only between differentially ranked cliques or clusters. Since chaebol is not a 
mere sum of legally independent firms but a strategically coordinated aggregate of 
affiliated firms and affiliated people through shareholding ties, the assumption of the 
clusterability model – coexistence of cliques without hierarchy among them within a 
given boundary – loses its theoretical and empirical ground to represent the relational 
features of chaebols. 
Second, one of the main differences between the ranked clusters model and the 
transitivity model is that the ranked clusters model assumes the existence of single 
hierarchical relations between differentially ranked cliques. On the contrary, the 
transitivity model is a less restrictive model than the ranked clusters model as the former 
assumes the possible absence of ties between differentially ranked cliques. This 
difference becomes more evident when looking at Figure 3.6. While the ranked clusters 




such an identified single clique to send ties to other cliques. Considering the role of 
affiliated people – in particular, the group chairman and his or her family members – as 
the chaebol’s major owners and controllers, the existence of multifarious cliques as the 
initial tie senders to other cliques in the transitivity model does not seem to fit or 
represent the overall forms of chaebols’ centralized, hierarchical network structure well. 
 
3.12. Changing Patterns of Corporate Control 
So far using blockmodeling, I examined the simplified inter-firm network structure of 
each business group. In addition, I investigated macro-level overall configuration of each 
chaebol using tau statistic. It is critical to investigate how affiliated persons are connected 
with affiliated firms. The examination of network patterns between affiliated persons and 
affiliated firms would reveal how group owners and family members strategically invest 
or divest their financial resources for the stable maintenance of group ownership and how 
they utilize equity ties for their overarching corporate control over affiliated firms. First, I 
examine the ways in which affiliated persons hold the equities of member firms. Second, 
I try to identify what specific types of combinatorial shareholding ties tend to be more 
frequently used to connect affiliated persons with affiliated firms occupying specific 
block positions. When I analyze the changing trend of connecting patterns between 
affiliated persons and affiliated firms, I also seriously take into account the affiliated 





3.12.1. Changing Patterns of Corporate Control by Group Owners and Family 
Members 
I examine the various ways that affiliated persons hold the equities of member firms to 
maintain family-based corporate control at the group level. As mentioned in the previous 
section, affiliated persons can be categorized into three different groups: group founders 
and family members [F], top executives [E], and non-profit organization [N]. Considering 
these three different types of affiliated persons who have engaged in group ownership 
and control, it can be assumed there are eight possible combinatorial patterns of joint 
shareholding ties that affiliated persons are able to send to affiliated firms: FEN, FE, FN, 
EN, F, E, N, and NONE.37 From the standpoint of affiliated firms, it could also be 
understood that each affiliated firm is directly connected with affiliated persons by one of 
seven possible combinations of joint shareholding ties (FEN, FE, FN, EN, F, E, and N) or 
has no direct connection with affiliated persons (NONE). 
To examine which specific combinatorial patterns are more prevalent than others, 
I analyze the incidence matrices of each business group over time. As explained in detail 
                                                
37 Eight plausible combinations of joint shareholding are as follows: 
 
· FEN: Joint shareholding of firm’s equity by group founders and family members [F], top 
executives [E], and non-profit organizations [N] 
· FE: Joint shareholding of firm’s equity by group founders and family members [F] and 
top executives [E] 
· FN: Joint shareholding of firm’s equity by group founders and family members [F] and 
non-profit organizations [N] 
· EN: Joint shareholding of firm’s equity by top executives [E] and non-profit 
organizations [N] 
· F: Shareholding of firm’s equity by group founders and family members [F] only 
· E: Shareholding of firm’s equity by top executives [E] only 
· N: Shareholding of firm’s equity by non-profit organizations [N] only 




in the previous section, the incidence matrix represents the affiliated persons’ 
shareholding percentage of affiliated firms in each business group. In the incidence 
matrix [m (row) x n (column)], m is composed of three categorized affiliated persons and 
n is the affiliated companies of which shares are held (or not held) by the affiliated 
persons. Figure 3.9. Changing Trends of Eight Possible Combinatorial Patterns of Equity 
Shareholding Ties Affiliated Persons Send Affiliated Firms over Time shows what types 


































Figure 3.9. Changing Trends of Eight Possible Combinatorial Patterns of Equity 










































































Comparison of Changing Proportion of the Type [F] 
The most prevalent result is that the proportion of [F] in most business groups decreased 
as time went on when one compares the proportion of [F] in 1997 with that of [F] in 2003. 
The proportion of [F] in seven out of twenty-eight chaebols increased during this research 
period.38 A notable commonality among these seven groups is that five groups, except for 
the Taihan group and the Seah group, were newly established business groups as a 
consequence of the separation from their original groups during this research period. The 
size – the number of affiliated firms – of these newly established chaebols was relatively 
                                                
38 Changing trend of the proportion of [F] of these seven chaebols are as follows:  
 
Kisco (0.142 in 2000 to 0.25 in 2001 to 0.18 in 2003) 
Taihan (0.375 in 1997 to 0.57 in 1999 to 0.455 in 2003) 
Seah (0.381 in 1997 to 0.393 in 2003) 
Hyundai Motor (0.13 in 2000 to 0.28 in 2003) 
Hyundai Department (0.375 in 1999 to 0.41 in 2003) 
Hyundai Development (0 in 1999 to 0.2 in 2001 to 0.33 in 2003) 




small ranging from three to fifteen at the outset. Family members who had a stake in 
newly established chaebols seemed to be actively involved in the affiliated firms’ 
ownership and control in order to put the group’s still unstable inter-firm network 
structure on solid foundation as fast as they could. 
In contrast to these seven chaebols’ increasing trend in the proportion of [F], the 
proportion of [F] of the other twenty-one chaebols decreased during the time span of this 
research, 1997-2003. Whereas some business groups with an increasing proportion of [F] 
were usually newly established groups and had a relatively small number of affiliated 
firms, other chaebols with a decreasing proportion of [F] were usually composed of a 
relatively large number of firms.39 Moreover, it is interesting to note that all of the top 
business groups led the trend of a decreasing proportion of [F]: for example, Samsung 
(0.155 (9/58)40 in 1997 to 0.048 (3/62) in 2003), LG (0.392 (20/51) in 1997 to 0.044 
(2/45) in 2003), Hyundai (0.421 (24/57) in 1997 to 0.143 (1/7) in 2003), Hanjin (0.64 
(16/25) in 1997 to 0.31 (7/23) in 2003), and SK (0.125 (5/40) in 1997 to 0.034 (2/58) in 
2003). 
The overall decreasing trend of the proportion of [F] can be partly attributed to 
unprecedented environmental pressure. After the financial crisis of 1997, chaebols were 
faced with government-led economic reform policies and regulations. Therefore, it would 
                                                
39 Only a few business groups’ size was small under this category. The Hyundai Heavy group had 
five to six affiliated firms. While the Hyundai group was one of the largest chaebols in Korea and 
it had fifty seven affiliated firms in 1997, its size rapidly decreased as a result of group division 
and it had only seven affiliated firms in 2003. The Dongkuk group, like the Hyundai group, 
decreased its size from seventeen in 1997 to eight in 2003 following the group division in 2000. 
 
40 With regard to the fraction in the parentheses, the numerator refers to the number of affiliated 
firms that receive specific types of combinatorial shareholding ties and the denominator 




not be plausible for the group owners and family members on their own to expand the 
proportion of their ownership shares of affiliated firms. Furthermore, as the group size 
became larger, it must have been a challenging task to maintain far-reaching dominance 
over all affiliated firms by relying only on family members themselves. Finally, faced 
with external pressures as well as internal challenges, the chaebol owners and family 
members seemed to more actively explore alternative ways to get over these challenging 
situations.  
 
Cross Comparison of Increasing Proportion of the Types [NONE] with [F] 
Using the type [NONE] as another reference point, one compares the proportion of 
[NONE] in 1997 with that of 2003. This analysis reveals that nineteen chaebols increased 
the proportion of [NONE] but the other nine groups decreased the proportion of [NONE]. 
If the changing trends of [F] and [NONE] are simultaneously taken into account, then the 
twenty-eight chaebols could be classified into four categories. This can be seen in the 
two-by-two table (See Table 3.11. Classification of Chaebols by the Changing Trend of 













The most distinctive feature of this cross-classifying process is that sixteen out of  
nineteen chaebols that commonly shared the trend of an increasing proportion of [NONE] 
showed a decreasing trend in the proportion of [F] during this research period. That is, 
these sixteen chaebols relied relatively less on type [F] as a specific type of tie to link 
affiliated persons to affiliated firms than they did before.41 This trend demonstrates that 
both the chaebol owners and their family members were less directly connected with 
affiliated firms than before. At the same time, an increasing trend in the proportion of 
[NONE] in most chaebols indirectly represents an increasing significance of interfirm 
relations within chaebols for the formation of a business group.  
In contrast to the decreasing tendency of the proportion of [F], the proportion of 
the types [FEN], [FE], [FN] or [E] tended to generally increase during the time span of 
1997-2003.42 From the affiliated firms’ view, this trend could be interpreted that, as time 
                                                
41 The other remaining three out of nineteen chaebols were Kisco, Taihan, and Seah. These three 
groups increased the proportion of [F] during this research period. 
 
42 To illustrate this trend more clearly, one just shows some major groups’ trend here. 
 
Hanjin:  FEN (0 (0/25) in 1997 to 0.13 (3/23) in 2003) 
FE (0 (0/25) in 1997 to 0.238 (5/21) in 1998 to 0.043 (1/23) in 2003) 
 
LG:  FEN (0.02 (1/51) in 1997 to 0.122 (5/41) in 1999 to 0.067 (3/45) in 2003)  
FE (0(0/51) in 1997 to 0.022 (1/45) in 2003) 
FN (0.118 (6/51) in 1997 to 0.022 (1/45) in 2003) - decrease 
E (0(0/51) in 1997 to 0.222 (10/45) in 2003) 
 
Samsung:  FEN ( 0.103 (6/58) in 1997 to 0.113 (7/62) in 2003) 
FE (0.034 (2/58) in 1997 to 0.113 (7/62) in 2003) 
EN and E was decreased. 
 
SK:  FEN (0.15 (6/40) in 1997 to 0.158 (6/38) in 1999 to 0.069 (4/58) in 2003) 
FE (0.025 (1/40) in 1997 to 0.052 (3/58) in 2003) 





goes on, when affiliated firms are directly connected with affiliated people, the former 
tends to receive ties not only from the group owner and family members but also from 
other affiliated agents such as executives or non-profit organizations. For the group 
owner and family members, the same phenomenon means that they more vigorously 
mobilize top executives and/or non-profit organizations as their allies to stabilize their 
corporate ownership of and control over affiliated firms.43    
Compared with the above mentioned sixteen groups, the other three business 
groups – Kisco, Taihan, and Seah – increased both their proportion of [F] and that of 
[NONE] during this research period. That is, family members of these groups tended to 
actively stretch their ties to affiliated firms. In particular, the proportion of [F] within 
both the Seah group and the Taihan group was very high in 2003. In the case of the 
Taihan group, two types of ties – [F] and [NONE] – were constantly observed over time. 
However, type [FE] was only observed for the first three years, 1997-1999. This means 
that the Taihan group was primarily owned and controlled by family-centered relational 
patterns and the owner of the Taihan group did not constantly mobilize executives as his 
allies. The Seah group, like the Taihan group, also barely mobilized other affiliated 
persons for the family-based robust corporate control even though type [FN] was 
                                                                                                                                            
H:  FE (0.14 (8/57) in 1997 to 0.286 (2/7) in 2003) 
E (0 (0/57) in 1997 to 0.208 (5/24) in 2000 to 0.143 (1/7) in 2003) 
 
43 If firms, in spite of no direct connections with affiliated persons of a chaebol, are to be regarded 
as affiliated firms of a chaebol, then these firms might be linked with other affiliated firms that 
are under the control of affiliated persons. Considering this general condition of inter-firm 
network structure of Korean business groups, it can be suggested that chaebol owners and family 
members that commonly share an increasing proportion of [NONE] and a decreasing proportion 
of [F] not only more actively exploit inter-firm relations but also become more strategic to 





consistently observed throughout the whole period and type [FEN] began to be observed 
in 2001. The Kisco group departed from the Dongkuk group and established its group 
structure in 2000. In particular, this group relies more on type [FE] (0.285 (2/7) in 2000 
to 0.273 (3/11) in 2003) than on type [F]. Although type [FN] (0.286 (2/7) in 2000) was a 
crucial path for corporate control at the outset, it disappeared in 2003. 
 
Cross Comparison of Decreasing Proportion of Types [NONE] with [F] 
Now, when the research focus shifts from an increase in the proportion of [NONE] to a 
decrease in the proportion of [NONE], I find that nine business groups belong to this 
category. Among these nine business groups,44 four business groups - Hyundai Motor, 
Hyundai Development, Hyundai Department, and Orion - show an increasing trend of the 
proportion of [F].45 These four business groups have some commonalities. First, all four 
business groups were newly established chaebols during this research period. Second, 
                                                
44 These nine groups’ decreasing proportion of [NONE] is as follows: 
 
Hyundai Motor (0.733 (11/15) in 2000 to 0.56 (14/25) in 2003) 
Hyundai Development (0.667 (2/3) in 1999 to 0.583 (7/12) in 2003) 
Hyundai Department ( 0.625 (5/8) in 1999 to 0.471 (8/17) in 2003) 
Orion (0.956 (22/23) in 2001 to 0.926 (25/27) in 2003) 
 
Youngpoong (0.663 (15/24) in 1997 to 0.35 (7/20) in 2003) 
Kumho (0.781 (25/32) in 1997 to 0.687 (11/16) in 2003) 
Dongyang Chemical (0.714 (15/21) in 1997 to 0.474 (9/19) in 2003) 
Dongbu (0.583 (14/24) in 1997 to 0.455 (10/22) in 2003) 
Dongyang (0.667 (16/24) in 1997 to 0.625 (10/16) in 2003) 
 
45 Four out of nine business groups show the increasing tendency of the proportion of [F]:  
 
Hyundai Motor (0.13 (2/15) in 2000 to 0.28 (7/25) in 2003) 
Hyundai Development (0 (0/3) in 1999 to 0.33 (4/12) in 2003) 
Hyundai Department (0375 (3/8) in 1999 to 0.412 (7/17) in 2003) 




they each expanded their group size since launching their group form. The family 
members of these groups tend to be more directly connected with member firms and try 
to engage in ownership and management of affiliated firms in group expansion process. 
On the contrary, the remaining five chaebols — Kumho, Dongyang Chemical, 
Dongbu, Dongyang, and Youngpoong – were characterized by a decrease in both the 
proportion of [F] and the proportion of [NONE].46 The common ground of all these five 
groups was that the number of affiliated firms from each of these five groups also 
decreased during this period. When business groups were losing their affiliated firms and 
hence their group size was shrinking, the group owners and family members tried even 
harder to assemble top executives as their allies in order to defend family-based stable 
corporate ownership and control. For instance, in the case of the Kumho group, whereas 
the proportion of [F] was decreasing, the proportion of [FE], [E], and [N] showed an 
increasing trend. Both the Dongyang Chemical group and Dongbu group, like the Kumho 
group, also show the similar trend. For the Dongyang Chemical group, the proportion of 
[F] slightly decreased but there was an increase in the proportion of [FE] and [E]. The 
proportion of [F] in the Dongbu group declined from 0.25 (6/24) in 1997 to 0.136 (3/22) 
in 2003, but the proportion of [FEN] and [FN] increased during this period. The 
                                                
46 A decreasing trend of the proportion of [F] of these five business groups is as follows: 
 
Kumho (0.16 (5/32) in 1997 to 0.06 (1/16) in 2003) , 
Dongyang Chemical (0.19 (4/21) in 1997 to 0.23 (5/22) in 2000 to 0.16 (3/19) in 2003) 
Dongbu (0.25 (6/24) in 1997 to 0.33 (7/21) in 2001 to 0.136 (3/22) in 2003) 
Dongyang (0.25 (6/24) in 1997 to 0.188 (3/16) in 2003) 
The proportion of [F] in Youngpoong group was steady: (0.25 (6/24) in 1997 to 0.33 (7/21) in 




Dongyang group showed a slight proportional increase of [FE] and [FN] because of a 
shrinkage of the group size itself. 
 
3.12. 2. Combinatorial Types and Firm’s Block Positions 
In the previous section, the research focus was on how affiliated persons arrange and 
rearrange their shareholding ties with affiliated firms for their robust corporate control 
under environmental uncertainty and changing group conditions such as increasing or 
decreasing group size.47 Using the types [NONE] and [F] as two major axes for 
comparative analysis, I studied the changing trends of different combinations of 
connecting ties between affiliated persons and affiliated firms. 
In this section, it is the affiliated firms’ block positions that are added to the 
analysis of the changing trend of connecting patterns between affiliated persons and 
affiliated firms. By identifying which specific types of combinatorial shareholding ties 
tend to be more frequently used to connect affiliated persons with affiliated firms 
occupying specific block positions, I try to determine how group owners have been 
strategically contriving the inter-corporate network structure of a business group for the 
purpose of family-based corporate control. 
                                                
47 When I refer to the size of a business group in this thesis, it means the number of affiliated 
firms. In the process of categorizing chaebols in terms of inter-corporate relational patterns, 
especially combinatorial types between affiliated firms and affiliated people, I found that group 
size seems to be closely related to the configuration of group structure. In other words, this 
finding is not based on deductive process. Rather, it is an inductive result. Therefore, this finding 
is in some sense an indirect critique to sweeping generalizations about the group structure of 




Identifying affiliated firms’ different position taking within a network structure of 
a business group is possible by assessing their specific block positions through 
blockmodeling analysis. Here, I identify seven different block positions in an inter-firm 
network structure of each business group: A, B, C, D-l, D-2, D-3, and D-ISO. In the 
process of classifying the blocks’ specific positions, one considers the following three 
factors: (1) the configuration of reduced graphs in blockmodeling, (2) the outdegree and 
indegree of affiliated firms belonging to the same block, and (3) the combinatorial 
patterns of joint shareholding ties that affiliated persons send to affiliated firms belonging 
to the same block. The position of each block is determined by considering these three 
factors. 
First, I identify blocks as a result of structural equivalence. Using reduced graphs, 
I examine each block’s sending and receiving ties. In general, if a block has relatively 
more sending ties to other blocks (including itself) but has relatively less receiving ties 
from other blocks, then this block might be counted as a core or intermediary block (A, B, 
and C). However, if a block has very few or no sending ties but has some receiving ties, 
then this block might be regarded as a peripheral block (D-l, D-2, and D-3). If a block has 
neither sending nor receiving ties, then this block is considered an isolated block (D-ISO). 
Second, I take into account each firm’s outdegree and indegree in the 
classification process. Degree itself refers to “the number of nodes adjacent to it” 
(Wasserman and Faust 1994:125). Indegree is the number of other adjacent nodes that 
chooses one specific node in the particular relationship whereas outdegree refers to the 




415) identified four different positions: “carrier,” “transmitter,” “receiver” and “isolate” 
with reference to outdegree and indegree: 
 
Carrier or ordinary if dO (ni) > 0 and dI (ni) > 0  
Transmitter if dO (ni) > 0 and dI (ni) = 0  
Receiver if dO (ni) = 0 and dI (ni) > 0 
Isolate if dO (ni) = dI (ni) =  0  
 
where outdegree of node n, denoted by dO(ni) and indegree of node n, is denoted by dI(ni). 
If affiliated firms belonging to the same block are categorized as more of a carrier or 
transmitter rather than a receiver or isolate, then this block is likely to take a core or 
intermediary position rather than a peripheral position. However, if affiliated firms 
belonging to the same block are more frequently classified as a receiver rather than as a 
carrier or transmitter, this block might take a peripheral position.48  
Third, I also consider which specific blocks tend to receive which specific 
combinatorial patterns of joint shareholding ties that are sent from affiliated persons to 
affiliated firms. The eight possible combinatorial patterns that affiliated persons can send 
to affiliated firms have been previously outlined. Here it is of special interest to trace out 
the destination of the types [FEN], [F], and [FE] because these three types are widely 
                                                
48 First positions are “transmitters.” Chaebol’s affiliated persons (owner’s families, executives, 
and non-profit organizations) and a group of major companies are expected to take the role of 
transmitter positions. Second positions could be called “carriers” that are expected to be taken by 
major affiliated firms. Major affiliated companies’ shares are primarily owned by transmitters. 
Besides, these major affiliated companies own some amount of other firms’ shares belonging to 
the same chaebol. Furthermore, these intermediary firms themselves might have “transitive” or 
“cyclic” relationships with one another so that they function as a backbone for the stable 
controlling over business group as a whole. Third and finally, other subsidiary or affiliated firms’ 
positions are “receivers.” Receivers are subject to the control of other firms that own the specific 




observed patterns in connecting affiliated persons to affiliated firms. Here I assume that if 
some specific blocks have affiliated firms that receive type [FEN], then these blocks are 











In this research, one found a consistent pattern. Figure 3.10. Changing Patterns of 
Corporate Control in Four Illustrative Examples shows the simplified network structures 
of four chaebols as exemplary cases to represent four different trends. Here, the most 
conspicuous trend is that affiliated firms receiving shareholding ties from all three 
affiliated agencies type [FEN] are mainly posited in core or intermediate blocks rather 
than peripheral blocks. Nineteen out of twenty-eight chaebols showed type [FEN] at least 
once during the seven-year period. More specifically, fifteen among these nineteen 
business groups that adopted type [FEN] as their corporate strategy at least once belong 
to the category of increasing proportion of type [NONE] and the decreasing proportion of 
[F]. Considering the fact that sixteen business groups were classified in the category of 
increasing proportion of [NONE] and decreasing proportion of [F], it can be said that 
type [FEN] was primarily exploited by chaebols belonging to this category.49 The group 
owner and family members of these fifteen business groups seem to strategically 
mobilize affiliated persons, intertwine them like a rope, and selectively send this 
combinatorial tie to a few major firms within a business group. 
Both executives and non-profit organizations were mobilized by the chaebol 
owner and family members so as to take the role of vicarious agencies. Executives and 
non-profit foundations were expected to represent the interests of the chaebol owner, that 
is, the maintenance of the family-based stable corporate ownership and control. The most 
important aspect is that this joint equity holding strategy for the mobilization of corporate 
allies was made possible by a cooperative and even collusive relationship between 
                                                




principals – the chaebol chairman and family members – and agencies – executives and 
managers – within a chaebol. Therefore, the pattern of joint ownership of the affiliated 
firms’ share by means of mobilizing these allies becomes more apparent when family 
members try to control major affiliated firms. These major affiliated firms also take a 
vicarious role on behalf of the corporate interests of the chaebol owner and family 
members in some sense. So these major affiliates are a kind of mediator for effectively 
controlling other major or subsidiary affiliates within a business group. Finally, the 
controlling strategy of these business groups tends to become more isomorphic with 
regard to mobilizing all three affiliated agencies for the purpose of owning and 
controlling major firms. 
On the contrary, nine out of twenty-eight chaebols never adopted type [FEN] 
during this research period. What is noteworthy is that six out of these nine chaebols 
commonly shared the trend of an increasing proportion of [F].50 In general, these six 
groups share three common characteristics. First, five out of these six groups were newly 
established groups during this research period. Second, none of them utilized [FEN] ties 
as their corporate control strategy. Third, in the beginning, these five groups were 
composed of a relatively small number of affiliated firms – three to twenty-three – 
although they constantly increased their group size. To summarize, the size of these 
newly established groups was still relatively small, and hence their inter-firm network 
structure was less complicated than that of chaebols consisting of a large number of 
affiliated firms. Therefore, family members’ direct engagement in corporate ownership 
                                                





and control cannot be understood as an ineffective strategy when the group size is 
relatively small. 
Five business groups – Youngpoong, Kumho, Dongbu, Dongyang Chemical, and 
Dongyang – belonging to the category of a decrease both in the proportion of [NONE] 
and [F] did not show a consistent pattern with regard to type [FEN]. Among these five 
groups, Dongyang Chemical and Dongyang did not show type [FEN]. However, the 
Dongbu group began to exploit type [FEN] ties starting in 1998 and most of these ties 
were directed to core block firms but they were also connected with peripheral block 
firms during the years 2000-2002. In contrast, the Kumho group used type [FEN] in 1997 
and 1998 but it has not kept this type any more since 1999. The Youngpoong group made 
use of type [FEN] only once in 2000 and this tie was directed to core block firms. 
Now, let us shift the focus from type [FEN] to the joint shareholding type [FE]. 
As this research already showed, type [FEN] is mainly directed to major firms posited in 
core blocks. On the other hand, the direction of type [FE], along with that of type [F], is 
in some sense omnidirectional because type [FE] has been frequently used to connect 
affiliated persons with affiliated firms that were located in core or intermediary blocks 
and sometimes even in peripheral blocks. Only two – Lotte and Hyundai Heavy – out of 
twenty-eight business groups never adopted type [FE] during 1997-2003. For the Lotte 
group, however, type [FN] was widely used as a corporate control pattern by the family 




as well as core blocks.51 Type [F], like type [FE], was connected to affiliated firms 
occupying different block positions. However, type [F], unlike type [FE], became the less 
popular one as time went on.52  
As the number of affiliated firms that had no direct relation with affiliated persons 
was increasing in the inter-firm network, that is, an increasing trend in type [NONE], it 
became a more critical issue for group owners to effectively organize and reorganize the 
inter-firm network structure of a business group. What is more, the family members’ 
endeavor to control affiliated firms by relying only on themselves became more difficult 
as the number of affiliated firms increased. The chaebol owners might try to effectively 
control member firms by reducing the burden of the “span of control.” Generally 
speaking, the span of control means “no superior should have more subordinates than can 
be effectively overseen” (Scott 2003: 41). Finally, they mobilized other affiliated 
agencies like executives and/or non-profit organizations as their allies.  
To recapitulate, I examined how the group owners and family members were 
connected with affiliated firms for their overarching corporate control over business 
groups. For this examination, I considered two relational features in the network structure 
                                                
51 The type [FN] in the Lotte group was a widely adopted strategic pattern following type [F] and 
type [NONE]: the proportion of [FN] in 1997 was 0.179 (5/28) and it increased to 0.2 (7/35) in 
2003. In 1997, three out of five [FN] were directed to two core blocks and the other two [FN] 
were directed to a peripheral block. In 2003, four out of seven [FN] had been connected with two 
core blocks and the other three [FN] had relations with three affiliated firms located in peripheral 
blocks. 
 
52 Here, what is interesting is that some affiliated firms that belonged to an isolated block in an 
image matrix of inter-firm network structures were connected to affiliated persons, especially 
family members. It means that family members tended to directly own some affiliated firms from 





of each chaebol: one feature is the eight possible combinatorial patterns of joint 
shareholding ties that affiliated persons send to affiliated firms; the other is the different 
position taking of affiliated firms in the inter-firm network structure of a business group. 
A particularly notable pattern that was found is that whereas the proportion of [F] tended 
to decrease in most chaebols, the proportion of types [FEN], [FE], [FN] or [E] increased 
during this research period of 1997-2003. In other words, family members’ attempt to 
control affiliated firms by relying solely on family members became a less popular 
corporate controlling strategy as time went on. On the one hand, this changing trend is 
partly due to increasing environmental pressures after the financial crisis of 1997. On the 
other hand, this trend could be understood as a corporate reaction to changing group size 
in order to maintain family-based corporate control at the group level. As the business 
group size gets bigger, the group owner and family members try to find ways to 
effectively control member firms by reducing the burden of the span of control; so they 
mobilize other affiliated agents like executives and/or non-profit organizations as their 
allies for overarching corporate control. 
However, the group owner’s and family members’ direct involvement in affiliated 
firms’ corporate ownership and control cannot necessarily be treated as an ineffective 
strategy. I found that, when business groups were newly established during this research 
period and when the size of these groups was still relatively small, their inter-firm 
network structures were less complicated than those of chaebols consisting of a large 
number of affiliated firms. Given these overall corporate conditions, the family members 




tried to own and manage affiliated firms in the process of group expansion. A notable 
phenomenon is that some chaebols showed the similar corporate control pattern when 
their group size was shrinking. Under this corporate situation, the group owners and 
family members also tended to actively utilize executives as their corporate allies to 
maintain the family-based, stable, corporate ownership and control at the group level. 
Affiliated firms receiving shareholding ties from all three affiliated agencies – 
type [FEN] – are mainly posited in core or intermediate blocks rather than peripheral 
blocks. In particular, when the group size is large enough and more affiliated firms are 
not directly related with family members, the more the group owner and family members 
of these groups seem to strategically mobilize affiliated persons. Therefore, they 
intertwine these persons like a rope, and send this combinatorial tie to a few chosen major 
firms within a business group. Whereas type [FEN] is mainly directed toward major firms 
posited in core blocks, the direction of type [FE] and [F] is in some sense omnidirectional 
because these two types are directed to affiliated firms which are located in core, 
intermediary, or even peripheral blocks. 
Finally, family-based corporate control over chaebols is a strategic contrivance. 
This strategic ploy works by organizing and reorganizing ownership patterns along with 
the mobilization of top executives and non-profit organizations acting as vicarious agents 
on behalf of the interests of family members. In other words, this family-based corporate 
control in Korean business groups is exercised by aligning different types of 
combinatorial equity ties and by selectively sending these different types of ties to 





3.13. Strategic Condescension: Proactive Response to Environmental Pressure 
The chaebol owners pretended that their direct ownership at least declined at the group 
level when they were confronted with strong environmental pressure to reform their 
corporate structure in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 1997. In addition, it became 
a more critical task for the chaebol owners and family members to own and control all 
member firms with their limited financial resources as the group size became larger. So 
the business group owners tended to utilize and rely more on indirect ownership over 
affiliated firms than they had ever done before. The chaebol owner sustains his 
overarching controlling power over the business group by delegating the some amount of 
ownership shares to allies so that the allied agents exercise vicarious controlling power 
over affiliated firms on behalf of the chairman of a business group. Therefore, the 
chaebol owners and family members, rather than merely relying on themselves, mobilize 
affiliated agents such as executives and non-profit foundations with the intention of 
retaining family-based corporate control over chaebols. 
Faced with the question of why those who occupy the position of controller in an 
organization sometimes delegate their power to others, Perrow (1986) reasons that the 
dominant intend to keep up their dominance by partially delegating their power to 
trustworthy insiders at the cost of economic efficiency. He argues that “of course, one 
purchases some inefficiency along with this loyalty. Inefficiency means that the costs of 
doing business are increased. But the difference between a small increase in the operating 




enormous. In most cases, the exchange of loyalty for competence is in the executive’s 
interest” (Perrow 1986: 12). 
Similarly significant in this regard is Pierre Bourdieu’s depiction of the so-called 
“strategies of condescension” (Bourdieu 1984: 472-473; 1991; Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992: 143).  Condescension strategy, according to Bourdieu, means that: 
 
By temporarily but ostentatiously abdicating his dominant position in order to 
“reach down” to his interlocutor, the dominant profits from this relation of 




Bourdieu (1991) shows how strategies of condescension work in a concrete context of 
linguistic interaction by reporting one anecdotal example. There was a mayor in a 
province of south-west France. When he had a chance to make a speech at a ceremony to 
honor a poet who was born in that province, he delivered his speech not in standard 
French but with a dialect. The mayor’s speech evoked a great sensation from the local 
residents because the mayor’s linguistic practice was a kind of “transgression” of the 
unwritten law that people, especially officials, should speak French whenever they 
delivered a speech in public. Residents of this province were well aware of the fact that 
the mayor possessed a linguistic quality (a qualified professor) so as to speak eloquently 
in French. As it were, the mayor spoke in a dialect not because he had not mastered 
French but because he wanted to impress on local residents his linguistic practice as a 
“thoughtful gesture” despite his mastery of French. In the end, this condescending speech 




When there is a clear distinction of the dominant from the dominated, those who 
have authoritative power or prestigious social status can “transgress” the generally 
expected behaviors imposed on their positions without losing any of their privilege. Then 
why would they condescend themselves? This transgression is an intended social practice. 
The dominant who are able to perform transgressive activities, even if their 
condescending behaviors appear that they are overtly humiliating themselves and looking 
up to the dominated, have a covert motivation to secure their dominant position itself and 
to make their dominance strong in the existing relation of power by gaining favorable 
feedback and appreciation from the dominated. “Symbolic negation of the hierarchy,” 
Bourdieu argues, makes it possible for the dominant to “combine the profits linked to the 
undiminished hierarchy with those derived from the distinctly symbolic negation of the 
hierarchy - not the least of which is the strengthening of the hierarchy implied by the 
recognition accorded to the way of using the hierarchical relation” (Bourdieu 1991: 68). 
However, prior to Bourdieu, Peter Blau in Exchange and Power in Social Life 
([1964] 1986) had already tackled a similar issue on what Bourdieu called 
“condescension strategy.” While explaining how the social practice of ‘self-depreciation” 
of some group members could promote their social acceptance and status in a small group 
or an organization, Blau claims that: 
 
Self-depreciation does not always promote sympathy and social acceptance. [...] It 
is easy to exhibit such modesty for the person whose status is securely anchored, 
since doing so cannot endanger his position. On the contrary, his modesty is likely 
to earn the leader the approval and loyalty of his followers to complement the 
respect his abilities command, and thus to increase the effectiveness of his 




in the group, moreover, their appealing modesty is, in fact, a strategy to win group 
support in this competition (Blau [1964] 1986: 48-49). 
 
 
Finally, both Blau and Bourdieu underscore that dominant individuals, whose social 
status  is secure in a hierarchical relation, can exercise self-depreciation by revealing their 
shortcomings or condescend themselves by transgressing tacitly shared rules in order to 
get social profit - social recognition, respect, and loyalty from the dominated - without 
weakening their social position and power. 
It seems that Bourdieu’s condescension strategy is relevant explaining the 
changing trend of corporate control in regards as to why the chaebol owners and family 
members modified their controlling strategy by having more recourse to indirect control 
rather than direct control alone. The chaebol owners revised their corporate controlling 
strategy when they were faced with coercive environmental conditions such as the 
Korean government’s more rigorous corporate regulations and structural reform policies 
in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 1997. When the group owners revised their 
controlling strategies in response to the changing environmental conditions, their 
intentions did not seem to be based on merely following government regulations or just 
relinquishing their overall corporate ownership and controlling power. Rather, their 
intention was to gently but persistently preserve their controlling power over affiliated 
firms. This becomes more evident from the fact that not one chaebol owner surrendered 
their ownership or completely delegated their controlling power to professional managers 
throughout this research period even though some chaebols went bankrupt under the 




renounce their corporate ownership and control even though they experienced the 
division of the group. Therefore, for chaebol owners and their family members, the 
condescension strategy was a proactive and reactive strategy in response to 
environmental pressure. 
 
3. 14. Conclusion 
The central concern of this chapter was to investigate how the chaebol owners and family 
members organized and reorganized different patterns of network structure of Korean 
business groups for their robust corporate control over all affiliates when they were 
confronted with unexpected environmental uncertainty. Raising the question about the 
sweeping generalization of chaebols’ overall structure, i.e., monolithic form of highly 
centralized and hierarchical inter-firm structure, I examined to what extent the ownership 
network structure of each business group differed from one another. Here, I assumed that 
the network structure of each chaebol would be anchored on some specific locus in the 
continuum ranging from a more centralized, hierarchical ownership and control on one 
end to a less centralized, hierarchical ownership and control at the other. 
An important result is that the tau test statistic based on a triad census provides 
insight into the big picture of network structures within each business group. This test 
reveals that the majority of Korean business groups tend to take “a single hierarchy of 
clique levels,” which is represented as the ranked clusters model, across chaebols over 




result of the financial crisis of 1997, most chaebols maintained a centralized, hierarchical 
form of the group structure. 
However, this result needs to be understood with caution. Generally speaking, the 
ranked clusters model, which was chosen among possible alternative models, provides us 
with the overall network structure of each business group at the macro level. In order to 
scrutinize possible variations within this general model of network structure, it is 
important to dissect complex network structures and to analyze how business groups are 
composed of some blocks occupying different positions and their accompanying roles 
within a given group boundary. Using blockmodeling and simple matching analysis, 
more concrete network configurations of each business group could be identified.  
In the synchronic comparison of image matrices, I found that the network 
structure of Korean business groups did not concentrate so much on a monolithically 
fixed type. Rather, there were notable variations of the forms of inter-firm network 
structures under the umbrella of a centralized, hierarchical form. In diachronic analyses, 
inter-firm structures of chaebols became relatively less centralized and less hierarchical 
while overall network structures still held transitive patterns as time went on. With 
respect to this changing trend, I suggest that this changing pattern reflects the so-called 
“condescending strategy.” It seems that the chaebol owners and family members adopt 
this type of corporate strategy to stabilize their family-based corporate ownership and 
control. Exploiting transitive relations by maneuvering trustworthy affiliated people into 




corporate ownership and control with limited resources rather than relying on family 
members themselves.    
 More than anything else, this trend became more evident when I examined how 
the group owners and family members were connected with affiliated firms for their 
overarching corporate control over affiliates. Family-based corporate control over 
chaebols is grounded on strategic configuration and re-configuration of ownership ties by 
family members and their allies. This family-based corporate control in Korean business 
groups is exercised by strategically aligning different types of combinational equity ties 
and then by sending these different types of ties to specific firms posited in different 
positions within the inter-firm network structure. More specifically, the family members’ 
attempts to control affiliates by relying on family members themselves has become less 
of a widely used pattern and less popular corporate controlling strategy than was 
employed during the research period of 1997-2003. 
 This trend, however, should not be understood as family members losing their 
ground for corporate control over affiliated firms. Family members actively mobilized 
executives and non-profit organizations as their allies for their robust corporate control. 
In particular, when the group size is large enough and when more affiliated firms are not 
directly related with affiliated persons, the group owner and family members seem to 
strategically mobilize trustworthy affiliated persons, combine them as a kind of vicarious 
agent on behalf of the interest of family members, and selectively send this combination 
to a few major firms occupying core positions within a business group. Affiliated firms 




intermediate blocks rather than peripheral blocks. Finally, in spite of unprecedented 
environmental pressure, Korean business groups did not forsake their forms but rather 
held on by organizing and reorganizing their inter-firm network structure as well as 




























NETWORK STRUCTURE AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE 
 
4.1. Overview  
How do the network structures of business groups influence the corporate performance of 
affiliated firms and what is the extent of their influence? Concerning family-based 
corporate ownership and control and their relation to corporate performance, Khanna and 
Yafeh claim, “we regard the family-firms line of research on groups as highly promising, 
both with respect to the prevalence of family-controlled groups in different environments, 
and with respect to the interaction between family considerations and group performance 
and efficiency” (2007: 351, Italics added).  It has been generally acknowledged that 
network structures could provide the chaebol owner and family members with the 
“opportunity” to maintain their overall ownership of and control over the entire group. 
The same network structures, however, could be the “constraint” for the same people 
when these structures become an inertial force to hinder firms’ preemptive actions or 
reactions against environmental uncertainty (e.g., Burt 1992; Granovetter 1973; Mizruchi 




strategic aggregate of intercorporate relations among affiliated firms and affiliated agents. 
This intercorporate connection is based on various relations such as family ties, equity 
shareholdings, and transactions. Therefore, the concept that a chaebol is not a mere sum 
of firms but an aggregate of strategically coordinated relations among affiliates is at the 
heart of the Korean business group.  
Once the relational characteristics of chaebols are understood, the question 
becomes whether each chaebol’s intercorporate network configurations are related to the 
corporate performance of affiliated firms. There have been contentious views about the 
corporate performance of affiliated firms within business groups. For example, while 
Lincoln, Gerlach, and Ahmadjian (1996) studied the Japanese Keiretsu case, they 
reported that the performance of member firms in Japanese business groups, unlike 
general expectations, was not always superior to that of non-member firms and some 
affiliates even brought about relatively low profitability. Then, despite the relatively low 
profitability of affiliated firms’ performance, why did the major owners of large firms 
and affiliated firms themselves develop and maintain intercorporate relations as a form of 
a business group? Pecuniary, as well as non-pecuniary, reasons seem to coexist as raisons 
d’être of business groups although in reality, these two motives are inextricably 
intertwined with each other.  
The enterprises that developed into chaebols were originally established and 
evolved by family entrepreneurs. Moreover, after the Korean War, these evolving groups 
of firms in Korea were the biggest beneficiaries of the developmental state’s favorable 




the suitable carriers for rapid economic growth by economic policy makers armed with 
the logic of the so-called selection and concentration. Chaebols reduced transaction costs 
through inter-firm transactions. They also strategically allocated resources and exchanged 
the personnel among affiliated firms at the group level.  
It is important that some affiliated firms were forced to share their corporate 
profits with other financially troubled affiliates to help the latter at the expense of 
financial efficiency. However, financial troubles could sometimes go beyond the carrying 
capacity at the group level. This problem did not just affect a few firms having direct 
connections with a troubled firm but could be diffused to other affiliated firms. As a 
result, the group itself could be faced with a catastrophic situation like the dissolution of 
the group itself or a series of bankruptcies of affiliated firms.  
In addition to the pecuniary reasons related to the formation and development of 
chaebols in the Korean economy, Korean business groups contributed to the interests of 
the group founder and his family members. That is, chaebols had functioned as the 
financial source as well as the institutional backdrop for the founder’s family members to 
keep up their established social status and maintain their upper class position. That is why 
almost all chaebol owners have consistently pursued the stable inheritance of their 
ownership and controlling power within a chaebol to their descendants. 
 
4.2. Network Structure and Corporate Performance  
A group of scholars (Gulati, Dialdin, and Wang 2002; Ingram and Roberts 2000: 390; 




the relation between network structure and corporate performance, “less attention has 
been paid to whether and how the structural characteristics of organizational networks 
account for the performance differences among firms and the performance of those ties 
themselves” (Gulati, Dialdin, and Wang 2002: 288). Keeping this issue in mind, I 
examine whether the overall configurations of each chaebol’s inter-firm relations at the 
group level, in which member firms are embedded, are closely associated with the 
corporate performance of affiliated firms at the firm level. If so, then it is necessary to 
examine to what extent network structure would be a critical factor in affecting the 
variations of corporate performance in Korean business groups. At the same time, one is 
interested in how much the corporate performance of affiliated firms would be closely 
associated with affiliated firms’ different network positions and their accompanying roles 
– a source of constraints as well as opportunities – both within a business group and with 
the direct engagement of family members in affiliated firms’ corporate ownership via 
equity shareholding.  
Thus, the primary focus in this chapter is on three relational features that are 
expected to reveal the value of structural characteristics of business groups and the 
positional features of affiliated firms within a chaebol.  
First, this research specifically focuses on how the overall network structure at the 
group level would affect the performance of affiliated firms. The overall relational 
features of each business group represent the inter-corporate network configurations: 
centrality, hierarchy and transitivity.53 Here, one examines to what extent the overall 
                                                




network configurations of each business group at the group level would influence the 
corporate performance of affiliates at the firm level. The first hypothesis is that the more 
centralized, hierarchical, or transitive the overall network structure of a chaebol, the 
lower the corporate performance of affiliates of this group would be.  
Second, I investigate whether the different network positions of affiliated firms 
and their accompanying roles within a chaebol are related to their corporate performance. 
The controlling power of an affiliated firm would be conditioned by its position within 
the inter-corporate network structure. Moreover, both the affiliated firm’s position and its 
accompanying role are embedded in its inter-corporate ties with other affiliates within a 
chaebol. Thus, each firm’s different positions and its accompanying roles within inter-
corporate relations are expected to provide each firm with constraints as well as 
opportunities for its corporate activity. I assume that an affiliated firm’s capacity to exert 
control over other affiliated firms would be closely associated with its corporate 
performance.  
To identify each affiliate’s network position, one takes into account each firm’s 
degree centrality in a dyadic relation with other affiliates (Freeman 1979) as well as its 
block position in terms of structural equivalence (White, Boorman, and Breiger 1976). 
When an affiliated firm’s indegree is low but its outdegree is high, then this firm is 
expected to be more influential than others within each chaebol’s equity shareholding 
network structure. In contrast, if an affiliate’s indegree is high or low, but its outdegree is 




Consequently, this firm is expected to be posited in a lower position within an 
intercorporate network structure. 
I construct a binary variable that is based on its block position as a result of 
structural equivalence. If a firm is categorized as a superordinate or intermediate position, 
it is coded as one. However, if a firm is categorized as a subordinate or isolate position, it 
is coded as zero. The corporate performance of affiliated firms occupying the 
superordinate or intermediate position is expected to be better than that of other affiliates 
occupying the subordinate position. The second hypothesis is that the higher the position 
of affiliated firms within an inter-corporate network structure, the better the corporate 
performance of these firms would be.  
Third and finally, I focus on whether there is any meaningful difference between 
the corporate performance of some affiliated firms having direct ties with family 
members and that of others having no direct ties with family members. With regard to 
this issue, Luo and Chung (2005: 416), while analyzing the transitional trend of Taiwan’s 
business groups, underscore that “the main source of family advantages lies in family 
trust and loyalty, property inheritance, and patrilineal authority.” This statement seems to 
be pertinent to the case of Korean business groups as well. As it were, a trustworthy 
family relationship with recourse to blood ties has been the initial foundation of inter-
firm formation and the development of business groups in general and chaebols in 
particular. Therefore, the family-based corporate ownership of and control over chaebol 




However, it is ironic that “without examining the social structure that binds the 
group together and shapes resource sharing, these studies [previous research] assume that 
particularistic ties enhance performance during transitions, but such assumptions have 
not been empirically established” (Luo and Chung 2005:  405, Italics added). That is, 
there is an insufficient amount of empirical evidence on the effect of family members’ 
engagement in corporate management on overall corporate performance. Remembering 
the significance of the presumptive argument about the family-based, inter-corporate 
formation of business groups and its expected influence on the corporate performance of 
affiliated firms, I scrutinizes whether an affiliated firm’s direct connection with family 
members positively affect an affiliate’s corporate performance.  
When family members own some or a major proportion of shares of affiliated 
firms, they naturally have a stronger attachment to the corporate practice of these firms as 
opposed to other affiliated firms to which family members do not directly invest their 
financial resources; the rationale is that family members expect higher corporate gains 
when they have a vested financial interest. In a similar vein, I also expect that family 
members would be interested especially in the efficient corporate management of 
affiliates to which they directly invest their financial resources. Accordingly, it can be 
assumed that direct investment by family members to specific affiliates and their more 
intensive interest in efficient corporate management of these affiliated firms are expected 
to increase the corporate profit of these directly invested firms. The third hypothesis is 
that the more an affiliated firm is directly connected with family members, the better the 





In summary, by focusing on the inter-firm network structures along with 
particularistic ties of each business group, I study to what extent these relational features 
would influence the corporate performance of affiliated firms. Three key research 
questions are as follows: How much do chaebols vary in their corporate performance? Do 
chaebols with strong centrality at the group level also show relatively strong corporate 
performance? Is an affiliate firm’s centrality or direct connection with family members 
closely associated with corporate  performance across chaebols?  
 
4. 3. Theoretical Justification for Multi-level Analysis 
Since the research objective of this chapter is to investigate whether there is a significant 
difference in the corporate performance of affiliated firms across business groups, I try to 
take into account both firm-level and group-level factors. For this purpose, I develop a 
two-level hierarchical model. Multi-level analysis is an appropriate analytical framework 
to investigate the before-mentioned research objective. Here, Granovetter’s (2005) 
statement on business groups is worthy of special note because his depiction of  the main 
features of business groups indirectly validates why multi-level analysis could be 
considered an appropriate framework to examine the corporate performance of affiliates 
within a business group:   
 
Groups are more than the sum of their firms. Because they are internally and 
socially structured, it is misleading to measure average profitability of firms 
within a group, as each may play a different role and thus achieve 
correspondingly different financial results. […] In both Korea and Japan, it is 
misleading to measure the average performance of group firms because the social 




performance without accounting for the role it plays in relation to other group 
firms. The extent to which a firm’s performance is closely tied to that of others in 
the group rather than being decoupled in ways that justify separate analysis 
depends significantly on the strength of overall group identity. Such identity is a 
factor in determining behavior and performance that is difficult if not impossible 
to explain from a purely economic viewpoint (Granovetter 2005: 440-441).  
 
 
In her analysis of Chinese business groups, Keister (2000), like Granovetter, also 
underscores the assertion that a firm’s performance cannot be just understood by merely 
relying on the firm’s corporate attributes. It is critical to take into account other relational 
factors, such as “inter-firm networks” and “the environment within which the firm 
operates” (Keister 2000: 171), while studying the corporate performance of business 
groups.  
As already noted, the primary focus is to examine to what extent and in what 
ways the network structures of business groups tend to influence the corporate 
performance of affiliate firms. For this purpose, I use hierarchical models, known as 
multi-level linear models or multi-level analysis (Luke 2004; Raudenbush and Bryk 
2002), to test the theoretical framework outlined above. In the multi-level model, I 
measure the effect of group-level features as well as firm-level features on the variability 
of the corporate performance of affiliate firms at the firm level. The data for this analysis 
is organized in a hierarchical form so that affiliated firms (level-one) are nested within 
each business group (level-two).54  An affiliated firm is the unit of analysis while 
analyzing an affiliated firm’s corporate performance. The statistical package HLM 7.00 is 
used for the analyses.   
                                                
54 For the multilevel analysis, I construct two data matrices: one matrix is composed of variables 





4.4. Data and Method 
I construct a data set of each business group over time that shows each firm’s attributes 
along with relational features at the level-one. For this purpose, data for the corporate 
features of affiliated firms are drawn from two business yearbooks that are publicly 
accessible – Company Yearbook (Maeil Business Newspaper) and Hankyung Business 
Yearbook by Korea Investors Service (The Korea Economic Daily) – over the research 
period from 1997 to 2003.55 Data for relational features at the firm- and group-level have 
already been constructed by social network analyses in chapter three.  
 
Dependent variable: Return on Assets (ROA) as corporate performance 
There have been ongoing debates as to what corporate performance is and which 
attributes of a firm could be regarded as a relevant measure to reveal the corporate 
performance of a firm. And yet, it is hard to tell whether there is any one pre-given or 
fixed reference point to single out what corporate performance is. With regard to this 
ongoing issue, it seems that Marshall Meyer’s reflexive remark on corporate performance 
is a worthwhile reference point to make sense of corporate performance in a concrete 
research context. Meyer writes:  
 
                                                
55 Since data for the information of firms in 2003 are included in the yearbooks for 2004, I 
collected the information of affiliated firms for this research from yearbooks published in 2004. 
In addition, I crosschecked the information from two data sources so that I could clarify the 
accuracy of the information for this research. I collected the following information of each 
affiliated firm: listed/unlisted firm, financial/non-financial firm, established year, total capital, 
paid in capital, total assets, debt, and net income. Then, I calculated return on assets, debt to 




Performance describes how well or poorly an organization is doing. But 
performance is either a moving target, the parameters of which always change, or 
a fixed target, the parameters of which are known only partially. As to our 
preoccupation with performance, the best suggestion, perhaps, is that 
performance measures are used to determine and later to justify the distribution 
of wealth, power, and prestige within and among organizations (Meyer 1994: 556, 
Italics added).  
 
Considering two main features of performance – i.e., performance is about “how well or 
poorly an organization is doing” and its criterion of measurement is not absolute but 
relative, I adopt the return on assets (ROA) as a measure of the corporate performance of 
affiliated firms. Return on assets is interpreted as “a measure of return on total investment 
in a firm” (Barney 2002: 33). That is, ROA that is measured by the ratio of net income to 
total assets is the generally acknowledged corporate indicator of profitability of a firm.56 
For that reason, ROA has been a widely chosen as a gauge to represent profitability or 
                                                




The formula is relevant when one knows both the total assets at a time (year: t) and total asset of a 
year before (year: t – 1).56 Here, total assets are composed of the sum of total capital and total 
liabilities. For instance, if ROA of a firm is 0.30 (30%), then it means that this firm generates 
profits of $ 0.3 for each $ 1.00 in assets. Thus, high return on assets is considered an effective 
corporate performance of a firm.   
However, when total asset (year: t – 1) is unavailable for some reasons, I just use total 




The unavailability of total asset at time (t – 1)  in this research is mainly due to the following two 
reasons: if a firm is established in a specific year (t), then there is no total asset in a year (t – 1); it 




corporate performance of business groups (e.g., Japanese business groups (Lincoln, et al. 
1996); Taiwanese business groups (Luo and Chung 2005); Korean business groups 
(Chang 1999)).57  
 
Firm Level or Level-One Variables 
I choose the following variables that are expected to represent the relational features 
(variables 1-4) and corporate attributes (variables 5-8) of each affiliated firm: (1) block 
position, (2) normalized outdegree, (3) normalized indegree, (4) family tie, (5) listed firm, 
(6) financial firm, (7) years, and (8) debt ratio ( = debt / total assets).  
 
Block Position:  whether each affiliated firm’s position in the overall network structure of 
each business group affects its corporate performance is examined in terms of block 
position. As a result of structural equivalence introduced in chapter three, each firm’s 
position is identified within the intercorporate network structure. Here, when an affiliated 
                                                
57 To measure corporate performance, there are other possible indicators. For example, growth 
rate was a widely adopted indicator when the priority of economic policies under the regime of 
the developmental state during 1960s and 1980s was given to increasing growth rate rather than 
increasing corporate profit. Therefore, if my research period was the 1960s to 1980s, then growth 
rate would be a relevant measure and would resonate well with institutional conditions of those 
periods. However, while experiencing the financial crisis of 1997, the focus of corporate 
performance of business organizations in Korea shifted from corporate growth to corporate gain. 
This is one reason that I chose return on assets (ROA) as the performance measure. Even in 
measuring corporate profitability, there are also various kinds of measures. For example, return 
on equity (ROE) is a widely used measure. Here, the difference between ROA and ROE is that 
debt is one part of assets. Considering the relatively high debt-to-equity ratio of most Korean 
firms, return on assets would be a more realistic measure to assess the financial health and 





firm is posited in core or intermediary blocks, it is counted as one. However, when an 
affiliated firm is nested in peripheral or isolated blocks, it is counted as zero.  
 
Standardized Indegree and Outdegree Centrality: In addition to identifying an affiliated 
firm’s position in terms of its assigned blocks as a consequence of structural equivalence, 
each firm’s indegree and outdgree centrality is counted as another relational feature. This 
centrality measure is expected to reflect each firm’s position and its accompanying role 
within a business group. However, since the size of each chaebol – the number of 
affiliated firms – varies, different group size is likely to result in a different range of 
indegree and outdegree centrality. This makes it difficult to directly compare the 
centrality of affiliated firms belonging to different business groups. To resolve this 
problem, one adopts a “normalized” or “standardized” measure of indegree and outdegree 
instead of raw indegree and outdegree (Freeman 1979; Knoke and Yang 2008: 63; 
Wasserman and Faust 1994: 178-179).58 Considering the context of this research, some 
affiliated firms could be considered to be posited in a core position when these firms 
show high outdegree but low indegree. In contrast, other affiliated firms are expected to 
be nested in a peripheral position when they have low outdegree but high indegree. If 
firms are located in an intermediate position, then they might have relatively moderate 
outdegree and indegree.  
 
                                                
58 A standardized measure of indegree or outdegree can be calculated by dividing each affiliated 
firm’s indegree or outdegree centrality by the maximum possible number of ties with other 




Affiliated Firms Having Direct Ties with Family Members: In order to investigate 
whether there was any meaningful difference in corporate performance between some 
affiliated firms having direct ties with family members and other firms having no direct 
ties with family members, I measure whether or not each affiliated firm has received an 
equity shareholding tie from family members. When an affiliated firm is directly 
connected with family members via an equity shareholding tie in this research context, 
then this firm takes a value of one, or otherwise is zero. This could be also interpreted as 
follows: if family members hold direct shares of an affiliated firm, then there is a direct 
connection between an affiliated firm and family members who have a stake in this 
specific firm.  
 
Listed or Unlisted Affiliated firm: A firm can be listed in the Korean securities market 
once it fulfills listing requirements.59 If an affiliated firm is listed on the Korean securities 
market, this affiliated firm is coded one or otherwise is zero. I expect that listed firms in 
general would demonstrate better corporate performance than unlisted firms since the 
former already fulfills a set of general requirements to be listed in the Korean securities 
market.60  
 
                                                
59 Concrete criteria of listing requirements in the Korean securities market including both KOSPI 
(Korea Composite Stock Price Index) and KOSDAQ (Korea Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotation) can be found at www.krx.co.kr. For example, if a firm is to be listed in KOSPI, then 
the firm should have operated “without interruption for at least three years since establishment” 
which is one of the criteria to measure soundness of the firm.  
 
60 However, one also needs to keep in mind that some non-banking financial affiliates are unlisted 
firms and they tend to take a critical role for corporate control as a kind of springboard to 




Financially or Non-financially Affiliated Firms: When an affiliated firm is a non-banking 
financial institution (NBFI), such as an insurance company, investment company, or 
security firm, it takes the value one, or otherwise is zero. This distinction is related to the 
role of a NBFI within a business group. As referred to in chapter two, the Korean 
government prohibited chaebols from owning commercial banks as their affiliated firms 
since the government-led economic development plan was launched in 1962. The main 
reason for this regulation was that if chaebols had owned commercial banks and hence 
controlled domestic capital market at their disposal, chaebols would have dominated 
almost all economic areas with little or no competition. However, non-banking financial 
institutions, instead of commercial banks, have functioned as the critical financial reserve 
for chaebols, and act as a go-between to lend and distribute financial resources to 
affiliated firms on behalf of the chaebol owner and his or her family members.  
 
Established year [Age]: An organization’s age has been considered as one of the 
important features of a firm because of the “liability of newness” (Stinchcombe 1965). 
Younger organizations, compared with more established ones, are easily likely to fail 
since newly established organizations generally tend to be situated in an inferior position  
to obtain resources within a market. In addition, they usually experience difficulty in 
gaining legitimacy of their corporate practices from a specific field in which they are 
embedded. For purposes of this research, a firm’s age is measured by subtracting the 





Debt-ratio: Debt-ratio61 is measured by the ratio of debt to total assets. With this financial 
measure at the firm-level, I examine how much the degree of indebtedness of affiliated 
firms is associated with the corporate performance of the affiliates.  
 
Group Level or Level-Two Variables 
It has been generally acknowledged that the network structures of each business group 
can afford or constrain a chaebol’s adaptation to environmental pressure and institutional 
change (Gulati, Dialdin, and Wang 2002; Podolny and Page 1998). Here, I am interested 
in to what extent the relational features at the group level would influence the variations 
of the corporate performance of affiliated firms at the firm level. To examine how well or 
poorly an organization is doing along with its differentially configured inter-firm 
relations, I take into account the following relational features at the group level: (1) 
centrality, hierarchy, and transitivity, (2) the number of affiliated firms, (3) the proportion 








                                                
61 Debt-ratio can be defined as “a measure to the extent to which debt has been used to finance a 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table  4.1. Descriptive Statistics displays descriptive information on affiliated firms and 
business groups. Each affiliated firm is nested within a specific business group in each 
year. The number of affiliated firms was 511 in 1997, decreased to 443 in 1999, and 
reached to 575 in 2003.62 Twenty-two business groups were included in this research in 
1997. As a result of group division of a few business groups between 1998 and 2001, six 
newly established groups were included in this research during this period: Hyundai 
Department (1999), Hyundai Development (1999), Kisco (2000), Hyundai Motor (2000), 
Orion (2001), and Hyundai Heavy Industries (2001). Accordingly, the total number of 
business group included in this research increased to twenty-eight in 2003.  
Concerning relational features of affiliated firms, more than half of affiliated 
firms in general were posited in core and intermediate blocks throughout this research 
period; it was sixty one percent in 1997, fifty seven percent in 1999, sixty four percent in 
2000, and fifty eight percent in 2003. The mean of normalized outdegree increased from 
8.04 in 1997 to 10.61 in 1999, and then it steadily decreased from 9.25 in 2000 to 8.35 in 
2003. In parallel with the changing trend of the mean of normalized outdegree, the mean 
of normalized indegree increased from 7.46 in 1997 and reached the peak to 10.18 in 
1999. Then, it steadily decreased to 7.71 in 2003.  
The changing trend of the proportion of direct connection between family 
members and affiliated firms is worthy of one’s attention. About the half of affiliated 
                                                
62 This change is partly due to actual decrease and increase the number of affiliated firms during 
this research period. And, in the process of the construction data set to do perform the analysis of 
multilevel model in HLM, when a specific firm has some missing values, then this case was 




firms in 1997 were directly connected with family members via equity shareholding. 
However, as time went on, this proportion steadily decreased to forty-four percent in 
2000 and to thirty-seven percent in 2003. This general trend seems to reflect the fact that 
family members who have a stake in affiliated firms tend to be less directly connected 
with affiliated firms or less directly invest their financial resources to their affiliated firms 
as time went on. It is also consistent with the pattern that I found in chapter three; that 
family members by themselves have a direct tie with affiliated firms became a less 
popular corporate control strategy.    
 The most notable fact with regard to corporate attributes is that the mean debt 
ratio of affiliated firms during this research span decreased from 0.81 in 1997 to 0.61 in 
2003 via 0.59 in 2002. This trend reflects the corporate reaction of Korean business 
groups against environmental pressure; since the decreasing indebtedness of big 
corporations was one of the major corporate reform policies that the Korean government 
executed after the financial crisis of 1997, chaebols had to show positive signals to the 
market for their corporate survival. Thus, this decreasing trend of the debt-ratio of 
affiliated firms represents such a corporate reaction. The proportion of listed firms 
slightly decreased from 0.26 in 1997 to 0.23 in 2000 to 0.21 in 2003 as more newly 
established firms were included in a business group. The proportion of financial firms 
was in some sense steady ranged from 0.17 in the years 1998-1999 to 0.15 in 1997 to 
0.12 in 2003. The average age of affiliated firms was 19.05 in 1997 and 18.01 in 2003.    
The relational features at the group level – centrality, hierarchy, and transitivity – 




during this time span while transitivity was relatively stable. The average firm size of 
business groups was twenty-seven in 1997, twenty in 1999, and twenty-four in 2003. 
However, what is most important is not the mean of the group size but the variations of 
the size (See also Table 3.1.). For example, the Taihan group consisted of eight affiliates 
but the Samsung group had fifty-eight affiliates in 1997; the Hyundai Heavy Industries 
group63 had six affiliated firms and the Samsung group was composed of sixty two 
affiliated firms in 2003. The mean of the overall density of business groups was steady 
and ranged from 0.08 in 1997 to 0.1 in 2003 via 0.11 in 1999. 
    
Multilevel Modeling  
In this research context, level-one refers to affiliated firm-level and level-two to business 
group-level. Furthermore, insofar as a specific affiliated firm belongs to one designated 
business group, the level-one units are considered to be nested within the group-level 
units. The dependent variable is the corporate performance of each affiliated firm, that is, 
return on assets (ROA) at the level-one. The main interest is to what extent overall 
network configuration at the group-level would influence the corporate performance of 
affiliated firms at the firm-level. Finally, as the main research question is grounded on 
multilevel and the data of this research is taking the nested form, I employ hierarchical 
linear models. In particular, since the primary interest of this research is to examine 
“variation between higher-level units,” I adopt “random effects model” (Browne and 
Rasbash 2004: 463). Specifically speaking, I raise the following question that is related to 
                                                
63 However, since the Hyundai Heavy Industries group is primarily oriented toward their business 




the comparison at the group level: does corporate performance of affiliated firms that 
belong to the same business group tend to be more similar than that of affiliated firms 
that belong to other business groups? In addition, to examine cross-level interactions, I 
investigate whether there are variations of a specified level-one variable – affiliated firm 
level variable (that is, the slope) – across business groups as a result of the influence of 
group level variable(s) on the specified level-one variable.  
 
Intraclass Correlation Coefficient 
In the first step of this analysis, to estimate the existence of variability of within-groups 
and between-groups in the dependent variable, I test the intraclass correlation coefficient 
(ICC). The ICC is measured by calculating the between-group variance over the total 
variance. The higher the value of the intraclass correlation coefficient, it is understood 
that two affiliated firms belonging to the same group would be more similar than two 
affiliated firms belonging to different business groups. Therefore, it is expected that there 
would be some “clustering” (Browne and Rasbash 2004: 461) effect of some units at the 
group level on the variability of corporate performance at the firm level. 
Table 4.2 Intraclass Correlation Coefficient shows the result of the estimated 
intraclass correlation coefficient from 1997 to 2003. The most notable observation is that 
the estimated ICC was 0.0321 in 1997 and 0.0557 in 2003, respectively. It means that 
group-level factors in 1997 and 2003 explain 3.21 percent and 5.57 percent, respectively, 
of the variability in the corporate performance of affiliated firms. As the estimated ICC in 




percent of the variance in ROA is at the affiliated firm level. However, the total variance 
of the corporate performance (ROA) from 1998 to 2002 that could be accountable by the 
group-level factors was minimal. It means that the group-level factors were not so 
influential as to explain the variability of the corporate performance (ROA) of affiliated 
firms during this time span. This result could also be understood that cluster effects were 
less of an influential factor than the effects of firm-level factors to account for the 
variability in the corporate performance of affiliated firms.  
 
Table 4.2. Intraclass Correlation Coefficient 
     
        
Year  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
The overall ROA mean -1.865 -1.110 2.776 0.551 -1.290 1.349 0.580 
        
Between group variance σ2u0  3.703 0.945 0.053 0.800 5.740 5.306 15.671 
Within group variance σ2e0 111.683 222.256 223.674 210.499 395.479 277.115 265.443 
        
ICC 0.0321 0.0043 0.0002 0.0038 0.0143 0.0188 0.0557 
ICC: ρ = σ2u0 / (σ2u0 + σ2e0 ) 
 
       
 
 
In brief, as a result of the examination of the possible group-level effect in terms 
of the estimated ICC, I found the overall network structure of business groups, unlike 
general expectation, was not a consistently influential factor in the variability of the 
corporate performance of affiliated firms. However, there was still some of the estimated 
variability in the corporate performance of affiliated firms that could be explained by 
group-level factors in specific years (1997 and 2003) even though its estimated value was 




from the hierarchical linear models of these two years. Although the estimated ICC was 
minimal during the years of 1998-2002, I, nonetheless, perform multilevel analysis in 
order to examine whether there are still meaningful trends or patterns in terms of a 
comparative perspective.   
Throughout this research, I found that a chaebol’s overall inter-corporate network 
configuration via equity shareholding was the strategically coordinated relational 
structure for the robust, stable, and overarching corporate control by family members 
over member firms. However, the inter-corporate network structure at the group level 
does not always seem to positively contribute to each member firm’s effective corporate 
practice. In other words, this result provides us with a detour to make sense of the 
primary function of the overall network structure of chaebols; the primary function of 
organizing and reorganizing the inter-corporate configuration at the group level is 
primarily oriented towards stabilizing the corporate dominance by family members at the 
group-level rather than maximizing the pecuniary corporate performance of affiliated 
firms at the firm-level.     
   
Substantive Modeling 
In this research, using hierarchical linear modeling to analyze hierarchically structured 
data is supported by the fact that affiliated firms (level-one) are nested within business 
groups (level-two). I simultaneously pay attention to (1) the relation between each 
affiliated firm’s corporate performance (ROA) and firm-level relational features and 




performance (ROA) and group-level relational features. After taking into consideration 
the existence of variance at both levels as a consequence of the estimated ICC, some 
variables are added at each level: eight independent variables at level-one and two 
independent variables at level-two. All level-one and level-two variables are grand-mean 
centered. I also include three cross-level interactions to examine how much some 
relational features at the firm-level, which are expected to be associated with corporate 
performance, tend to be influenced by relational features at the group-level: how the 
association between block position of an affiliated firm and its corporate performance is 
influenced by the overall group density at the group level; how the association between 
normalized outdegree and normalized indegree of an affiliated firm and its corporate 
performance is influenced by centrality at the group level. A general specification of the 




ROA = B0 + B1*Block Position + B2*Normalized Outdegree + B3*Normalized 
Indegree + B4*Family Tie + B5*Listed Firm + B6*Financial Firm + B7*Years + 





 B0 = G00 + G01*Centrality + G02*Density + u0 
 B1 = G10 + G11*Density + u1 
 B2 = G20 + G21*Centrality + u2 
 B3 = G30 + G31*Centrality + u3 
 B4 = G40 + u4 
 B5 = G50  
 B6 = G60  
 B7 = G70  







    ROA = G00 + G01*Centrality + G02*Density  
    + G10*Block Position + G11*Density*Block Position  
    + G20*Normalized Outdegree + G21*Centrality*Normalized Outdegree  
    + G30*Normalized Indegree + G31*Centrality*Normalized Indegree  
    + G40*Family Tie  
    + G50*Listed Firm 
    + G60*Financial Firm  
    + G70*Years  
    + G80*Debt Ratio  
    + u0 + u1*Block Position + u2*Normalized Outdegree + u3*Normalized Indegree  
    + u4*Family Tie   
    + u8*Debt Ratio + r 
 
Preliminary analysis indicated that listed firm, financial firm, and years did not vary. 
Therefore these variables were fixed. Other coefficients are estimated as random.  The 
number of independent variables that one could include in the modeling process was 
constrained because the size of the group-level sample was modest (N = 22 in 1997 and 
N = 28 in 2003). 
 
 
4.5. Results and Discussion 
Table 4.3. Two-level Hierarchical Linear Model of the Effect of Business Group’s 
Relational Features on the Affiliated Firm’s Corporate Performance (ROA) shows the 
analysis results of the multi-level model for each year. There are a number of notable 










Table 4.3. Two-Level Hierarchical Linear Model of the Effect of Business Group's   
Relational Features on the Affiliated Firm's Corporate Performance (ROA) 
      
(Year : 1997)      
Fixed Effects Coefficient se t Ratio Approxi. d.f. P-value 
Intercept G00 -1.176 0.250 -4.707 19 0 
      
Firm Level      
Block Position G10 1.106 0.771 1.435 20 0.167 
Normalized Outdegree G20 0.003 0.020 0.126 20 0.901 
Normalized Indegree G30 -0.113 0.049 -2.330 20 0.03 
Family Tie G40 1.735 0.624 2.780 21 0.011 
Listed Firm G50 -1.526 0.621 -2.457 376 0.014 
Financial Firm G60 -1.641 0.993 -1.653 376 0.099 
Years G70 0.035 0.041 0.861 376 0.39 
Debt Ratio G80 -18.371 3.592 -5.115 21 0 
      
Group Level       
Centrality G01 -6.396 2.960 -2.161 19 0.044 
Overall Density G02 15.463 7.437 2.079 19 0.051 
      
Cross Level       
Block Position X Overall Density G11 -62.203 22.923 -2.714 20 0.013 
Normalized Outdegree X Centrality G21 0.420 0.145 2.885 20 0.009 
Normalized Indegree X Centrality G31 0.002 0.359 0.004 20 0.997 
      
      
Random Effects SD Variance df Chi-square P-value 
Intercept u0 0.207 0.043 16 14.676 >.500 
Block Position Slope, u1 1.429 2.042 17 14.047 >.500 
Normalized Outdegree Slope, u2 0.033 0.001 17 3.458 >.500 
Normalized Indegree Slope, u3 0.066 0.004 17 10.655 >.500 
Family Tie Slope, u4 1.015 1.030 18 11.066 >.500 
Debt Ratio Slope, u8 15.312 234.468 18 52.884 0 
level-1,       r 7.863 61.819       
      
Note: When variables are statistically significant at the p ≤ .05 level, then these variables are 
appeared in bold.  
      












      
      
      
(Year : 1998)      
Fixed Effects Coefficient se t Ratio Approxi. d.f. P-value 
Intercept G00 -0.623 0.457 -1.361 19 0.189 
      
Firm Level      
Block Position G10 -0.682 1.403 -0.486 20 0.632 
Normalized Outdegree G20 -0.046 0.027 -1.681 20 0.108 
Normalized Indegree G30 -0.138 0.074 -1.867 20 0.077 
Family Tie G40 2.201 1.396 1.577 21 0.13 
Listed Firm G50 0.097 1.036 0.094 317 0.925 
Financial Firm G60 0.972 1.250 0.778 317 0.437 
Years G70 0.135 0.062 2.193 317 0.029 
Debt Ratio G80 -20.133 4.291 -4.691 21 0 
      
Group Level       
Centrality G01 2.547 4.071 0.626 19 0.539 
Overall Density G02 23.046 16.308 1.413 19 0.174 
      
Cross Level       
Block Position X Overall Density G11 -15.043 19.003 -0.792 20 0.438 
Normalized Outdegree X Centrality G21 -0.129 0.116 -1.115 20 0.278 
Normalized Indegree X Centrality G31 0.267 0.553 0.483 20 0.634 
      
      
Random Effects SD Variance df Chi-square P-value 
Intercept u0 0.976 0.953 17 13.358 >.500 
Block Position Slope, u1 5.557 30.881 18 24.618 0.136 
Normalized Outdegree Slope, u2 0.065 0.004 18 8.054 >.500 
Normalized Indegree Slope, u3 0.172 0.030 18 13.805 >.500 
Family Tie Slope, u4 4.501 20.256 19 27.943 0.084 
Debt Ratio Slope, u8 18.214 331.756 19 117.889 0 
level-1,       r 11.171 124.791       
      
      
      













      
      
      
(Year : 1999)      
Fixed Effects Coefficient se t Ratio Approxi. d.f. P-value 
Intercept G00 2.904 0.559 5.195 21 0 
      
Firm Level      
Block Position G10 1.152 1.167 0.987 22 0.334 
Normalized Outdegree G20 -0.033 0.034 -0.976 22 0.34 
Normalized Indegree G30 -0.158 0.106 -1.482 22 0.153 
Family Tie G40 1.014 1.470 0.69 23 0.497 
Listed Firm G50 -1.147 1.271 -0.902 296 0.368 
Financial Firm G60 -0.466 1.823 -0.256 296 0.798 
Years G70 0.062 0.065 0.96 296 0.338 
Debt Ratio G80 -12.712 4.925 -2.581 23 0.017 
      
Group Level       
Centrality G01 -7.146 3.997 -1.788 21 0.088 
Overall Density G02 11.838 13.715 0.863 21 0.398 
      
Cross Level       
Block Position X Overall Density G11 3.509 20.260 0.173 22 0.864 
Normalized Outdegree X Centrality G21 -0.045 0.164 -0.272 22 0.788 
Normalized Indegree X Centrality G31 -1.343 0.784 -1.714 22 0.101 
      
      
Random Effects SD Variance df Chi-square P-value 
Intercept u0 1.188 1.411 17 19.755 0.286 
Block Position Slope, u1 1.374 1.887 18 11.261 >.500 
Normalized Outdegree Slope, u2 0.086 0.007 18 9.551 >.500 
Normalized Indegree Slope, u3 0.324 0.105 18 40.980 0.002 
Family Tie Slope, u4 4.266 18.196 19 17.839 >.500 
Debt Ratio Slope, u8 21.004 441.158 19 319.892 0 
level-1,       r 11.299 127.663       
      
      
      













      
      
      
(Year : 2000)      
Fixed Effects Coefficient se t Ratio Approxi. d.f. P-value 
Intercept G00 1.020 0.524 1.946 23 0.064 
      
Firm Level      
Block Position G10 0.077 1.738 0.044 24 0.965 
Normalized Outdegree G20 -0.036 0.039 -0.93 24 0.362 
Normalized Indegree G30 -0.199 0.077 -2.587 24 0.016 
Family Tie G40 2.145 0.964 2.225 25 0.035 
Listed Firm G50 -1.015 1.154 -0.879 355 0.38 
Financial Firm G60 0.551 1.079 0.51 355 0.61 
Years G70 0.103 0.067 1.546 355 0.123 
Debt Ratio G80 -2.376 1.886 -1.26 25 0.219 
      
Group Level       
Centrality G01 -2.693 4.817 -0.559 23 0.582 
Overall Density G02 20.434 17.336 1.179 23 0.251 
      
Cross Level       
Block Position X Overall Density G11 -23.471 43.566 -0.539 24 0.595 
Normalized Outdegree X Centrality G21 -0.185 0.163 -1.135 24 0.268 
Normalized Indegree X Centrality G31 -0.155 0.773 -0.2 24 0.843 
      
      
Random Effects SD Variance df Chi-square P-value 
Intercept u0 0.305 0.093 20 15.647 >.500 
Block Position Slope, u1 5.805 33.694 21 30.384 0.084 
Normalized Outdegree Slope, u2 0.042 0.002 21 14.012 >.500 
Normalized Indegree Slope, u3 0.098 0.010 21 9.755 >.500 
Family Tie Slope, u4 1.199 1.437 22 11.485 >.500 
Debt Ratio Slope, u8 6.245 39.006 22 56.600 0 
level-1,       r 13.172 173.497       
      
      
      













      
      
      
(Year : 2001)      
Fixed Effects Coefficient se t Ratio Approxi. d.f. P-value 
Intercept G00 -0.881 1.006 -0.875 25 0.39 
      
Firm Level      
Block Position G10 -2.498 2.503 -0.998 26 0.327 
Normalized Outdegree G20 -0.111 0.052 -2.137 26 0.042 
Normalized Indegree G30 -0.272 0.083 -3.255 26 0.003 
Family Tie G40 2.909 0.900 3.234 27 0.003 
Listed Firm G50 -1.669 1.208 -1.382 354 0.168 
Financial Firm G60 1.243 2.446 0.508 354 0.612 
Years G70 0.247 0.060 4.147 354 0 
Debt Ratio G80 -9.734 4.054 -2.401 27 0.024 
      
Group Level       
Centrality G01 -10.744 4.245 -2.531 25 0.018 
Overall Density G02 39.072 16.821 2.323 25 0.029 
      
Cross Level       
Block Position X Overall Density G11 -129.486 34.681 -3.734 26 0.001 
Normalized Outdegree X Centrality G21 0.170 0.239 0.71 26 0.484 
Normalized Indegree X Centrality G31 0.112 0.286 0.39 26 0.7 
      
      
Random Effects SD Variance df Chi-square P-value 
Intercept u0 2.703 7.308 23 21.610 >.500 
Block Position Slope, u1 11.152 124.364 24 63.813 0 
Normalized Outdegree Slope, u2 0.191 0.037 24 22.933 >.500 
Normalized Indegree Slope, u3 0.241 0.058 24 21.227 >.500 
Family Tie Slope, u4 2.618 6.854 25 13.938 >.500 
Debt Ratio Slope, u8 17.122 293.157 25 101.173 0 
level-1,       r 16.290 265.378       
      
      
      












      
      
      
(Year : 2002)      
Fixed Effects Coefficient se t Ratio Approxi. d.f. P-value 
Intercept G00 1.485 0.605 2.455 25 0.021 
      
Firm Level      
Block Position G10 -1.501 1.461 -1.027 26 0.314 
Normalized Outdegree G20 0.013 0.041 0.326 26 0.747 
Normalized Indegree G30 -0.087 0.060 -1.454 26 0.158 
Family Tie G40 2.346 1.106 2.121 27 0.043 
Listed Firm G50 -2.720 1.208 -2.252 395 0.025 
Financial Firm G60 -4.080 1.301 -3.137 395 0.002 
Years G70 0.087 0.053 1.633 395 0.103 
Debt Ratio G80 -11.939 2.854 -4.183 27 0 
      
Group Level       
Centrality G01 -12.493 6.522 -1.915 25 0.067 
Overall Density G02 0.919 14.704 0.063 25 0.951 
      
Cross Level       
Block Position X Overall Density G11 -36.366 30.512 -1.192 26 0.244 
Normalized Outdegree X Centrality G21 0.204 0.163 1.25 26 0.222 
Normalized Indegree X Centrality G31 1.335 0.364 3.672 26 0.001 
      
      
Random Effects SD Variance df Chi-square P-value 
Intercept u0 1.620 2.623 23 27.941 0.218 
Block Position Slope, u1 4.724 22.319 24 38.773 0.029 
Normalized Outdegree Slope, u2 0.014 0.000 24 16.533 >.500 
Normalized Indegree Slope, u3 0.105 0.011 24 30.010 0.184 
Family Tie Slope, u4 2.091 4.371 25 15.309 >.500 
Debt Ratio Slope, u8 9.855 97.122 25 69.941 0 
level-1,       r 13.994 195.834       
      
      
      














      
      
      
(Year : 2003)      
Fixed Effects Coefficient se t Ratio Approxi. d.f. P-value 
Intercept G00 0.711 0.626 1.135 25 0.267 
      
Firm Level      
Block Position G10 3.371 1.371 2.459 26 0.021 
Normalized Outdegree G20 -0.037 0.048 -0.77 26 0.448 
Normalized Indegree G30 -0.041 0.080 -0.515 26 0.611 
Family Tie G40 0.219 1.182 0.185 27 0.855 
Listed Firm G50 0.391 0.995 0.394 404 0.694 
Financial Firm G60 -4.359 1.648 -2.644 404 0.009 
Years G70 0.084 0.036 2.344 404 0.02 
Debt Ratio G80 -10.960 2.291 -4.784 27 0 
      
Group Level       
Centrality G01 -0.253 5.686 -0.044 25 0.965 
Overall Density G02 -7.526 11.075 -0.68 25 0.503 
      
Cross Level       
Block Position X Overall Density G11 10.330 22.558 0.458 26 0.651 
Normalized Outdegree X Centrality G21 0.325 0.305 1.065 26 0.296 
Normalized Indegree X Centrality G31 1.397 0.287 4.863 26 0 
      
      
Random Effects SD Variance df Chi-square P-value 
Intercept u0 2.083 4.340 21 19.189 >.500 
Block Position Slope, u1 4.444 19.747 22 28.177 0.17 
Normalized Outdegree Slope, u2 0.070 0.005 22 28.435 0.162 
Normalized Indegree Slope, u3 0.244 0.060 22 23.967 0.349 
Family Tie Slope, u4 1.368 1.870 23 19.649 >.500 
Debt Ratio Slope, u8 9.515 90.535 23 105.414 0 
level-1,       r 12.427 154.433       
      
      
      









At the group level, the most noteworthy finding is that over time, group-level factors 
were not consistently influential on the corporate performance of affiliated firms. In a 
multi-level model, G01 is a regression coefficient relating group centrality to corporate 
performance. In 1997, it is estimated as -6.396 with a p-value less than 0.05. It means that, 
on average, the group centrality is negatively associated with the corporate performance 
of affiliated firms and it is statistically significant. However, since then, group centrality 
is not an influential factor to explain the corporate performance at the firm-level except in 
2001 (G01 = -10.744, p = 0.018) and negatively associated with the corporate 
performance although it is not statistically significant. In addition, overall density at the 
group-level, while mostly positively associated with ROA, is not an influential factor to 
explain the value of the corporate performance of affiliated firms.  
 The result of this analysis based on multi-level modeling has shown that the 
direct effect of group-level factors – centrality and density – on the value of the corporate 
performance of affiliated firms in each year was not influential. In other words, the inter-
firm network structure of a business group in Korea does not seem to directly influence 
the pecuniary-oriented corporate performance. Nonetheless, that the association between 
centrality and ROA was consistently negative during this research period even though it 
was not statistically significant seems to imply that an excessively centralized inter-firm 
relation would not be helpful in the long run for the efficient corporate practice of 






Another notable finding is that, at the firm-level, affiliated firms which have a direct 
connection with family members via equity shareholding ties tend to produce a higher 
level of corporate performance than those having no direct connection with family 
members. Even though the association between the existence of a direct connection of an 
affiliated firm with family members and corporate performance (ROA) has not always 
been statistically significant over time, this association remained consistently positive 
throughout this research period (1.735 (p = 0.011) in 1997, 2.145 (p = 0.035) in 2000, 
2.909 (p = 0.003) in 2001, 2.346 (p = 0.043) in 2002). Therefore, it can be inferred that 
when some affiliated firms are directly tied to family members via equity shareholding, 
these firms at least tend to bring about better corporate performance than other affiliates 
that do not have direct ties with family members. The direct engagement of family 
members in corporate ownership of and control over an affiliated firm at the group level 
could be an efficient corporate management method in that it could more easily handle an 
“agency problem” that is caused by the division between ownership and contorl in a 
corporation. As a result, it can be said that an affiliated firm’s direct connection with 
family members tends to positively influence the firm’s corporate performance in the 
case of Korean business groups. 
 However, it is also worthwhile to remember what Granovetter emphasizes: “The 
goal of families can conflict with profit maximization for the groups and firms they 
dominate. At times the clash is entirely financial, as when families shift resources around 




Such families are still maximizing profits” (Granovetter 2005: 442). Thus, balancing the 
interests between the maximizing corporate profit of affiliated firms at the firm-level by 
the direct engagement of family members and the overarching, family-based, corporate 
control over entire affiliated firms at the group-level would be another critical issue while 
accounting for how business groups maintain their group structure.       
Unlike the positive influence of family ties on the corporate performance of 
affiliated firms, the other variables that are expected to represent relational features at the 
firm level do not show a consistent pattern or strong association with corporate 
performance. The affiliated firm’s block position only shows a positively significant 
association with corporate performance in 2003 (G10 = 3.371, p = 0.021). Similarly, the 
firm’s normalized outdegree does not consistently show a positive or negative association 
with the value of corporate performance; it is not statistically significant during this 
research span either. The firm’s normalized indegree was not always statistically 
significant over time. However, unlike other relational features such as block position and 
normalized outdegree, the coefficient (G30) of a firm’s normalized indegree is always 
estimated as negative (e.g., -0.113 (p = 0.03) in 1997, -0.199 (p = 0.016) in 2000, -0.272 
(p = 0.003) in 2001). This means that when a firm’s indegree is relatively high, its 
corporate performance would be low.  
Another notable result at the firm-level is that debt ratio among the variables of 




statistically significant throughout the entire research period.64 It means that at least a 
high debt ratio at the individual firm level is not a positively contributing factor to the 
efficient corporate performance of affiliated firms.    
 
Cross-Level Factors 
Finally, it is noteworthy to report the result of cross-level interactions: cross-level 
interactions were included in this multi-level modeling in order to examine how much 
some relational features at the firm-level, which are expected to be associated with 
corporate performance, tend to be influenced by relational features at the group-level.  
In 1997, there are two significant cross-level interactions. First, a relatively higher 
level group density tends to reduce the effect of affiliated firms occupying a core or 
intermediary block position on corporate performance (G11 = -62.203, P = 0.013). This 
could be understood that under the umbrella a higher density level of a business group, 
affiliated firms that were posited in core or intermediary block positions did not bring 
about better corporate performance than other affiliated firms that were posited in 
peripheral positions. Second, a relatively less centralized network structure tends to 
strengthen the effect of high outdegree centrality of some affiliated firms on corporate 
performance (G21 = 0.420, p = 0.009). In other words, when a business group’s inter-
firm network structure takes a relatively less centralized form, some affiliated firms that 
sends many equity shareholding ties to other affiliates would have less pressure to 
effectively manage these inter-firm relations in terms of a “span of control.” Accordingly, 
                                                
64 The only exception is in the year 2000. An affiliated firm’s debt ratio is negatively associated 




such an intercorporate condition would provide those affiliated firms with a more 
favorable business condition to increase corporate profit. However, there have been no 
consistently meaningful effects of cross-level interactions since 1998 even though there 
was one meaningful cross-level interaction each year from 2001 to 2003.  
 
Discussion 
The research focus of this chapter revolved around the extent in which networks 
structures of Korean business groups contributed to the corporate performance of 
affiliated firms during this turbulent period after the financial crisis of 1997. Since a 
business group is not a mere sum of firms but a strategically coordinated inter-firm 
relation composed by affiliated people and affiliated firms, I assumed that relational 
features at the group level would influence the variations of corporate performance at the 
firm level. At the same time, considering the fact that a business group is an economic 
entity, the focus was on how the form itself as a business group would be an effective 
inter-organizational body enabled to enhance the corporate performance of group 
member firms. One major finding is that group structure is not necessarily so influential 
on each affiliated firm’s corporate performance over time because group-level factors did 
not show a consistent pattern of association with the corporate performance of affiliated 
firms over time. This result implies that the network structure of Korean business groups 
contributed to sustaining the family-based robust, effective corporate ownership and 
control at the group level rather than to enhancing the pecuniary-oriented corporate 




Unlike the minimal influence of inter-firm relation itself at the group level on an 
affiliated firm’s corporate performance, the most notable finding at the firm-level 
analysis was that, generally speaking, family ties have positively affected the corporate 
performance of affiliated firms. The direct affiliation of family members with affiliated 
firms via equity shareholding ties enhanced the corporate performance of the latter. This 
result in some sense indirectly reveals that the Korean business group is not a 
contingently evolved corporate body but a strategically constructed social-economic 
group. Group owners and family members who are engaged in the corporate ownership 
of and control over affiliated firms do not always have enough financial resources to 
solidify their overarching dominance over all affiliated firms. Therefore, in this situation, 
they strategically developed a direct relation with some affiliated firms and intensively 
engaged themselves in their corporate practice. The test result of the firm-level in multi-
level modeling reveals this tendency.   
In summary, the inter-corporate relation of each Korean business group that is 
analyzed in this research is not a directly influential factor to improve its member firms’ 
corporate performance. And yet, insofar as the direct connection of the group owner and 
his or her family members with affiliated firms was possible by maneuvering and 
constrained by the existing inter-corporate relation, the network structure of each 
business group seems to become at least a relational backdrop to help family members 











CHAPTER FIVE. CONCLUSION 
 
The research interest of this thesis was triggered by an ongoing issue in the field of 
organization theory and economic sociology about how organizations adapt to changing 
institutional environments and how they react to environmental uncertainty for their 
survival and achievement of their goals. Regarding the Korean financial crisis of 1997 
and the aftermath of this historic event as an institutional backdrop for this study, the 
focus of this thesis is on which organizing and controlling mechanisms within network 
structures of Korean business groups worked for the family-based corporate ownership 
and control under these environmental pressures. In addition, the issue of whether these 
organizing and controlling mechanisms have changed over time was also addressed. 
Finally, I tackled an issue concerning to what extent these network structures of Korean 
business groups contributed to the affiliated firms’ corporate performance during this 
turbulent period.  
In chapter two, by incorporating the insights of economic sociology with a social 
network framework, I emphasized that pecuniary as well non-pecuniary interests of social 




organizations. The network structures of a business group could be a double-edged sword 
for the group founder and his or her family members in that this structure could not only 
be an opportunity structure but also a structural constraint for family-based corporate 
control. Emphasizing the social network approach as an appropriate theoretical and 
methodological framework to analyze the inter-corporate relations of each business group, 
I pointed out that these inter-corporate relations were configured and reconfigured for the 
stable maintenance of family-based corporate ownership and for their robust control over 
affiliated firms during this research period. At the same time, while underscoring that 
power is a social relation, I argue that different configurations of chaebols’ network 
structures are closely related to the sustenance of family-based corporate control within a 
business group. With regard to institutional conditions during the research period, I 
emphasized that the exogenously imposed reform efforts for corporate restructuring after 
the financial crisis of 1997 could be a challenging and even fragile undertaking when 
they did not resonate with the interests of two major endogenous agents, i.e., the Korean 
government and chaebols. In short, the corporate control patterns of business groups are 
closely intertwined with groups’ network structures. By effectively utilizing and 
strategically (re)organizing the network structures of inter-firm ownership ties so as to 
buffer business groups from environmental pressure, the group owners and family 
members tried to maintain their overarching ownership and controlling power over 
affiliated firms. 
The pattern of intra-group shareholding by each of the twenty-eight major 




research in that they showed how family-based ownership was strategically organized 
and how to reorganize corporate control over all affiliated firms in a business group. 
Therefore, while examining the shareholding relations of each chaebol, I studied not only 
the patterns of shareholding of the chaebol owner and owner’s family, but also those of 
all affiliated firms that were identified as the member firms of each business group. 
 
In chapter three, I examined the inter-organizational network structures of the top 
twenty-eight business groups in Korea while regarding the Korean financial crisis of 
1997 and the aftermath of this crisis as a natural experiment. The overall analyses about 
the relation between network structure and corporate control of Korean business groups 
could be synthesized by three major findings.  
First, Korean business groups did not drastically transform or even deconstruct 
their overall network structures as a result of the tau test statistic based on a triad census. 
The majority of Korean business groups tended to take “a single hierarchy of clique 
levels” over time, which is represented as the “ranked clusters model.” This means that, 
despite unprecedented environmental pressure after the financial crisis of 1997, most 
chaebols maintained a centralized, hierarchical form of the group structure. This result, 
however, needs to be understood with caution because the ranked clusters model provides 
us with the overall network structure of each business group at the macro level.  
The analyses of blockmodeling and a simple matching method have shown more 
concrete but simplified network configurations of each business group at the micro inter-




time although these variations were under the umbrella of a centralized, hierarchical form. 
In other words, the network structure of Korean business groups does not lean so much 
toward a monolithically fixed type. Rather, the analysis in synchronic comparison has 
shown that there are noticeable variations of the forms of inter-firm network structures in 
each year. In addition, diachronic analysis shows that overall structural forms of Korean 
business groups shifted to less centralized and hierarchical forms while keeping transitive 
patterns stable.  
Second, I analyzed how the group owners and family members were connected 
with affiliated firms for their overarching corporate control over business groups. Two 
relational features in the network structure of each chaebol were considered: eight 
possible combinatorial types of joint shareholding ties and a firm’s positions within an 
inter-firm network. By identifying the specific types of combinatorial shareholding ties 
that tended to be more frequently used to connect affiliated persons with affiliated firms 
occupying specific block positions, I determined how the group owners have been 
strategically contriving the inter-corporate network structure of a business group for the 
purpose of family-based corporate control. Here, a notable pattern was that the family 
members’ attempts to control affiliates by relying on family members themselves has 
become less of a widely used pattern and a less popular corporate controlling strategy 
than was employed during the research period of 1997-2003. This changing trend is 
partly due to increasing environmental pressures after the financial crisis of 1997. In 
addition,  this trend could be understood as a corporate reaction to changing group size in 




Third, although the family members’ attempt to control affiliated firms by relying 
solely on family members became a less popular corporate controlling strategy as time 
went on, this pattern should not be understood as family members losing interest for 
corporate control over affiliated firms. An examination of the various types of inter-
connections between affiliated people and affiliated firms within each business group 
shows that family members actively mobilized executives and non-profit organization(s) 
as their allies for robust corporate control during this research period. In particular, when 
the group size was large enough and when more affiliated firms were not directly related 
with affiliated persons, the group owner and family members strategically mobilized 
trustworthy affiliated persons, intertwined them as vicarious agents on behalf of the 
interest of family members, and selectively sent this combinational tie to a few major 
firms occupying core positions within a business group. In other words, affiliated firms 
receiving shareholding ties from all three affiliated agencies were mainly posited in core 
or intermediary blocks rather than peripheral blocks. In contrast to type [FEN], the 
direction of type [FE] and type [F] were in some sense omnidirectional because these two 
types were directed to affiliated firms which were located in core, intermediary, or even 
peripheral blocks. 
Finally, family-based corporate control over chaebols is a strategic contrivance. 
This control is exercised by aligning different types of combinatorial equity ties and by 
selectively sending these different types of ties to specific firms occupying different 
positions in the inter-firm network structure. Despite unprecedented environmental 




organizing and reorganizing their inter-firm network structure as well as by strategically 
maneuvering the ownership ties of affiliated persons. 
 
I suggest that Bourdieu’s “condescension strategy” is relevant to account for the 
changing trend of corporate control patterns. The chaebol owners modified their 
controlling strategy by having more recourse to indirect control than to direct control 
alone. However, the group owners’ intentions seemed to neither merely follow 
governmental regulations nor simply give up their overall corporate ownership and 
controlling power. Rather, their intention was to gently but persistently preserve their 
controlling power over affiliated firms. For the chaebol owners and family members, the 
condescension strategy was a proactive and reactive strategy in response to 
environmental pressure. 
 
In chapter four, the major focus was on to what extent the overall group structure 
of each chaebol would influence the variations of group member firms’ corporate 
performance at the firm level. Two noteworthy findings emerged from the analyses of 
multi-level modeling. First, at the group level, the most noteworthy finding is that over 
time, group-level factors were not consistently influential on the corporate performance 
of affiliated firms. When I analyzed the association between intercorporate network 
structure at the group level and the variations of corporate performance of affiliated firms 
at the firm level, I found that group-level factors were not consistently influential on the 




 Second, however, when affiliated firms are directly connected with family 
members via equity shareholding, these firms tend to show a higher level of corporate 
performance than that of other affiliated firms with no direct ties to family members. 
Therefore, at least some affiliated firms of which shares are directly owned by family 
members tended to bring about more effective corporate performance. Finally, this result 
indirectly means that network structures of Korean business groups tend to be shaped, 
maintained, and reorganized for family-based, effective, overarching corporate control at 
the business group level rather than for efficient corporate performance of affiliated firms 
at the firm level. Nevertheless, insofar as the direct connection of a group owner and his 
or her family members with affiliated firms has been grounded on a group’s overall 
network structure, I argue that the network structure of each business group needs to be 
considered at least a relational backdrop to help family members gain corporate profit 
through their strategically constructed direct ties with some affiliated firms.         
 
By retrieving the patterned relations of economic transactions – equity 
shareholding in this thesis – within each business group in Korea under unprecedented 
environmental uncertainty, I intended to clarify identifiable controlling patterns that 
served the interests of family members.  
In fact, there is an undeniable reality; it is hard to imagine the existence of 
chaebol without its founder and his or her family members who are engaged in group 
control and ownership. In this thesis, I tried to examine what was going on below the 




“noticed but unseen”65 network structures of Korean business groups and analyze them: I 
investigated how they were organized and reorganized for the (pecuniary and non-
pecuniary but still economically related) interests of the group owner and family 
members; then how patterned relational structures of business groups were associated 
with the corporate performance of affiliated firms that shared group membership and 
were connected with other affiliates and affiliated people. 
     
This thesis is indebted to relational paradigm in the field of sociology and 
organization theory (e.g., Bearman 1993; Granovetter 1985; 2005; Stark 1996; 2001; 
White 1981): A business group is not a mere sum of firms but a strategically coordinated 
inter-corporate group. Power is a relation since it is implemented by networks and could 
be powerful under specific relational backdrops that the power holder is embedded in. 
The controlling power of business group owners is not just based on financial resources. 
Rather, their controlling power is grounded on how they ooccupy specific corporate 
positions and how they skillfully organize and reorganize inter-corporate relations along 
with effectively utilizing the available financial resources. With regard to the pecuniary 
interest of family members, their direct tie to affiliated firms is an influential factor in 
guaranteeing corporate gain that results from these firms’ corporate performance. To 
conclude, for the purpose of overall corporate control at the group level, condescension 
strategy is an effective corporate practice; but for the purpose of pecuniary gain, having 
direct ties with affiliated firms is a more effective way for family members. 
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